Swami Aseemanand’s Confessions: Its time for an apology
Manisha Sethi
Swami Aseemanand’s confession before the metropolitan magistrate of
Tees Hazari Court has finally put the seal of legal validity over what
had been circulating for months now, since the surfacing of the audio
tapes seized from Dayanand Pande’s laptop. That Hindutva groups had
been plotting and executing a series of bomb blasts across the
country—including Malegaon (2006 and 08), Samjhauta Express (2007),
Ajmer Sharif (2007) and Mecca Masjid (2007).
For the past several years however, dozens of Muslim youth have been
picked up, detained, tortured, chargesheeted for these blasts—with
clearly no evidence, except for custodial confessions (which unlike
Swami’s confessions have no legal value). Report after report has
proved that the Maharashtra and Andhra police willfully refused to
pursue the Hindutva angle preferring to engage in communal
witch-hunt—or as in the case of Nanded blast—where the evidence was so
glaring as to be unimpeachable—weakening the prosecution of these
elements.
What is striking today is not the revelation contained in Aseemanand’s
confessions but that it should have taken the country’s premier and
pampered security agencies this long—four years after the Malegaon
serial blasts, and even longer since the explosions elsewhere in
Maharashtra—to unravel the Hindutva terror networks. Especially so,
when Maharshtra ATS chief Hemant Karkare had, as far back as 2008,
communicated to the Hyderabad Police the sensational claim by Col.
Purohit that he had procured RDX from an army inventory when he was
posted in Jammu and Kashmir in 2006. While the Hyderabad Police having
conveniently arrested over 70 Muslim youth, tortured them at private
farmhouses and extracted confessions, refused even to seek Puroshit’s
custody; the Haryana ATS investigating the Samjhauta Express blast
questioned Dayanand Pande but then pleaded that the trail had turned
cold, thus washing its hands off. The use of RDX in the Samjhauta
blast was touted as proof enough of Pakistani involvement in the
Samjhauta blast; the crucial piece of evidence, the suitcase carrying
the bomb was traced to Kothari Market in Indore, but the Haryana ATS,
possibly under pressure or simply incredulous about the possibility of
Hindutva terror appeared paralyzed.
Amnesia about Narco-Analysis?
What is one to make of the reports of the Narco-analysis tests
conducted on SIMI activists, including Safdar Nagori his brother
Kamruddin Nagori and Amil Parvez in April 2008, which claimed
expediently that SIMI activists “had helped carry out the Mumbai train
bombings of July 11, 2006 and the Samjhauta Express blasts of January
2007...with the help of Pakistani nationals who had come from across
the border.” India Today magazine had proudly claimed in an
‘exclusive’ that the Narco-tests revealed “SIMI’s direct links with
not only the Mumbai train bombings which killed over 200 persons but
also links with the Samjhauta Express blast of February 2007 which
killed 68 persons.” The reports of the Narco test on Nagori claimed
that he had revealed that “some persons from Pakistan” had purchased
the suitcase cover at Kataria market, Indore, while a SIMI activist
“helped them to get the suitcase cover stitched”. Nagori is said to
have named Abdul Razak and Misbah-ul-Islam of Kolkata as key people
who provided crucial support to SIMI’s Indore unit in executing the
Samjhauta train blast.
As for the Malegaon blasts, Nagori is said to have ‘admitted’ during
the Narco test that some Muslim members were involved and he was aware
of it; and he attributed the Hyderabad blast to one Nasir—who
according to Nagori disliked the owner of the Gokul Chat stall—who was
arrested a few months’ prior to Nagori’s arrest.
Other important information revealed in the exclusive story is the
Nagori claim that “most of the SIMI activists knew about other bomb
conspiracies across the country” and the presence of sleeper cells in
Hubli. (Sandeep Unnithan, India Today, 19 September 2008)
So why did Nagori decide—even if in a drugged state—to take credit for
the blasts that have now been proven to be the handiwork of Sangh
offshoots? To boost SIMI’s sagging image? Or maybe to score brownie
points over rival factions within SIMI?
Or perhaps, as several scientists, jurists and civil rights activists
have been pointing out, Narco-analysis not only robs the suspect’s
rights and dignity—amounting to third degree—but is also highly
unscientific, dubious and undependable as evidence in investigations.
It is entirely possible for the investigator to induce, communicate
his/ her ideas and thoughts to the suspect, thereby eliciting a
response favoured by the investigator and the police theory—whatever
it happens to be at the moment.
Media or Hand Maiden of the Police?
What India Today was trying to disguise as a scoop was the result not
of any painstaking investigation, but the patronage of security
agencies. This is sadly becoming too routine in supposedly
investigative stories about blasts and terror strikes: security
agencies pass on dossiers and reports such as the Narco tests to
favoured journalists, who dutifully reproduce the police version. The
public naming of individuals and groups as suspects—with little
credible evidence—is usually a prelude to detentions, arrests and
torture of ‘suspects’. No doubt, claims that SIMI members in
Maharashtra were in the know of the bomb conspiracy then afford
greater freedom to the police to launch manhunts for former SIMI
members (even when the organization was still not banned) as
co-conspirators. Mass arrests following Mecca Masjid blasts were
accompanied by stories which implicated local youth from
Muslim-dominated localities such as Moosaram Bagh (“Behind the Mecca
Masjid Bombing: Communal Violence, Organised Crime and Global Jihad
Intersect in Andhra Pradesh’s Capital” by Praveen Swami, Frontline,
May 23, 2007). Such stories lent a veneer of legitimacy to the
subversion of due processes of law—where the hype surrounding the
threats of Islamic terrorism justifies the shortcut methods of
investigation—namely illegal detentions, torture, custodial
confessions, narco-tests and the like.
On October 11, 2007 the Union Home Ministry claimed that the Ajmer
Sharif blast was the handiwork of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which was
opposed to Sufi Islam, whose prime symbol was the Ajmer Sharif dargah.
And the very next day, Praveen Swami served up “The War against
Popular Islam” (The Hindu, October 12, 2007), wherein he claimed that
the bombing of the Ajmer dargah—as well as blasts at Mecca Masjid and
Sufi shrine in Malegaon—reflect a “less-understood project: the war of
Islamist neoconservatives against the syncretic traditions and beliefs
that characterise popular Islam in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.” It
turns out now that Swami’s profound understanding has been turned on
its head: it was not rabid Islam’s war against popular Islam but
Hindutva’s revenge on the inherent syncreticism of India. Aseemanand
is said to have told the magistrate: “Since Hindus throng the Ajmer
Sharif Dargah we thought a bomb blast in Ajmer would deter Hindus from
going there.” (in Tehelka, 15 January, 2011). Again screaming
headlines about HUJI link created an atmosphere in which the Rajasthan
SIT could detain a dozen Imams, maulvis and madrasa teachers, without
producing the suspects in court, plucking them from their native
places and bringing them to Ajmer for interrogation without even
bothering to obtain transit remands.
More recently, the Varanasi blast occasioned yet another rash of
stories based on ‘sources’ in the Indian intelligence agencies about
Indian Mujahideen men on the run, in hideouts abroad, but whose
associates still live in places as predictable as Azamgarh and
Bhatkal. (For a fairly standard story see, “Indian Mujahudeen: The
Hunt Continues” by Vicky Nanjapa.
http://vickynanjapa.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/indian-mujahideen-the-hunt-continues/)
Gear up for more arrests, shall we?
An apology? And some compensation?
Though the Mecca Masjid blast case was transferred to the CBI, the
Hyderabad Police registered three cases related to conspiracies in
order to retain control over the investigations and indeed to push for
its line of investigation based on forced confessions extracted under
torture. This is clear demonstration of the high stakes Special
Investigation Teams (SITs) and Special Cells attach to cases such as
bomb blasts and terror attacks: terror investigations are lucrative
means of earning quick medals, promotions and awards—as long as
scapegoats (read Muslim youth) can be produced and paraded as
masterminds, conspirators and accomplices.
The Home Ministry must release a White Paper on the total number of
those arrested and in jail currently for the blasts now in every
single the blasts named by Swami Aseemanand as the handiwork of his
organization and associates. Those still languishing in prisons must
be released without any further delay.
Those whose lives have been destroyed, those psychologically scarred
and socially stigmatized by these false charges and imprisonment
deserve surely a public apology, from the state governments as well as
the Home Ministry. The former Home Minister Shivraj Patil had
expressed his satisfaction at the direction of the Ajmer bomb probe—at
the time when maulavis and madrasa teachers were being picked up—and
in 2009, P. Chidambaram had pleaded that the investigations in the
Mecca Masjid blast case had reached a dead end with the death of the
mastermind of the blast, Shahid Bilal (the same Bilal whose house
appeared prominently in Praveen Swami’s article). More recently, when
a Hindutva angle was suggested by the Maharashtra ATS in the Pune
Bakery blast, The Maharashtra Home Minister, RR Patil threatened
action against the ATS Chief.
Even the exceedingly low levels of political propriety in our country
can be no excuse for not tendering an apology to the victims of the
witch-hunt. The Andhra Chief Minister has announced grandly on the
floor of the state assembly that he would tender an apology if it was
proved that Muslim youth had been deliberately harassed by the police
in the aftermath of the Mecca Masjid blasts. The AP Chief Minister
would do well to read the reports of the National Minorities
Commission and the AP Minorities Commission, both of which laid bare
the gratuitous violence committed by the Hyderabad police on suspects.
The CM appears to be waiting for the report of the Justice Bhaskara
Rao Commission before offering an apology (newspaper reports on 17 Dec
2010). Except that he forgot that the Commission was appointed to look
into the police firing after the Mecca Masjid blasts and not into
accusations of torture and illegal detention—and the Commission
already submitted its report to the CM three months ago, in October
2010!
While we need to be vigilant that the investigations are now not
derailed by prejudice of security agencies and state governments; the
issue of compensation to those unjustifiably arrested and tortured
needs to be addressed urgently. Dr. Haneef’s case in Australia—where
the Australian government apologised and paid undisclosed large sums
of money as compensation for wrongful terror accusations and
detention—should serve as a model for us here. The Andhra Pradesh
Government’s offer of rehabilitation package of Rs 30,000 –Rs 80,000
as loans (!) to those who suffered arrests and torture can only add
insult to the already inflicted injury (“Andhra’s ‘Healing Touch’ to
‘innocent’ Muslims”, Indian Express, 14 Nov 2008). Just for the sake
of record, even these loans have not materialsed. On the other hand,
the state government is contesting the damages of Rs 20 lakhs each
being claimed by the victims in the Hyderabad City Civil Court.
Finally, all those who colluded and covered up these sham
investigations need to be brought to justice: those in the
intelligence agencies, officers of the police and security agencies,
political bosses et al. The Hyderabad Joint Commissioner of Police
(Administration) Harish Gupta—who presided over the Mecca Masjid
custodial confessions, torture and narco-analysis tests—must be held
accountable. As must be each and every police officer who participated
in this charade of investigation; in this large scale violation of the
rights of the accused by subjecting them to brutal torture, and in
doing so, undermined their own office. Police officers must be charged
and tried for their criminal acts of violence against the youth—whom
they knew to be innocent—as well as gross dereliction of duties for
deliberately building their investigations on falsehoods in so serious
a crime as bomb blasts.
We shouldn’t have had to wait for a change of Swami Aseemanand’s heart
to reach this far.
Sd/-
Manisha Sethi, Sanghamitra Misra, Ahmed Sohaib, Adil Mehdi, Tanweer
fazal, Ghazi Shahnawaz, Arshad Alam, Farah Farooqi, Azra Razak,
Ambarien Al Qadar, Anwar Alam, Shakeb Ahmed, Haris ul Haq for JTSA.
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Sunday, January 09, 2011
Thursday, June 24, 2010
The Print Media and Minority Images by Chandan Mitra
It is a general view among Muslims in India that the English-Language media does not project a true and positive picture of the community. They also believe that there is a bias in the international media against the Muslims in general. This, of course, is an over-simplified analysis of an otherwise complicated situation- portraying the image of Muslims as the largest religious minority in India, as well as that of a stereotyped monolithic community living in a Hindu-majority country. The reality is that the variation of the image of Indian Muslims projected by the Indian media varies vastly but the expectations are unfair in the given circumstances. My point of reference is the English language media–for the simple reason that, being an insider, I am closely aware of the reality and more of limitations.
Though I do not fully agree with the perception of Indian Muslims as far as their media image is concerned but I will not directly contest their perception, I would rather go into detail of the features of this psyche along with the problems of the media. For only this reason, I shall also speak from the stand-point of the Urdu press in India as it is only the Urdu press run by Muslims that has done more damage to the Muslim image in India than any other language media. In this analysis, I shall not include such Urdu newspapers as Pratap, Milap, and Hind Samachar as neither are they run by Muslim establishments, nor are their readership Muslim. Their professional concerns and editorial orientations are altogether different. The Urdu media, especially in north India -and more specifically Delhi -is negative and least interested in propagating and encouraging positive Muslim images in a plural society such as India . There is a perception among scholars—even Muslim readers—that Urdu newspapers are not interested in playing any role to make the Muslims a part of the social changes and modernization that is rapidly taking place in India . Ather Farouqui, sums this up aptly:
…the prospects remain that Urdu journalism will continue the traditional game of arousing Muslim sentiments through provocative writing, and render them susceptible to the influence of the communal leadership with which a good many Urdu journalists are themselves aligned due to their own ambitions for political prominence and professional clout…
It is also true that, other than Delhi, the English media and the media of regional languages (other than Hindi print media of north India as in north India it is a different story altogether with a much complicated political sociology) in respective regions see Muslims as part of regional culture and local politics. Except from north Indian Muslims, the Muslims of the entire country whose mother-tongue is other than Urdu or Hindi have fully assimilated themselves with the regional cultural ethos to the extent that they cannot be counted as one entity with the Muslims of northern India . Farouqui further says:
Without doubt the Muslims of South India and West Bengal never recognized Urdu as their language and a symbol of their religious identity. In the changed political milieu too even if Urdu was never their language and in the past they were greatly distanced from the Muslims of North India. Culturally north Indian Muslims always considered themselves different from Muslims in the rest of the country. They are also the victims of the pronounced sense of superiority. Cultural distance and the strong sense of superiority on the part of north Indian Muslims become a great hurdle in linking them with the South Indian Muslims. This factor also prevented the movement for Pakistan from reaching South India except for a few big cities such as Hyderabad . Migration to Pakistan from the South was limited precisely because of the hold of north Indian Muslims over the Muslim League particularly by the Ashraf (gentry). Linguistic and cultural conflicts have arisen there even after the formation of Pakistan thus, the subsequent establishment of Bangladesh and the remarkable rise of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The strife in the refugee-dominated urban areas of Sindh province is an ample proof of this. Muslim politics in contemporary India are not particularly different from what they were in the past. The hold of north Indian Muslims on Muslim political campaigns even after independence has been strong. This prompted the presumption that the north Indian Muslim leadership would also be successful in the South. However the humiliating defeat of Syed Shahabuddin, a self-designated vocal spokesman of South Indian Muslims, in Bangalore during the 1989 general elections made the north Indian Muslims leadership acutely aware of its real standing in the South.
In northern India , not only the Muslims, but also the Hindus, are a unique socio-political phenomenon. Broadly speaking, north India is itself such a strange political phenomenon that understanding its psychology has never been easy, even for sociologists. The Hindu-Muslim context of north India is different from that of the rest of India . The imbroglio called Hindi versus Urdu is therefore not only the politics of language, but also has the gamut of political complexities at its forefront. The Urdu-Hindi controversy of the nineteenth century was the reflection of this politico cultural conundrum. Even today, the situation has not changed much. Howsoever complicated the reality may be because of its variations, in the eyes of the world, the images that are projected by the English media of India especially Delhi , are the images of India , irrespective of being Muslim or Hindu.
As far as Muslims are concerned, Muslim intellectuals in Delhi are deemed the sole representatives of the entire Muslim community for the simple reason that their being in Delhi gives the media easy access to them. To what extent are the Muslim intellectuals working in the universities and the retired bureaucrats active within the media circle genuinely concerned about the sociology of India Muslims, is a known fact? Very clearly, the members of the English speaking Muslim elite in Delhi have neither have an understanding of the problems of common Muslims, nor do they have any interest in the matter. This is perhaps the reason why the common educated Muslim is not only unfamiliar with these so-called intellectuals but, if they know of them, they even hate them.
To an extent, the Urdu newspapers of Delhi , working as a single entity, could be said to have an understanding of the north India Muslims’ psyche, but they have only played a negative role in their lives. As far as the electronic media is concerned, some Urdu TV channels use the spoken language and focus on the Muslim middle-class that is still almost negligible in proportion to the entire Muslim population. But these channels too give the way to misunderstanding about Muslims. As such, viewers of Urdu TV channels are mostly those who do not know English, it seems that there is no respite for common Muslims.
Despite being a single entity, the speed with which Urdu newspapers form north India, especially weekly newspapers of Delhi, are heading towards decay is rather on expected and anticipated lines. I shall not talk here about official circulation figures of Urdu newspapers that merely serve the purpose of the government to show that Urdu is flourishing. In the government files, of course, Urdu journalism is making steady progress simply because the government officials are assigned the role of issuing misleading statements highlighting the progress made in case of the promotion of Urdu, particularly by a certain central government organization namely National Council for Promotion of Urdu Language.
The question of the progress of Urdu journalism is concerned with the system of Urdu education in common schools with secular curricula. The issue of script has now arisen in the context of the dini madaris. If the children whose mother-tongue is Urdu get an opportunity to study Urdu within their school curricula, the entire sociology of the dini madaris will undergo a sea-change; it would mark their decisive decline. Until there is no arrangement for teaching Urdu in the secular curriculum, the population wanting to learn Urdu would remain confined to the dini madaris and the Urdu newspapers even though unwillingly, would print only what the madrasa-educated people would like to read. We all know what the madrasa-educated people want to read and we are also aware of how a person educated in religious institution views a pluralistic society, or how the religious person himself is viewed by the pluralistic society.
Unfortunately, after Partition, Urdu has not been included by the Congress leadership in the secular curriculum, especially in the north India states. Consequently, the madrasas kept growing. With the passage of time, they replaced school education among Muslims and established a parallel system dangerous to the nation but more for Muslims themselves. One reason for the survival and growth of the madrasas is the economic backwardness of the common Muslims. But when Muslim children did not go to school, both economic and social transformation stopped among Muslims. Without doubt, the increase in the number of madrasas is also an example of the failure of our national educational policy and constitutional obligation to treat Muslims at par in education too. Obviously, an economically backward section of society, such as the Muslims, cannot develop an educational system parallel to the state-sponsored educational apparatus. Sooner or later, society will have to provide Muslims with secular education at par with other religious groups, mainly Hindus, so that they are made part of mainstream education and occupy a common civic space. It is for us to think how to stop the growth and spread of the dini madaris, whose network comprises half-a-million madrasas with 50 million full–time students. (These are authentic and undisputed figures known to all, issued by the government, and which were not challenged.) We should also not forget that because of being religious educational institutions, madrasas are much more organized and influential than the secular-curriculum schools run by the government.
The English media in India is an elite media, an offshoot of the baggage of history. As a large majority of Muslims in India are economically deprived and do not live in big cities, there is a tendency in the English language media to ignore issues that concern Muslims. The English media, however, plays an important role in shaping perceptions in the minds of India as a whole. Although read by 2 or 3% (and really understood by hardly 1%) of the Indian population, the images that the English media builds and creates are reflected decisively in the international scene as well as within India . These images enhance a political balance. The English media provides the pan Indian picture for the regional language media unaware of north Indian languages, such as Hindi (which is already considered as biased as the Urdu media is overzealous in its presentation of Muslim issues). The English-language media is said to provide a common ground between these conflicting positions and is, in a certain sense, a moderator or a melting pot among the various sections of India . There are also allegations from Muslims against the English media that are true but the whole English media does not behave so irresponsibly.
It is true that the English media often picks up wrong Muslim voices that do not represent the community; this is counter productive. For example we have Shabana Azmi who always gets space because of being associated with Bollywood. She is easily accessible and knows the English idiom of discourse. But she does not represent anybody but herself, and due to the glamour element attached, her views get highlighted much more than those of various other more representative people. It is the responsibility of the media to search for the right voice and the media has certainly been lazy in that matter.
Certain stereotypes in the media also condition issues. For instance, there is a widespread misconception in the media about the role of the Dar-ul Uloom Deoband. The general feeling is that it is a place where one can get the ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ very easily. Certainly this perception is wrong but the Muslims did nothing to remove this misconception. They just blame the media but cannot request the ulema not to issue fatwas that makes a mockery of the entire community. After 11 September 2001, there has been a lot of coverage of Deoband and its activities, on assumed lines based moe on imagination than field work and visits to the prestigious Islamic university. To the great disappointment of correspondents from the electronic media who occasionally happen to visit Deoband, they found that Deoband was not what they had actually visualized.
But all said and done, one is at a loss to realize that if, half a million madrasas exist in India , where 50 million full time students are enrolled, it is naturally a matter of great concern. These 50 million students do not include the part-time student who attends the madrasas. There are lots of Muslim students who go to regular schools and attend the madrasas part-time to study the Koran and Islamic tenets. So instead of blaming Deoband we should suggest something that can enable the Muslim educational empowerment. I would not comment on the practical joke of the government which, in the name of the madrasa modernization scheme, proposed to spend Rs. 20 crore. A break-up of this money would show that on an average it comes to Rs.0.40 per student. One can easily understand the Congress’s logic or the whole logic of the modernization of madrasas scheme initiated by Rajiv Gandhi.
There are two strands in the media, particularly in the English media. One is patronizing, the other antagonistic. The patronizing strand recognizes that a wrong has been done to the Muslims, and one has to go out of the way to support them and advise them what they should and should not do. This strand is growing among a section of the Hindu intelligentsia and the media. There is another well-known antagonistic strand mainly propounded by Vinod Mehta that Muslims are a prisoner of these images. This strand does not reach out for any kind of dialogue or understanding and has certain stereotyped images of which everybody has become a prisoner.
Siddharth Varadrajan, a senior editor with The Hindu, was scathing in his criticism of the media for long. I do not think that there is a conscious communal basis, at least in the English media but I agree with the view that most of the people working with the English media, including Muslims do not know Muslim society at large. They know only the elite Muslims and at the most, the upper middle class Muslim strata. The bias, if any, is a product of ignorance. It is time for common Muslims to not get into the paranoid feeling that the media has been consciously seeking to victimize or portray them as villains in the Indian society. There are people with a communal viewpoint, who would not in acceptable parlance be called secular. Though they do have space in the English media, they belong to various communities (including Muslims). By and large, the media has tended to be responsible even in cases related to reporting on riots. The English-language media has persisted in trying to bring the guilty to book on a number of issues, —whether it was during the 1984 anti-Sikh massacre, in Maliana or Hashimpura or Meerut or Bhagalpur, or in 2002 Gujarat carnage. The reporting of the English press of these incidents shocked the entire nation. English press pursued these incidents relentlessly, and reporters have gone back to the spot on every anniversary of these riots to bring home the point that the guilty persons are running scot-free, and that the state has not taken any action to bring them to book. Siddharth Varadarajan is correct that there were lapses during the initial reporting because of newspaper reliance on the police version (which is often communally biased), the high financial cost of newsgathering, reliance on unprofessional stringers and the bias of the news desk. But, the media does thereafter take up in systematic manner cases of human rights violation, police atrocities, and the tardy process of inquiries.
I do not agree with the view that the media is insensitive to the issues of the Muslims. It has, in fact, been responsible and responsive – its extent is another issue. Instead of tarring the entire media with the same brush, one needs to differentiate and expand the space where there is a greater concern and sensitivity, rather than saying that the whole media is the same. The Muslim intelligentsia should not shut themselves out from the English media; rather, they have to enhance their space within it.
The painting of the images is not only in terms of terrorism or madrasas. There are other issues with wider social ramification that we must consider. Take the issue of the triple talaq in one sitting, for instance, on which reams have been written in the English media in the last ten or twelve years, ever since the Shah Bano issue. I am not saying that these should not be discussed, but the disproportionate amount of space and time that goes into the over-simplified analysis intensifies stereotypes. Most of the nonsense becomes possible because of publicity hungry ulema. We have to look beyond, rather than just point to improper riot reporting or inherent biases. We have to highlight issues that will bring about fundamental changes – issues of the Muslims’ socio-economic growth, progress and the educational empowerment and achievements. The reality is that issues that are not really germane to the genuine problems of the Muslim community get undue attention from the media as well as from Muslim writers, There are other issues that are of greater relevance. For example, how many Muslim students go to primary schools? What is the drop out ratio of Muslim students after secondary and senior secondary examinations? How many Muslims have been inducted into the police force at the level of sepoy and sub-Inspectors? How many are there in the administrative services examinations conducted by the subordinate staff selection commissions in the states? If the proportion of Muslims is low, why is it so? These are real issues that the Muslim themselves do not get to read or reflect upon, debate, or discuss.
If we discuss Muslim education, we discuss it only through the English medium which is just utopian. If we can discuss Muslim proportion in government services, we just talk of civil services, an impossible thing for first generation learners whether Hindus or Muslims. Needless to say that, this entire elite phenomenon will not work to improve the socio economic conditions of common Muslims in India . In the world of entertainment, there is a great deal of Muslim participation but again it is an elite phenomenon. I think that is where we are all collectively guilty: these issues do not get discussed.
Is there a bias that is causing the decline in Muslim representation in the government services? Why, for instance, has the Muslim middle-class, which was such a critical factor in the pre-Partition years, declined and dwindled in comparison to the Hindu middle class? Arguably, it is true that a very large section of the Muslim middle-class did migrate to Pakistan between 1947 and 1950, but why did it not grow? We never discussed the complexity of the issue that the Muslim middle-class voice is not really the voice of the entire Muslim community
The new Muslim middle class is also the new-born psychological version of the aristocratic Muslim elite of pre-partition India . In the Hindu community, the Hindu middle-class got education in state run schools where regional language and not English was the medium. Now the Hindu middle class dictates and determines the socio political agenda and sets the tone for dialogue and discourse at the international level too. These issues, I emphasize again, needs to be reflected in the media, debated, and discussed again and again. The media is the only forum for interaction and greater participation, both for intra-community dialogue within the Muslim community and inter-community dialogue between all communities that together can lead to a better, prosperous and cohesive India . The media has to correct itself, but we also have to look beyond as the myopic vision that we have at present will not solve the problem. The two communities have lived together for hundreds of years, and they will continue to live together. Biases have to be corrected – unfortunately, they have intensified. What do we do about that? I think that is what we have to focus on, and I hope that there will be more writers, more commentators, and more Muslims joining and contributing to the media. The media is today getting increasingly effective and powerful, and greater Muslim participation is needed in it.
Biases do exist every where. But just as there are biases, there are also people who go out of the way to try and correct them. These are both part of the fractured Indian reality that we should recognize, and try to widen the space, widen Muslim participation in the media, and have more people talking about real Muslim issues, going beyond those issues that unfortunately help intensify stereotypes.
Chandan Mitra is the Editor in chief of the widely circulated English daily 'The Pioneer' and he is also a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha).He can be contacted at chandanmitra@hotmail.com.
(This article was included in the book edited by Ather Farouqui titled "Muslims and the Media Images:News versus Views" published by the Oxford University Press , India .)
Though I do not fully agree with the perception of Indian Muslims as far as their media image is concerned but I will not directly contest their perception, I would rather go into detail of the features of this psyche along with the problems of the media. For only this reason, I shall also speak from the stand-point of the Urdu press in India as it is only the Urdu press run by Muslims that has done more damage to the Muslim image in India than any other language media. In this analysis, I shall not include such Urdu newspapers as Pratap, Milap, and Hind Samachar as neither are they run by Muslim establishments, nor are their readership Muslim. Their professional concerns and editorial orientations are altogether different. The Urdu media, especially in north India -and more specifically Delhi -is negative and least interested in propagating and encouraging positive Muslim images in a plural society such as India . There is a perception among scholars—even Muslim readers—that Urdu newspapers are not interested in playing any role to make the Muslims a part of the social changes and modernization that is rapidly taking place in India . Ather Farouqui, sums this up aptly:
…the prospects remain that Urdu journalism will continue the traditional game of arousing Muslim sentiments through provocative writing, and render them susceptible to the influence of the communal leadership with which a good many Urdu journalists are themselves aligned due to their own ambitions for political prominence and professional clout…
It is also true that, other than Delhi, the English media and the media of regional languages (other than Hindi print media of north India as in north India it is a different story altogether with a much complicated political sociology) in respective regions see Muslims as part of regional culture and local politics. Except from north Indian Muslims, the Muslims of the entire country whose mother-tongue is other than Urdu or Hindi have fully assimilated themselves with the regional cultural ethos to the extent that they cannot be counted as one entity with the Muslims of northern India . Farouqui further says:
Without doubt the Muslims of South India and West Bengal never recognized Urdu as their language and a symbol of their religious identity. In the changed political milieu too even if Urdu was never their language and in the past they were greatly distanced from the Muslims of North India. Culturally north Indian Muslims always considered themselves different from Muslims in the rest of the country. They are also the victims of the pronounced sense of superiority. Cultural distance and the strong sense of superiority on the part of north Indian Muslims become a great hurdle in linking them with the South Indian Muslims. This factor also prevented the movement for Pakistan from reaching South India except for a few big cities such as Hyderabad . Migration to Pakistan from the South was limited precisely because of the hold of north Indian Muslims over the Muslim League particularly by the Ashraf (gentry). Linguistic and cultural conflicts have arisen there even after the formation of Pakistan thus, the subsequent establishment of Bangladesh and the remarkable rise of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The strife in the refugee-dominated urban areas of Sindh province is an ample proof of this. Muslim politics in contemporary India are not particularly different from what they were in the past. The hold of north Indian Muslims on Muslim political campaigns even after independence has been strong. This prompted the presumption that the north Indian Muslim leadership would also be successful in the South. However the humiliating defeat of Syed Shahabuddin, a self-designated vocal spokesman of South Indian Muslims, in Bangalore during the 1989 general elections made the north Indian Muslims leadership acutely aware of its real standing in the South.
In northern India , not only the Muslims, but also the Hindus, are a unique socio-political phenomenon. Broadly speaking, north India is itself such a strange political phenomenon that understanding its psychology has never been easy, even for sociologists. The Hindu-Muslim context of north India is different from that of the rest of India . The imbroglio called Hindi versus Urdu is therefore not only the politics of language, but also has the gamut of political complexities at its forefront. The Urdu-Hindi controversy of the nineteenth century was the reflection of this politico cultural conundrum. Even today, the situation has not changed much. Howsoever complicated the reality may be because of its variations, in the eyes of the world, the images that are projected by the English media of India especially Delhi , are the images of India , irrespective of being Muslim or Hindu.
As far as Muslims are concerned, Muslim intellectuals in Delhi are deemed the sole representatives of the entire Muslim community for the simple reason that their being in Delhi gives the media easy access to them. To what extent are the Muslim intellectuals working in the universities and the retired bureaucrats active within the media circle genuinely concerned about the sociology of India Muslims, is a known fact? Very clearly, the members of the English speaking Muslim elite in Delhi have neither have an understanding of the problems of common Muslims, nor do they have any interest in the matter. This is perhaps the reason why the common educated Muslim is not only unfamiliar with these so-called intellectuals but, if they know of them, they even hate them.
To an extent, the Urdu newspapers of Delhi , working as a single entity, could be said to have an understanding of the north India Muslims’ psyche, but they have only played a negative role in their lives. As far as the electronic media is concerned, some Urdu TV channels use the spoken language and focus on the Muslim middle-class that is still almost negligible in proportion to the entire Muslim population. But these channels too give the way to misunderstanding about Muslims. As such, viewers of Urdu TV channels are mostly those who do not know English, it seems that there is no respite for common Muslims.
Despite being a single entity, the speed with which Urdu newspapers form north India, especially weekly newspapers of Delhi, are heading towards decay is rather on expected and anticipated lines. I shall not talk here about official circulation figures of Urdu newspapers that merely serve the purpose of the government to show that Urdu is flourishing. In the government files, of course, Urdu journalism is making steady progress simply because the government officials are assigned the role of issuing misleading statements highlighting the progress made in case of the promotion of Urdu, particularly by a certain central government organization namely National Council for Promotion of Urdu Language.
The question of the progress of Urdu journalism is concerned with the system of Urdu education in common schools with secular curricula. The issue of script has now arisen in the context of the dini madaris. If the children whose mother-tongue is Urdu get an opportunity to study Urdu within their school curricula, the entire sociology of the dini madaris will undergo a sea-change; it would mark their decisive decline. Until there is no arrangement for teaching Urdu in the secular curriculum, the population wanting to learn Urdu would remain confined to the dini madaris and the Urdu newspapers even though unwillingly, would print only what the madrasa-educated people would like to read. We all know what the madrasa-educated people want to read and we are also aware of how a person educated in religious institution views a pluralistic society, or how the religious person himself is viewed by the pluralistic society.
Unfortunately, after Partition, Urdu has not been included by the Congress leadership in the secular curriculum, especially in the north India states. Consequently, the madrasas kept growing. With the passage of time, they replaced school education among Muslims and established a parallel system dangerous to the nation but more for Muslims themselves. One reason for the survival and growth of the madrasas is the economic backwardness of the common Muslims. But when Muslim children did not go to school, both economic and social transformation stopped among Muslims. Without doubt, the increase in the number of madrasas is also an example of the failure of our national educational policy and constitutional obligation to treat Muslims at par in education too. Obviously, an economically backward section of society, such as the Muslims, cannot develop an educational system parallel to the state-sponsored educational apparatus. Sooner or later, society will have to provide Muslims with secular education at par with other religious groups, mainly Hindus, so that they are made part of mainstream education and occupy a common civic space. It is for us to think how to stop the growth and spread of the dini madaris, whose network comprises half-a-million madrasas with 50 million full–time students. (These are authentic and undisputed figures known to all, issued by the government, and which were not challenged.) We should also not forget that because of being religious educational institutions, madrasas are much more organized and influential than the secular-curriculum schools run by the government.
The English media in India is an elite media, an offshoot of the baggage of history. As a large majority of Muslims in India are economically deprived and do not live in big cities, there is a tendency in the English language media to ignore issues that concern Muslims. The English media, however, plays an important role in shaping perceptions in the minds of India as a whole. Although read by 2 or 3% (and really understood by hardly 1%) of the Indian population, the images that the English media builds and creates are reflected decisively in the international scene as well as within India . These images enhance a political balance. The English media provides the pan Indian picture for the regional language media unaware of north Indian languages, such as Hindi (which is already considered as biased as the Urdu media is overzealous in its presentation of Muslim issues). The English-language media is said to provide a common ground between these conflicting positions and is, in a certain sense, a moderator or a melting pot among the various sections of India . There are also allegations from Muslims against the English media that are true but the whole English media does not behave so irresponsibly.
It is true that the English media often picks up wrong Muslim voices that do not represent the community; this is counter productive. For example we have Shabana Azmi who always gets space because of being associated with Bollywood. She is easily accessible and knows the English idiom of discourse. But she does not represent anybody but herself, and due to the glamour element attached, her views get highlighted much more than those of various other more representative people. It is the responsibility of the media to search for the right voice and the media has certainly been lazy in that matter.
Certain stereotypes in the media also condition issues. For instance, there is a widespread misconception in the media about the role of the Dar-ul Uloom Deoband. The general feeling is that it is a place where one can get the ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ very easily. Certainly this perception is wrong but the Muslims did nothing to remove this misconception. They just blame the media but cannot request the ulema not to issue fatwas that makes a mockery of the entire community. After 11 September 2001, there has been a lot of coverage of Deoband and its activities, on assumed lines based moe on imagination than field work and visits to the prestigious Islamic university. To the great disappointment of correspondents from the electronic media who occasionally happen to visit Deoband, they found that Deoband was not what they had actually visualized.
But all said and done, one is at a loss to realize that if, half a million madrasas exist in India , where 50 million full time students are enrolled, it is naturally a matter of great concern. These 50 million students do not include the part-time student who attends the madrasas. There are lots of Muslim students who go to regular schools and attend the madrasas part-time to study the Koran and Islamic tenets. So instead of blaming Deoband we should suggest something that can enable the Muslim educational empowerment. I would not comment on the practical joke of the government which, in the name of the madrasa modernization scheme, proposed to spend Rs. 20 crore. A break-up of this money would show that on an average it comes to Rs.0.40 per student. One can easily understand the Congress’s logic or the whole logic of the modernization of madrasas scheme initiated by Rajiv Gandhi.
There are two strands in the media, particularly in the English media. One is patronizing, the other antagonistic. The patronizing strand recognizes that a wrong has been done to the Muslims, and one has to go out of the way to support them and advise them what they should and should not do. This strand is growing among a section of the Hindu intelligentsia and the media. There is another well-known antagonistic strand mainly propounded by Vinod Mehta that Muslims are a prisoner of these images. This strand does not reach out for any kind of dialogue or understanding and has certain stereotyped images of which everybody has become a prisoner.
Siddharth Varadrajan, a senior editor with The Hindu, was scathing in his criticism of the media for long. I do not think that there is a conscious communal basis, at least in the English media but I agree with the view that most of the people working with the English media, including Muslims do not know Muslim society at large. They know only the elite Muslims and at the most, the upper middle class Muslim strata. The bias, if any, is a product of ignorance. It is time for common Muslims to not get into the paranoid feeling that the media has been consciously seeking to victimize or portray them as villains in the Indian society. There are people with a communal viewpoint, who would not in acceptable parlance be called secular. Though they do have space in the English media, they belong to various communities (including Muslims). By and large, the media has tended to be responsible even in cases related to reporting on riots. The English-language media has persisted in trying to bring the guilty to book on a number of issues, —whether it was during the 1984 anti-Sikh massacre, in Maliana or Hashimpura or Meerut or Bhagalpur, or in 2002 Gujarat carnage. The reporting of the English press of these incidents shocked the entire nation. English press pursued these incidents relentlessly, and reporters have gone back to the spot on every anniversary of these riots to bring home the point that the guilty persons are running scot-free, and that the state has not taken any action to bring them to book. Siddharth Varadarajan is correct that there were lapses during the initial reporting because of newspaper reliance on the police version (which is often communally biased), the high financial cost of newsgathering, reliance on unprofessional stringers and the bias of the news desk. But, the media does thereafter take up in systematic manner cases of human rights violation, police atrocities, and the tardy process of inquiries.
I do not agree with the view that the media is insensitive to the issues of the Muslims. It has, in fact, been responsible and responsive – its extent is another issue. Instead of tarring the entire media with the same brush, one needs to differentiate and expand the space where there is a greater concern and sensitivity, rather than saying that the whole media is the same. The Muslim intelligentsia should not shut themselves out from the English media; rather, they have to enhance their space within it.
The painting of the images is not only in terms of terrorism or madrasas. There are other issues with wider social ramification that we must consider. Take the issue of the triple talaq in one sitting, for instance, on which reams have been written in the English media in the last ten or twelve years, ever since the Shah Bano issue. I am not saying that these should not be discussed, but the disproportionate amount of space and time that goes into the over-simplified analysis intensifies stereotypes. Most of the nonsense becomes possible because of publicity hungry ulema. We have to look beyond, rather than just point to improper riot reporting or inherent biases. We have to highlight issues that will bring about fundamental changes – issues of the Muslims’ socio-economic growth, progress and the educational empowerment and achievements. The reality is that issues that are not really germane to the genuine problems of the Muslim community get undue attention from the media as well as from Muslim writers, There are other issues that are of greater relevance. For example, how many Muslim students go to primary schools? What is the drop out ratio of Muslim students after secondary and senior secondary examinations? How many Muslims have been inducted into the police force at the level of sepoy and sub-Inspectors? How many are there in the administrative services examinations conducted by the subordinate staff selection commissions in the states? If the proportion of Muslims is low, why is it so? These are real issues that the Muslim themselves do not get to read or reflect upon, debate, or discuss.
If we discuss Muslim education, we discuss it only through the English medium which is just utopian. If we can discuss Muslim proportion in government services, we just talk of civil services, an impossible thing for first generation learners whether Hindus or Muslims. Needless to say that, this entire elite phenomenon will not work to improve the socio economic conditions of common Muslims in India . In the world of entertainment, there is a great deal of Muslim participation but again it is an elite phenomenon. I think that is where we are all collectively guilty: these issues do not get discussed.
Is there a bias that is causing the decline in Muslim representation in the government services? Why, for instance, has the Muslim middle-class, which was such a critical factor in the pre-Partition years, declined and dwindled in comparison to the Hindu middle class? Arguably, it is true that a very large section of the Muslim middle-class did migrate to Pakistan between 1947 and 1950, but why did it not grow? We never discussed the complexity of the issue that the Muslim middle-class voice is not really the voice of the entire Muslim community
The new Muslim middle class is also the new-born psychological version of the aristocratic Muslim elite of pre-partition India . In the Hindu community, the Hindu middle-class got education in state run schools where regional language and not English was the medium. Now the Hindu middle class dictates and determines the socio political agenda and sets the tone for dialogue and discourse at the international level too. These issues, I emphasize again, needs to be reflected in the media, debated, and discussed again and again. The media is the only forum for interaction and greater participation, both for intra-community dialogue within the Muslim community and inter-community dialogue between all communities that together can lead to a better, prosperous and cohesive India . The media has to correct itself, but we also have to look beyond as the myopic vision that we have at present will not solve the problem. The two communities have lived together for hundreds of years, and they will continue to live together. Biases have to be corrected – unfortunately, they have intensified. What do we do about that? I think that is what we have to focus on, and I hope that there will be more writers, more commentators, and more Muslims joining and contributing to the media. The media is today getting increasingly effective and powerful, and greater Muslim participation is needed in it.
Biases do exist every where. But just as there are biases, there are also people who go out of the way to try and correct them. These are both part of the fractured Indian reality that we should recognize, and try to widen the space, widen Muslim participation in the media, and have more people talking about real Muslim issues, going beyond those issues that unfortunately help intensify stereotypes.
Chandan Mitra is the Editor in chief of the widely circulated English daily 'The Pioneer' and he is also a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha).He can be contacted at chandanmitra@hotmail.com.
(This article was included in the book edited by Ather Farouqui titled "Muslims and the Media Images:News versus Views" published by the Oxford University Press , India .)
Saturday, June 05, 2010
Editorial: EPW Economic & Political Weekly on Unravelling Hindutva Terrorism
Unravelling Hindutva Terrorism :
Communal prejudices have compromised our battle against terrorism.
When the bombs went off at Malegaon in September 2006, killing about 40 people and injuring many more who had gathered for the Friday afternoon prayer at a local mosque, the first arrests were of Muslim men who were supposed to belong to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The police claimed to have cracked the case. Less than a year later, in May 2007, when a similar bomb exploded in Hyderabad’s Mecca Masjid killing nine people, the police claimed that these were "sophisticated" bombs detonated via a cellphone located in Bangladesh and the main culprit was supposed to be a Muslim man affiliated to the Harkat-ul-Jehad al-Islami (HuJI). The police arrested some random young Muslims from the city and tortured them into confessing their "guilt". Six months later, when another bomb went off on the eve of the last Friday of Ramazan, in the Ajmer shrine in Rajasthan, it was again blamed on "jehadi terrorists".
It has taken the courageous, if simple, act by Hemant Karkare, the anti-terrorism squad chief of Maharashtra police, of following the available leads to show the linkages between the Malegaon bomb blasts and Hindutva-linked groups. Without this one single act, all these linkages would, perhaps, have remained hidden behind the lies and half-truths dished out by our security establishment. As is well known now, a group called Abhinav Bharat organised this attack. This group includes some religious figures as well as a serving officer of the Indian Army. There have been other clear instances of Hindutva groups involved in bomb making in Nanded, Kanpur, Bhopal and Goa. Most of these are linked to the Bajrang Dal, which is a front of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). There is now a clear linkage between the RSS and its fronts and personnel and a series of bomb blasts. This is apart from the evidence, much stronger, which links this redoubtable organisation, to scores of communal killings, the Gujarat riots of 2002 being the last of its "big" examples.
If terror derived from religious fundamentalism has one headquarter in India, it is the
RSS. Their younger siblings, the Islamic, Sikh or Christian fundamentalists, though dangerous in their own ways, cannot match the organisational network, financial muscle or political legitimacy that the RSS – its affiliates and personnel – possess. After all, India’s principal opposition party is a 100% subsidiary of the RSS and it is the shrill communal politics of this "family" which has created that political climate where any terrorist act could be, despite all evidence, linked to Muslims.
Nevertheless, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among Muslim communities is a serious issue. It has dangerous consequences, not just for its regressive social and political effects on the Muslims themselves, and needs to be fought with vigour. Islamic fundamentalism has also incubated and nurtured terrorist organisations and initiated violent acts, not just in India but also all over the world. None of this can be denied nor can the guard against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism be lowered.
However, it is now amply clear that our security agencies, government institutions and ministries, specially the home ministry, are deeply compromised by communal prejudice. In each of the cases highlighted above, and in many more, the prima facie evidence, both forensic and circumstantial, pointed to the involvement of Hindutva groups. Yet, unmindful of all evidence, they refused to follow open, clear leads pointing to Hindutva groups, but rather went around building fairy tales about Islamic terrorism’s involvement, picking up random Muslim men (and some women), torturing them till they accepted their "guilt" and finally claiming success in the case. As late as January this year, when the Hindutva terror link to Malegaon had been firmly established, and the Rajasthan police were already questioning the accused of the Ajmer blasts for their links to the Mecca Masjid bombs, the Hyderabad police was merrily arresting Muslims who, they claimed, were linked to the Mecca Masjid blast of 2007. The complicity of the Gujarat, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh police in the murder of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife, or the killing of Ishrat Jehan and her friends is now clearly established. There is also prima facie evidence of communal prejudice and wrongdoing in police action in cases like the Batla House encounter in Delhi. Unfortunately, the list of cases where communal prejudice by the police and security establishment is evident is so long that it can fill volumes.
While there has been some effort to recognise and address caste and gender prejudices and discriminations, there has been a certain cussedness about not accepting and redressing the discrimination and prejudice against religious minorities, particularly the Muslims. The present United Progressive Alliance government has taken some commendable steps to address this issue, primarily through reports of the Sachar Committee and the Ranganath Misra Commission. These have opened up space to discuss the structural discrimination and prejudice against Muslims in India as well as the measures needed to redress this. It is also true that the criminal link between Hindutva groups and bomb blasts has come to the fore under this regime. Nevertheless,
this is not sufficient; urgent steps are needed to disinfect our security establishment of the communal virus. Whether the present Home Minister P Chidambaram can measure up to this task, and whether the Congress Party can find the political will to take on Hindutva inside the administration and state structures, is an open question.
Communal prejudices have compromised our battle against terrorism.
When the bombs went off at Malegaon in September 2006, killing about 40 people and injuring many more who had gathered for the Friday afternoon prayer at a local mosque, the first arrests were of Muslim men who were supposed to belong to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The police claimed to have cracked the case. Less than a year later, in May 2007, when a similar bomb exploded in Hyderabad’s Mecca Masjid killing nine people, the police claimed that these were "sophisticated" bombs detonated via a cellphone located in Bangladesh and the main culprit was supposed to be a Muslim man affiliated to the Harkat-ul-Jehad al-Islami (HuJI). The police arrested some random young Muslims from the city and tortured them into confessing their "guilt". Six months later, when another bomb went off on the eve of the last Friday of Ramazan, in the Ajmer shrine in Rajasthan, it was again blamed on "jehadi terrorists".
It has taken the courageous, if simple, act by Hemant Karkare, the anti-terrorism squad chief of Maharashtra police, of following the available leads to show the linkages between the Malegaon bomb blasts and Hindutva-linked groups. Without this one single act, all these linkages would, perhaps, have remained hidden behind the lies and half-truths dished out by our security establishment. As is well known now, a group called Abhinav Bharat organised this attack. This group includes some religious figures as well as a serving officer of the Indian Army. There have been other clear instances of Hindutva groups involved in bomb making in Nanded, Kanpur, Bhopal and Goa. Most of these are linked to the Bajrang Dal, which is a front of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). There is now a clear linkage between the RSS and its fronts and personnel and a series of bomb blasts. This is apart from the evidence, much stronger, which links this redoubtable organisation, to scores of communal killings, the Gujarat riots of 2002 being the last of its "big" examples.
If terror derived from religious fundamentalism has one headquarter in India, it is the
RSS. Their younger siblings, the Islamic, Sikh or Christian fundamentalists, though dangerous in their own ways, cannot match the organisational network, financial muscle or political legitimacy that the RSS – its affiliates and personnel – possess. After all, India’s principal opposition party is a 100% subsidiary of the RSS and it is the shrill communal politics of this "family" which has created that political climate where any terrorist act could be, despite all evidence, linked to Muslims.
Nevertheless, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among Muslim communities is a serious issue. It has dangerous consequences, not just for its regressive social and political effects on the Muslims themselves, and needs to be fought with vigour. Islamic fundamentalism has also incubated and nurtured terrorist organisations and initiated violent acts, not just in India but also all over the world. None of this can be denied nor can the guard against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism be lowered.
However, it is now amply clear that our security agencies, government institutions and ministries, specially the home ministry, are deeply compromised by communal prejudice. In each of the cases highlighted above, and in many more, the prima facie evidence, both forensic and circumstantial, pointed to the involvement of Hindutva groups. Yet, unmindful of all evidence, they refused to follow open, clear leads pointing to Hindutva groups, but rather went around building fairy tales about Islamic terrorism’s involvement, picking up random Muslim men (and some women), torturing them till they accepted their "guilt" and finally claiming success in the case. As late as January this year, when the Hindutva terror link to Malegaon had been firmly established, and the Rajasthan police were already questioning the accused of the Ajmer blasts for their links to the Mecca Masjid bombs, the Hyderabad police was merrily arresting Muslims who, they claimed, were linked to the Mecca Masjid blast of 2007. The complicity of the Gujarat, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh police in the murder of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife, or the killing of Ishrat Jehan and her friends is now clearly established. There is also prima facie evidence of communal prejudice and wrongdoing in police action in cases like the Batla House encounter in Delhi. Unfortunately, the list of cases where communal prejudice by the police and security establishment is evident is so long that it can fill volumes.
While there has been some effort to recognise and address caste and gender prejudices and discriminations, there has been a certain cussedness about not accepting and redressing the discrimination and prejudice against religious minorities, particularly the Muslims. The present United Progressive Alliance government has taken some commendable steps to address this issue, primarily through reports of the Sachar Committee and the Ranganath Misra Commission. These have opened up space to discuss the structural discrimination and prejudice against Muslims in India as well as the measures needed to redress this. It is also true that the criminal link between Hindutva groups and bomb blasts has come to the fore under this regime. Nevertheless,
this is not sufficient; urgent steps are needed to disinfect our security establishment of the communal virus. Whether the present Home Minister P Chidambaram can measure up to this task, and whether the Congress Party can find the political will to take on Hindutva inside the administration and state structures, is an open question.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
New Wave of Sangh Parivar Violence in Karnataka: Hindus Rescued Muslims
*"Hindutva People Attacked Us And Hindus Saved Us"*
The mega narrative called world and life has both big actors and small
actors. Big actors can call the shots but its not they who run the show.
They just spoil the show. It’s these small actors who keep the world going.
These thoughts were the ripples created by my tryst with a few victims of
one of the nineteen incidents (till 19 March) that have taken place in Udupi
and Dakshina Kannada districts of Karnataka after the Hindu Samajothsava
held on March 15 at Mangalore.
These boys were one of the first victims of the series of violence. These
boys namely: Aarif, Ahraf, Thaufeek, Sirajuddin, Hameed, Sarfaraz, Navman
and Rajesh, who were returning home (Mulky) on March 15 after a cricket
tourney in Brahmavar got caught in the traffic jam at Kaup where communal
disturbance had erupted.
Unaware of the communal disturbance the boys in their car imagined that the
traffic jam was because of some accident that they assumed had taken place
on the road. As they were waiting for the traffic to be cleared, a police
constable according to Hammed came to them and asked if there were women in
the car and when said “no” he asked the boys to run away.
Within a few minutes after this a group of 30-40 people returning from the
Hindu Samajothsava mobbed the car and asked if the people inside were
Muslims. Realizing the fact that they were Muslims, due the sticker pasted
on the front glass saying ‘Masha-Allah’ the attackers broke the frontal
glass first and then the back glass. Realizing the threat to their life the
boys inside the car opened the door and ran in different directions. But
before they escaped from the hands of the attackers, they were beaten quite
badly.
*“I am a Hindu”*
While they were being beaten, during their attempt to run, Rajesh, a Hindu,
was showing his ears being pierced and also his sacred thread to the
attackers as a proof to say that he was a Hindu. That being not enough he
also kept crying “I am a Hindu, I am a Hindu” but the attackers did not
spare him.
Rajesh after the incident was being taken to the house of Soori Shetty, who
rescued Rajesh, but Jagadeesh Achar a friend of Soori Shetty, took Rajesh to
his house because Rajesh was of his caste!!! That night, Rajesh speaking to
Jagadeesh Achar said “if we had spoken only in Kannada the attackers
wouldn’t have known that there are Muslims in the car.
*“Hindutva people attacked us and Hindus saved us”*
After opening the door and running in different directions Hameed crossing
all the fences that he faced reached a “Hindu house” where a lady, he said,
asking him to hide inside her house stood at the door with a sickle and
chased away the attackers who were chasing him. As this lady was fighting
the saffron brigade, Hameed escaped through the back door.
Aarif, once he opened the door to run, was caught by the attackers and
beaten with rod and a lathi. He said that escaping from their hands he ran
directly to a police near by holding whom tightly he said “save me, save me”
and the police expressing his helplessness said “run away from here.” On
understanding that the situation had “gone beyond the control of police”
Aarif ran towards the residential area and collapsed in the courtyard of a
“Hindu house” where, he said, two women took him in and served him water.
“They were the ones who later on took me to the hospital near by for first
aid”, said Aarif.
Thaufeek another boy said that escaping from the hands of the attackers ran
to a non-residential area and climbed a tree and hid himself behind the
leaves filled branches.
Saying that the very thought and memory of those moments scare him; Hameed
said “Hindutva people attacked us and Hindus saved us” and adds to it “Those
who attacked us are pawns in this game. The real culprits are the ones who
instigate these people to attack.”
*“Human life is more important”*
“All of us got scattered while we all ran for our lives and finally it was
one Soori Shetty, a localite, who using all his contacts brought us together
and ensured that we all are taken to the hospital” recollects Sirajuddin.
Soori Shetty said that his house is located near by the place where the
mishap took place on Sunday. That evening on hearing noise from the streets,
he said, he had come out of home to see what was happening. Soori Shetty
said that on realizing that there was a communal conflict he decided to do
his “duty.” Recollecting the incident he said “human life is more important
than religion and other things.”
How I wish the big actors had the wisdom of the small actors of this mega
narrative!!!
- *Samvartha 'Sahil'*
The mega narrative called world and life has both big actors and small
actors. Big actors can call the shots but its not they who run the show.
They just spoil the show. It’s these small actors who keep the world going.
These thoughts were the ripples created by my tryst with a few victims of
one of the nineteen incidents (till 19 March) that have taken place in Udupi
and Dakshina Kannada districts of Karnataka after the Hindu Samajothsava
held on March 15 at Mangalore.
These boys were one of the first victims of the series of violence. These
boys namely: Aarif, Ahraf, Thaufeek, Sirajuddin, Hameed, Sarfaraz, Navman
and Rajesh, who were returning home (Mulky) on March 15 after a cricket
tourney in Brahmavar got caught in the traffic jam at Kaup where communal
disturbance had erupted.
Unaware of the communal disturbance the boys in their car imagined that the
traffic jam was because of some accident that they assumed had taken place
on the road. As they were waiting for the traffic to be cleared, a police
constable according to Hammed came to them and asked if there were women in
the car and when said “no” he asked the boys to run away.
Within a few minutes after this a group of 30-40 people returning from the
Hindu Samajothsava mobbed the car and asked if the people inside were
Muslims. Realizing the fact that they were Muslims, due the sticker pasted
on the front glass saying ‘Masha-Allah’ the attackers broke the frontal
glass first and then the back glass. Realizing the threat to their life the
boys inside the car opened the door and ran in different directions. But
before they escaped from the hands of the attackers, they were beaten quite
badly.
*“I am a Hindu”*
While they were being beaten, during their attempt to run, Rajesh, a Hindu,
was showing his ears being pierced and also his sacred thread to the
attackers as a proof to say that he was a Hindu. That being not enough he
also kept crying “I am a Hindu, I am a Hindu” but the attackers did not
spare him.
Rajesh after the incident was being taken to the house of Soori Shetty, who
rescued Rajesh, but Jagadeesh Achar a friend of Soori Shetty, took Rajesh to
his house because Rajesh was of his caste!!! That night, Rajesh speaking to
Jagadeesh Achar said “if we had spoken only in Kannada the attackers
wouldn’t have known that there are Muslims in the car.
*“Hindutva people attacked us and Hindus saved us”*
After opening the door and running in different directions Hameed crossing
all the fences that he faced reached a “Hindu house” where a lady, he said,
asking him to hide inside her house stood at the door with a sickle and
chased away the attackers who were chasing him. As this lady was fighting
the saffron brigade, Hameed escaped through the back door.
Aarif, once he opened the door to run, was caught by the attackers and
beaten with rod and a lathi. He said that escaping from their hands he ran
directly to a police near by holding whom tightly he said “save me, save me”
and the police expressing his helplessness said “run away from here.” On
understanding that the situation had “gone beyond the control of police”
Aarif ran towards the residential area and collapsed in the courtyard of a
“Hindu house” where, he said, two women took him in and served him water.
“They were the ones who later on took me to the hospital near by for first
aid”, said Aarif.
Thaufeek another boy said that escaping from the hands of the attackers ran
to a non-residential area and climbed a tree and hid himself behind the
leaves filled branches.
Saying that the very thought and memory of those moments scare him; Hameed
said “Hindutva people attacked us and Hindus saved us” and adds to it “Those
who attacked us are pawns in this game. The real culprits are the ones who
instigate these people to attack.”
*“Human life is more important”*
“All of us got scattered while we all ran for our lives and finally it was
one Soori Shetty, a localite, who using all his contacts brought us together
and ensured that we all are taken to the hospital” recollects Sirajuddin.
Soori Shetty said that his house is located near by the place where the
mishap took place on Sunday. That evening on hearing noise from the streets,
he said, he had come out of home to see what was happening. Soori Shetty
said that on realizing that there was a communal conflict he decided to do
his “duty.” Recollecting the incident he said “human life is more important
than religion and other things.”
How I wish the big actors had the wisdom of the small actors of this mega
narrative!!!
- *Samvartha 'Sahil'*
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Assassination of Benazir Bhuto: A Passive Public
K.M.Sajad Ibrahim
Even after a year of the assassination of Benazir Bhuto, it is a mystery about her assassin. Even the world is silent about it. There is no doubt that the persons responsible for her muder are her own close relatives. Since this is an era of international terrorism, we can easily blame terrorists as responsible. This is the case of India as well. I remember the statement once made BJP leader, Sushma Swaraj during the bomb explosion that it was the drama of the Congress party to divert the attention of the public. Sushma Swaraj is one of the senior leaders of BJP and her statement is based on the tactics of the political parties. If we take into account of the many terrorist strikes in India, it was followed by some political crisis. It means that some political parties assume the role of terrorist. Our media is interested only the official version. Unlike past, our media is interested to promote the interest of the political parties and government and have no sense of an independent investigation. There are some exceptions like Tehalka.
While attending an international conference I had an opportunity to discuss the issue of Benazir Bhutoo’s assassination with an academician from Pakistan. According to him it was done none other than Asif Ali Zardari. In the video clipping of the incident there was one man with pistol, who later disappeared, was a staff of Zardari. His intention was clear that as long as Benazir was alive it was not possible for him to reach the power centre of Pakistan. Incidentally, he later became the President of Pakistan. Moreover, the present government, which is a pro-Benazir party, is not keen in the investigation of the Benazir’s assassination. All these support the case of the involvement of Asisf Ali Zardari in the incident. But persons who hold power control the state and determine its direction. This is the case of not Pakistan alone, but many countries of third world including India. People are fool, who believe in the official version, in democracy it is their own government.
Even after a year of the assassination of Benazir Bhuto, it is a mystery about her assassin. Even the world is silent about it. There is no doubt that the persons responsible for her muder are her own close relatives. Since this is an era of international terrorism, we can easily blame terrorists as responsible. This is the case of India as well. I remember the statement once made BJP leader, Sushma Swaraj during the bomb explosion that it was the drama of the Congress party to divert the attention of the public. Sushma Swaraj is one of the senior leaders of BJP and her statement is based on the tactics of the political parties. If we take into account of the many terrorist strikes in India, it was followed by some political crisis. It means that some political parties assume the role of terrorist. Our media is interested only the official version. Unlike past, our media is interested to promote the interest of the political parties and government and have no sense of an independent investigation. There are some exceptions like Tehalka.
While attending an international conference I had an opportunity to discuss the issue of Benazir Bhutoo’s assassination with an academician from Pakistan. According to him it was done none other than Asif Ali Zardari. In the video clipping of the incident there was one man with pistol, who later disappeared, was a staff of Zardari. His intention was clear that as long as Benazir was alive it was not possible for him to reach the power centre of Pakistan. Incidentally, he later became the President of Pakistan. Moreover, the present government, which is a pro-Benazir party, is not keen in the investigation of the Benazir’s assassination. All these support the case of the involvement of Asisf Ali Zardari in the incident. But persons who hold power control the state and determine its direction. This is the case of not Pakistan alone, but many countries of third world including India. People are fool, who believe in the official version, in democracy it is their own government.
Friday, November 21, 2008
Impact of India’s Partnership with Israel: Major Implications By- K.M.Sajad Ibrahim
India’s relation with Israel since 1992 has been viewed as an outcome of the post-cold war scenario. With the demise of the Soviet Union, India lost its long time military supplier and principal diplomatic crutch. It has also grown increasingly disenchanted with Arab sympathy for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. As a result of the diplomatic relations, India showed keen interest in developing high level military and commercial links with Israel, especially during the period of BJP led government of 1998-2004. Israel is now the second largest supplier of arms to India (after Russia). It provides India with missile radar, border monitoring equipment and other similar high-tech military hardwires. In addition, several thousand Indian soldiers have been provided with “anti-insurgency training in Israel”. The latest in the series was the launching of Israel’s spy satellite by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence-gathering capability. The geopolitical implications of the collaboration between India and Israel are grave and manifold. India’s close collaboration with Israel is fundamentally to woo the United States as well as to build a new strategic relation vis-Ã -vis Pakistan and China.
India and Palestine Question
India’s relation with the West Asia was formulated by Jawarlal Nehru in 1930s. Although Nehru took an impartial view regarding the Arab-Israeli differences in the initial period, he later took the stand of supporting the Arabs by taking into account of the denial of justice to the Palestinians. In the 1939 Resolution adopted by the Indian National Congress, it stated that “in Palestine the Jews have relied on British armed forces to advance their special privileges”. Even Gandhiji was not ready to recognize the Jewish nationalism, which was artificially created in Palestine at the cost of indigenous Arab population. Nehru indicted Zionism for fostering Jewish settlement in Palestine at the expense of the Arab population. Jayapraksh Narayan stated:
“No doubt the Jews were entitled as a persecuted people to compassion and some compensation for the wrongs heaped upon their innocent heads through the centuries. But it was certainly not the Arabs, least of all the Palestinians, who were the persecutors. If the Christian peoples and powers of the West, some of whom had tried mercilessly to exterminate the Jews, were anxious at least to salve their conscience and do a good turn to their victims, they had no right to do it at the cost of the Arabs”
Nehru in his letters to his daughter, Indira, during his prison days commented the British tactics in Palestine in favour of the Jewish immigrants violating the rights of the Palestine as another face of a colonial power. He saw the English in Palestine pitting “Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and (making) it appear that (their) presence is necessary to act as an arbiter and to keep the peace between the two”. All these were some of the basic perspectives of Indian leaders regarding the Jewish colonialism in the pre-independence period.
The first task before India in its post independence period was to examine an appropriate solution to the Palestine question by becoming a member in the Special UN Committee. India supported the minority plan which recommended a federation of two Arab and Jewish states by opposing the partition plan of Palestine. (During this period the third world countries were not emerged as members of the UN General Assembly). The decision of India was influenced by the perception of Indian leaders on the Palestine question as well as the partition of India.
When Israel became a reality in 1948, India had several reservations in granting recognition to it. Nehru openly stated the reason as a gesture of supporting the stand of Arab countries. Moreover, India opposed U.N. membership for Israel in 1949. By 1950 a series of efforts had been made to influence the Indian government to recognize the state of Israel by the Jewish lobby as well as its counterpart in India. Finally, India accorded its recognition to the State of Israel in late 1950 without establishing any formal ties until 1992.
India’s Support to Palestinian Struggle
When Israel invaded Sinai on October 29, 1956 as a reaction to Egypt’s decision to nationalize Suez Canal, India condemned it as a re-imposition of European colonialism in the Afro Asian world. The attack of Egypt by Israel along with British and French forces was viewed as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and all Indian political parties, from right to left, condemned it. India cosponsored resolutions in the General Assembly urging the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Egypt. In fact, the Suez crisis drew Egypt and India closer together and its relation with Israel to low point and ended all possibility for a bilateral tie.
The reemphasis given by India to the Arab cause out of Suez crisis of 1956 is reflected in the unstinting support of India to the case of Palestinian refugees. According to C.S. Jha, India’s permanent representative in the UN, stated in November 1959 that “the problem of Palestinian refugees is not merely an intensely human problem; it is one of great political importance and indeed affects the entire complex of political relations in the Middle East.” India’s hostility towards Israel increased even more after the death of Nehru in 1964. It was evident from India’s refusal to accept Israeli assistance in redeveloping the barren wastes of Rajastan. Similarly, Israeli offer of famine relief given in response to a plea by the UN Secretary General, U Thant was declined by India for political reasons. India condemned the Israeli invasion of Arab lands of Palestine in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In December 1967, D.P.Dhar, a member of Indian delegation to the UN Special Committee, reiterated Indian position, which recognized the Palestinian as a people and not merely as refugees. It also emphasized the need of for a lasting solutions to ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on the basis of UN resolution 194 (III).
In the meantime, the Indian political atmosphere was not fully supporting the views of the government stand. The opposition parties in India, except the Communist parties, demanded a cautious approach in the 1967 war, promoting a neutral stand. The parties like Swathanthra party and Jana Sangh openly supported Israel. It happened on account of the neutral policy of Egypt during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of 1965. Similarly, the Indian press also took a negative approach to official Indian position in the 1967 war. The news papers like Times of India, Indian Express, Statesman and Hindustan Times made critical remarks on Indian policy of supporting the Arabs.
The first setback to India’s relation with West Asia came in 1969 when India was denied participation on the Rabat conference of Islamic leaders due to the opposition of Pakistan. The meeting was convened to condemn the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Moreover, under the initiative of Pakistan the meeting also condemned the communal riots in Ahmedabad. As a reaction to these developments, India recalled its Senior Envoys from Morocco and Jordan. Further, Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, Dinesh Singh held a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Abba Eban in New York, as a first sign of improving relations with Israel. During the Indo-Pak war in November 1971, countries like Egypt and Syria took a neutral stand while countries like Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned India. However, Israel took a pro-India stand by criticizing Pakistan actions in East Bengal.
However, India continued pro-Arab stand even in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. At the same time India gradually moved away from the policy of supporting individual Arab countries by focusing exclusively on Palestine question. Hence in the post-1973 war period India gave more importance to support the struggles of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. In this respect, India played considerable role in the UN to support the PLO’s bid for observer status in 1974. India became the first non-Arab government to extend formal diplomatic accreditation to the representatives of the PLO in January 1975. Moreover, India was a cosponsor of General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975.
When Janata party came to power in 1977, there were speculations about the shift of India’s policy towards Palestine. It was during this period Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign Minister made an unofficial visit to India. However, there was no official action in supporting the relationship with Israel. When Camp David Accord was signed in September 1978 between Israel and Egypt, India opposed it along with the Arab world. In 1980 Indira Gandhi returned to power with the continued support of Palestinian struggle. It was during this period India accorded full diplomatic recognition to the Office of PLO in New Delhi. Moreover, Yasser Arafat paid state visits to India in 1980 and 1982. This line of Indian policy continued until early 1990s. The situation in West Asian witnessed a sea change when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. It was during this period the Soviet Union was disappearing from the world map marking the era of unipolar world. In the meantime, the P.L.O. lost its prestige in West Asia on account of its support to Saddam Hussain. The United States took the initiative of holding international Middle East Peace Conference immediately after expelling Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This marked new era in West Asia due to different varieties of diplomatic manoeuvring. As a consequence to these developments, India also made drastic changes in its policy towards West Asia.
Ties with Israel and Shift in India’s Foreign Policy
The decision of establishing formal ties with Israel was taken by P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister of Congress government in January 1992. The decision was a surprising one, although it looked like a long awaited decision, as remarked by Indian media. In fact, the decision of India to start formal relation with Israel was based on changes in the international scenario. It was the beginning of post-cold war period war era with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s strong ally for a long period. In the new situation India desired the support and collaboration with major international powers like the United States, especially in the wake of the political turmoil in Kashmir. In this respect India had two objectives in promoting its relation with the US. Firstly, to overcome the propaganda unleashed by Pakistan on Kashmir situation. Secondly, India required strategic cooperation with the US due to the demise of the Soviet Union, the leading exporter of arms to India. It was imperative for India to modernise Indian weaponry. At the same time India was fully aware of the complexities in establishing strong ties with the US. In this context India found Israel as a best option of appeasing the US line of policy. It is to be noted that India announced its decision to formally establish relations with Israel on the eve of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to the US.
Moreover, the P.L.O. had already recognised the state of Israel to join as a party of the peace process in the Middle East. So India found a favourable occasion in justifying its ties with Israel. It was also remarked that India’s normal relation with Israel was helpful to get the status of a mediator in the on going peace negotiations. India’s relationship with Israel also marked the shift of India’s foreign policy from the traditional line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist to economic and strategic developments. In the decade following this normalisation of ties, successive governments of both the centrist Congress and the rightist BJP, irrespective of party ideology, have rapidly forged extensive military, economic and political relationship. In fact, the shift within the Indian ruling classes from the official position of non-alignment and state-centred economic development towards a pro-United States policy facilitated and encouraged this change attitude towards Israel.
Milestones in the India-Israel Relations
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israel relationship was that India emrged Israel’s second largest trading partner in Asia after Hon Kong and Israel became India’s largest supplier of military equipment after Russia. Although India’s relation with Israel started at a low profile, a sea change took place after the NDA came to power in 1998. India soon became Israel’s closest ally in Asia with strategic, defence and intelligence cooperation growing rapidly. India became the biggest market for Israeli arms. Israel supplied not only military hard wares but also several high-techs, critical weaponry such as wide array of surveillance items, electronic warfare systems, a ground based Green Pine ABM radar, and phalcon airborne warning and control systems. These arms sales were part of a declared NDA policy to forge an alliance among India, United States and Israel.
The United States has given clearance to Israel’s delivery of phalcon reconnaissance aircraft to India, in marked contrast to Washington’s vigorous opposition to supplying them to China in 1998. The US forced Israel to cancel the deal to sell the phalcons to China out of concern altering the balance of power between China and Taiwan. In February 2003 an agreement was made to supply advanced Israeli avionic systems for the Indian Air Force’s new MIG-27 combat aircraft. There were reports about the collaboration between India and Israel on a missile defence system based on the Israel Arrow technology.
India-Israeli partnership has intensified since 1998 and later led to the visiting of India’s Home Minister, L.K.Advani and India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh to Israel in quick succession in mid 2000. The delegates of the Indian team with L.K.Advani consisted of Heads of India’s intelligence agencies, RAW, IB, and Central Police Organisations fighting terrorism. In addition to this, India’s National Security Advisor, Brijesh Mishra and Services Chiefs have paid their visit to Israel since 1998, underlining the growing strategic cooperation between India and Israel. The top officials of Indian Navy also conducted goodwill visits to Israel.
The Israeli aid during the Kargil war in 1999 was considered by India as a cementing factor in the Indo-Israeli relationship. It was during the visit of Shimon Pares to India in January 2002 India and Israel made major agreements to fight ‘terrorism’. Ironically, the word ‘terrorism’ used by Israel was about the national liberation struggle of the Palestinians, which had been strongly supported by India until late 1980s. An Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesman said during the visit of Pares: “India finds it increasingly beneficial to learn from Israel’s experience in dealing with terrorism”. This line of Indian policy was in contradiction with the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy, supporting all national liberation movements.
The most significant event in the Indo-Israeli relationship was the visit of Israeli Prime Minster, Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003. In fact, the visit engineered much controversy in the wake of the assassination of Palestinian leaders by Israeli military forces during the period. There were series of protests in different parts of India against the Israeli Prime Minister. However, the Indian government adopted a cautious step of either displeasing Sharon or giving much honour against the public sentiments. At the same time, there were many agreements during his visit as Sharon was accompanied by a large delegation of about 30 influential businessmen, eager to forge new contracts and open new markets in India.
When the UPA government under the Congress leadership came to power in mid-2004, it decided to follow the same line of the policy adopted by the earlier NDA regime. During the NDA rule the Congress party had criticised some of the close cooperation between India and Israel. But UPA government followed its relations with Israel without changing any policies. India’s Navel Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Israel in January 2008 to finalise several key defence projects. It was reported that Mehta had reviewed efforts to enhance the Israeli-origin barak missiles defence system.
Major implications in the Indo-Israeli Relationship
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israeli relation is the aberration in the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy. In the first four decades after independence, successive governments sought to project India as country dedicated to decolonisation. This posture offered the basis for the principled foreign policy of Nehruvian state which drew its own legitimacy from the tumultuous anti-colonial struggle that brought about independence for the subcontinent in the late 1940s. But when India decided to establish its ties with Israel, it had far reaching implications including military and intelligence cooperation against Pakistan and Islamic terrorism. In fact, India’s relation with Israel was not a normal one as it expanded into different vital fields, even foiled India’s traditional relations with Arab countries and Iran. It was viewed as a tactic used by the US to bring India into its strategic orbit. As a result, it lost its independent foreign policy initiatives in the post-cold war period.
The traders and business lobby in India and Israel played a crucial role in fostering the ties between the two countries for promoting their interests. The Indian business lobby was not interested any matters regarding the case of Palestinians. Since Palestine has little to offer financially or technologically, while Israel can sell to India what the US refuses to India, these pragmatists insisted that New Delhi had no option but to court the more “valuable” Israel. The official Israeli figures show that Israel exports to India valued $1.270 billion in 2006 and imports $1.433 billion to Israel. Agricultural, water and IT technologies in addition to fertilisers and diamonds are major mutual trade concerns. The State Bank of India became the first foreign bank to open a branch in Israel’s diamond exchange.
The India-Israeli alliance strengthens the US strategic designs for India and the region. India holds significant place in the September 20, 2002 National Security Strategy of the US, a policy document to support the actions of the current US President, George Bush. Like Israel in West Asia, the US needed a close ally in South Asia to confront terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to overcome the challenges posed by China. The Indo-US nuclear deal is the most significant outcome of this kind of policy initiatives of the United States.
“Pakistan factor” was another aspect which cemented the relation between India and Israel. For India, the growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and its support to terrorism in Kashmir and different parts of India were most important challenges. In the case of Israel, the nuclear capability of Pakistan and its support to Palestinian extremists posed a threat to its security. In this context Pakistan was a common threat to India and Israel and any alliance in this direction was considered as most valuable. There were reports about the Israeli clandestine support to Indian nuclear explosion, Pokhran II in May 1998. Even the Sangh Parivar was demanding for an alliance with Israel way back in 1960s and 1970s to face the “Islamic threat” from Pakistan and Kashmir.
India’s relationship with the West Asian countries, most specifically Iran, has been a point of contention in the Indo-Israeli partnership. Israel’s relationship with Iran is extremely antagonistic and unstable. Israel viewed Iran as the most important threat to its security in the region due to the kind of support it extended to Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists. In the case of India, Iran is considered as the most important ally in the region. India paid a lot of respect to Iran on account of its support to Kashmir issue against Pakistan. So India treated Iran as an ideal power in the region to counter Pakistan influence in West Asia. But with the inception of Indo-Israeli ties India’s traditional relationship with Iran badly damaged. Israel’s spy satellite, Tecsar (Polaris), was launched by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence gathering capability. In fact, the real objective behind the launching of the satellite was to undermine the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, India voted twice on the IAEA governing body against Iran under the compulsion from the United States. All these created rifts between India and Iran.
However, it is not possible to follow a negative policy towards the Arab countries by taking into account of many realities. It is estimated that more than five million Indian expatriate work in the Arab countries. Moreover, nearly $25 billion worth of Indo-Arab trade, including 60 per cent of Indian oil and gas imports worth $20 billion, is the basic support of Indian economy. In this respect, India had to follow a soft policy towards the question of Palestine. In order to overcome this dilemma an attempt had been made by Indian foreign policy makers to separate its Israeli policy from the Arab-Israeli conflict. To realise this objective, India has taken a more tactical neutral position on the Palestine question, publicly stating its continued support for the Palestinian case and making deliberative effort to further strengthen ties with ties Arab neighbours.
Conclusion
As a result of India’s new foreign policy decisions, its traditional line of supporting national liberation movements and ant-colonial and anti-imperial stands has been fizzled out. The Palestinians have been waging a struggle for their nationhood for the last six decades against Israeli illegal occupation of lands. India was one of the leading countries which extended all support to the Palestinian cause. India has always opposed the continued illegal occupation of West Bank and Gaza. However, India’s changed policy since 1992 is a blatant contradiction to its avowed policy of supporting the Palestinian cause due to the transformation in the international politics resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, India had enough justifications in establishing ties with Israel by taking into account of the factors like the recognition of Israel by the P.L.O. and some Arab countries. However, the current phase of India’s relation with Israel goes beyond the level of normalcy and reached a stage of much clandestine cooperation for defence and strategic purposes. Ironically, India wants to borrow the ideas of Israeli tactics of eliminating the Palestinian leaders in its efforts to combat terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. For a long period India had been condemning these Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Now the cooperation in the same field with Israel is against its foreign policy principle and the support to the Palestinian struggle.
Moreover, India never used its relation with Israel to resolve the issue of Palestinians. At present India is in a commanding position of using its good offices to influence Israel. However, no attempt was made to pressurise Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. It is very unfortunate that on many occasions since 1992 India was not ready to condemn Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians by sticking to a passive stand of supporting a ‘peaceful solution’ to the crisis. The new diplomatic initiatives of India target only its vested interest against the traditional principle of solidarity with the third world countries. The current trends indicate India’s keen interest to develop close ties with imperialist global powers like the United States for economic and defence benefits undermining its values and principles. In other words, Indian foreign policy lost its direction as it is dictated by the external powers to realise their objectives.
Endnotes
N.V. Raj Kumar (Ed.), The Background of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1952), p.57
Leonard A. Gordon, “Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel”, Jewish Social Studies, 37, Summer-Fall, 1975, p.223.
Jayaprakash Narayan, “The Arab-Israeli Question”, Indian and Foreign Review, Vol.6, July 15, 1969, pp.1-2.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p.789.
For details see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No.11, Document A/364 (UNSCOP Report)
G.Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 2, 1950-52, “1 October 1950”, (Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Jawaharlal Nehru Trust, 1986), p.217.
Subhash Kapila, India – Israel Relations: The Imperatives For Enhanced Strategic Cooperation, South Asia Analysis Group : Papers, cited at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers2/paper131.html retrieved on 12-09-2008
Sudha Rao, The Arab-Israeli Conflict : The Indian View (Delhi: Orient Longman, 19720, p.60
Krishna Gopal and Kokila Krishna Gopal, West Asia and North Africa (New Delhi: V.I. Publications, 1981), pp.274-277.
Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years”, Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.5, May 1995, p.493
Krishna Gopal Swamy, n.9, pp.278-279
Farah Naaz, West Asia: Changing Perspectives (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), p.95.
See Indian Opinion on the West Asian Crisis (Bombay: Indo-Israeli Friendship League, 1967).
Arthur G. Rubinoff, n.10, p.498.
Ibid
K.R.Singh, “India and West Asia: Retrospects and Prospects” in Nancy Jetly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999). p.227.
Raja Swamy, “The Case against Collaboration between Indian and Israel”, MR Zine,
30-08-06 cited in http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/swamy300806.html, retrieved on 11-09-08
Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeil Peace Negotiations (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p.28.
Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 27, 1980.
New York Times , January 30, 1992.
Nicola Nasser, “Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi’s Palestinian Policy”, 12 July 2007, Arabic Media Internet Network, cited at http://www.amin.org/look/amin/en.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=7&NrArticle=41334&NrIssue=1&NrSection=3 , retrieved on 09-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, “India and Israel Eye Iran”, FPIF foreign Policy in Focus, February 13, 2008, cited at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4959 retrieved on 10-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, US plays matchmaker to India, Israel, Asia Times on line, June 10, 2003, cited http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EF10Df03.html retrieved on 21-09-2008
Subhash Kapila, n.7.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
Bansidhar Pradhan, “Globalisation and the Shift in India’s Palestine Policy”, in Anwar Alam (Ed.), India and West Asia in the Era of Globalisation (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2008), pp.296-297.
Harsh V. Pant, “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints”, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol8, No.4, December 2004, cited at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Ramtanu Maitra, “Palestinians Pay for Indian Ambitions”, Asian Times on line, September 10, 2003, cited at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EI10Df03.html, retrieved on 25-09-2008.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
S.R.Chaudhari, “Indo-Israeli N-Nexus”, The Hindu, February 10, 1999.
Adam C Castillo, India and Israel: A balancing alliance, International Relations and Security Network, cited at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=19199 retrieved on 23-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Frederick Stakelbeck, Jr., "India and Israel Shape a New Strategic Relationship”, Global Politician , cited at http://www.globalpolitician.com/2345-israel
India and Palestine Question
India’s relation with the West Asia was formulated by Jawarlal Nehru in 1930s. Although Nehru took an impartial view regarding the Arab-Israeli differences in the initial period, he later took the stand of supporting the Arabs by taking into account of the denial of justice to the Palestinians. In the 1939 Resolution adopted by the Indian National Congress, it stated that “in Palestine the Jews have relied on British armed forces to advance their special privileges”. Even Gandhiji was not ready to recognize the Jewish nationalism, which was artificially created in Palestine at the cost of indigenous Arab population. Nehru indicted Zionism for fostering Jewish settlement in Palestine at the expense of the Arab population. Jayapraksh Narayan stated:
“No doubt the Jews were entitled as a persecuted people to compassion and some compensation for the wrongs heaped upon their innocent heads through the centuries. But it was certainly not the Arabs, least of all the Palestinians, who were the persecutors. If the Christian peoples and powers of the West, some of whom had tried mercilessly to exterminate the Jews, were anxious at least to salve their conscience and do a good turn to their victims, they had no right to do it at the cost of the Arabs”
Nehru in his letters to his daughter, Indira, during his prison days commented the British tactics in Palestine in favour of the Jewish immigrants violating the rights of the Palestine as another face of a colonial power. He saw the English in Palestine pitting “Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and (making) it appear that (their) presence is necessary to act as an arbiter and to keep the peace between the two”. All these were some of the basic perspectives of Indian leaders regarding the Jewish colonialism in the pre-independence period.
The first task before India in its post independence period was to examine an appropriate solution to the Palestine question by becoming a member in the Special UN Committee. India supported the minority plan which recommended a federation of two Arab and Jewish states by opposing the partition plan of Palestine. (During this period the third world countries were not emerged as members of the UN General Assembly). The decision of India was influenced by the perception of Indian leaders on the Palestine question as well as the partition of India.
When Israel became a reality in 1948, India had several reservations in granting recognition to it. Nehru openly stated the reason as a gesture of supporting the stand of Arab countries. Moreover, India opposed U.N. membership for Israel in 1949. By 1950 a series of efforts had been made to influence the Indian government to recognize the state of Israel by the Jewish lobby as well as its counterpart in India. Finally, India accorded its recognition to the State of Israel in late 1950 without establishing any formal ties until 1992.
India’s Support to Palestinian Struggle
When Israel invaded Sinai on October 29, 1956 as a reaction to Egypt’s decision to nationalize Suez Canal, India condemned it as a re-imposition of European colonialism in the Afro Asian world. The attack of Egypt by Israel along with British and French forces was viewed as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and all Indian political parties, from right to left, condemned it. India cosponsored resolutions in the General Assembly urging the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Egypt. In fact, the Suez crisis drew Egypt and India closer together and its relation with Israel to low point and ended all possibility for a bilateral tie.
The reemphasis given by India to the Arab cause out of Suez crisis of 1956 is reflected in the unstinting support of India to the case of Palestinian refugees. According to C.S. Jha, India’s permanent representative in the UN, stated in November 1959 that “the problem of Palestinian refugees is not merely an intensely human problem; it is one of great political importance and indeed affects the entire complex of political relations in the Middle East.” India’s hostility towards Israel increased even more after the death of Nehru in 1964. It was evident from India’s refusal to accept Israeli assistance in redeveloping the barren wastes of Rajastan. Similarly, Israeli offer of famine relief given in response to a plea by the UN Secretary General, U Thant was declined by India for political reasons. India condemned the Israeli invasion of Arab lands of Palestine in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In December 1967, D.P.Dhar, a member of Indian delegation to the UN Special Committee, reiterated Indian position, which recognized the Palestinian as a people and not merely as refugees. It also emphasized the need of for a lasting solutions to ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on the basis of UN resolution 194 (III).
In the meantime, the Indian political atmosphere was not fully supporting the views of the government stand. The opposition parties in India, except the Communist parties, demanded a cautious approach in the 1967 war, promoting a neutral stand. The parties like Swathanthra party and Jana Sangh openly supported Israel. It happened on account of the neutral policy of Egypt during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of 1965. Similarly, the Indian press also took a negative approach to official Indian position in the 1967 war. The news papers like Times of India, Indian Express, Statesman and Hindustan Times made critical remarks on Indian policy of supporting the Arabs.
The first setback to India’s relation with West Asia came in 1969 when India was denied participation on the Rabat conference of Islamic leaders due to the opposition of Pakistan. The meeting was convened to condemn the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Moreover, under the initiative of Pakistan the meeting also condemned the communal riots in Ahmedabad. As a reaction to these developments, India recalled its Senior Envoys from Morocco and Jordan. Further, Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, Dinesh Singh held a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Abba Eban in New York, as a first sign of improving relations with Israel. During the Indo-Pak war in November 1971, countries like Egypt and Syria took a neutral stand while countries like Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned India. However, Israel took a pro-India stand by criticizing Pakistan actions in East Bengal.
However, India continued pro-Arab stand even in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. At the same time India gradually moved away from the policy of supporting individual Arab countries by focusing exclusively on Palestine question. Hence in the post-1973 war period India gave more importance to support the struggles of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. In this respect, India played considerable role in the UN to support the PLO’s bid for observer status in 1974. India became the first non-Arab government to extend formal diplomatic accreditation to the representatives of the PLO in January 1975. Moreover, India was a cosponsor of General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975.
When Janata party came to power in 1977, there were speculations about the shift of India’s policy towards Palestine. It was during this period Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign Minister made an unofficial visit to India. However, there was no official action in supporting the relationship with Israel. When Camp David Accord was signed in September 1978 between Israel and Egypt, India opposed it along with the Arab world. In 1980 Indira Gandhi returned to power with the continued support of Palestinian struggle. It was during this period India accorded full diplomatic recognition to the Office of PLO in New Delhi. Moreover, Yasser Arafat paid state visits to India in 1980 and 1982. This line of Indian policy continued until early 1990s. The situation in West Asian witnessed a sea change when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. It was during this period the Soviet Union was disappearing from the world map marking the era of unipolar world. In the meantime, the P.L.O. lost its prestige in West Asia on account of its support to Saddam Hussain. The United States took the initiative of holding international Middle East Peace Conference immediately after expelling Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This marked new era in West Asia due to different varieties of diplomatic manoeuvring. As a consequence to these developments, India also made drastic changes in its policy towards West Asia.
Ties with Israel and Shift in India’s Foreign Policy
The decision of establishing formal ties with Israel was taken by P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister of Congress government in January 1992. The decision was a surprising one, although it looked like a long awaited decision, as remarked by Indian media. In fact, the decision of India to start formal relation with Israel was based on changes in the international scenario. It was the beginning of post-cold war period war era with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s strong ally for a long period. In the new situation India desired the support and collaboration with major international powers like the United States, especially in the wake of the political turmoil in Kashmir. In this respect India had two objectives in promoting its relation with the US. Firstly, to overcome the propaganda unleashed by Pakistan on Kashmir situation. Secondly, India required strategic cooperation with the US due to the demise of the Soviet Union, the leading exporter of arms to India. It was imperative for India to modernise Indian weaponry. At the same time India was fully aware of the complexities in establishing strong ties with the US. In this context India found Israel as a best option of appeasing the US line of policy. It is to be noted that India announced its decision to formally establish relations with Israel on the eve of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to the US.
Moreover, the P.L.O. had already recognised the state of Israel to join as a party of the peace process in the Middle East. So India found a favourable occasion in justifying its ties with Israel. It was also remarked that India’s normal relation with Israel was helpful to get the status of a mediator in the on going peace negotiations. India’s relationship with Israel also marked the shift of India’s foreign policy from the traditional line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist to economic and strategic developments. In the decade following this normalisation of ties, successive governments of both the centrist Congress and the rightist BJP, irrespective of party ideology, have rapidly forged extensive military, economic and political relationship. In fact, the shift within the Indian ruling classes from the official position of non-alignment and state-centred economic development towards a pro-United States policy facilitated and encouraged this change attitude towards Israel.
Milestones in the India-Israel Relations
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israel relationship was that India emrged Israel’s second largest trading partner in Asia after Hon Kong and Israel became India’s largest supplier of military equipment after Russia. Although India’s relation with Israel started at a low profile, a sea change took place after the NDA came to power in 1998. India soon became Israel’s closest ally in Asia with strategic, defence and intelligence cooperation growing rapidly. India became the biggest market for Israeli arms. Israel supplied not only military hard wares but also several high-techs, critical weaponry such as wide array of surveillance items, electronic warfare systems, a ground based Green Pine ABM radar, and phalcon airborne warning and control systems. These arms sales were part of a declared NDA policy to forge an alliance among India, United States and Israel.
The United States has given clearance to Israel’s delivery of phalcon reconnaissance aircraft to India, in marked contrast to Washington’s vigorous opposition to supplying them to China in 1998. The US forced Israel to cancel the deal to sell the phalcons to China out of concern altering the balance of power between China and Taiwan. In February 2003 an agreement was made to supply advanced Israeli avionic systems for the Indian Air Force’s new MIG-27 combat aircraft. There were reports about the collaboration between India and Israel on a missile defence system based on the Israel Arrow technology.
India-Israeli partnership has intensified since 1998 and later led to the visiting of India’s Home Minister, L.K.Advani and India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh to Israel in quick succession in mid 2000. The delegates of the Indian team with L.K.Advani consisted of Heads of India’s intelligence agencies, RAW, IB, and Central Police Organisations fighting terrorism. In addition to this, India’s National Security Advisor, Brijesh Mishra and Services Chiefs have paid their visit to Israel since 1998, underlining the growing strategic cooperation between India and Israel. The top officials of Indian Navy also conducted goodwill visits to Israel.
The Israeli aid during the Kargil war in 1999 was considered by India as a cementing factor in the Indo-Israeli relationship. It was during the visit of Shimon Pares to India in January 2002 India and Israel made major agreements to fight ‘terrorism’. Ironically, the word ‘terrorism’ used by Israel was about the national liberation struggle of the Palestinians, which had been strongly supported by India until late 1980s. An Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesman said during the visit of Pares: “India finds it increasingly beneficial to learn from Israel’s experience in dealing with terrorism”. This line of Indian policy was in contradiction with the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy, supporting all national liberation movements.
The most significant event in the Indo-Israeli relationship was the visit of Israeli Prime Minster, Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003. In fact, the visit engineered much controversy in the wake of the assassination of Palestinian leaders by Israeli military forces during the period. There were series of protests in different parts of India against the Israeli Prime Minister. However, the Indian government adopted a cautious step of either displeasing Sharon or giving much honour against the public sentiments. At the same time, there were many agreements during his visit as Sharon was accompanied by a large delegation of about 30 influential businessmen, eager to forge new contracts and open new markets in India.
When the UPA government under the Congress leadership came to power in mid-2004, it decided to follow the same line of the policy adopted by the earlier NDA regime. During the NDA rule the Congress party had criticised some of the close cooperation between India and Israel. But UPA government followed its relations with Israel without changing any policies. India’s Navel Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Israel in January 2008 to finalise several key defence projects. It was reported that Mehta had reviewed efforts to enhance the Israeli-origin barak missiles defence system.
Major implications in the Indo-Israeli Relationship
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israeli relation is the aberration in the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy. In the first four decades after independence, successive governments sought to project India as country dedicated to decolonisation. This posture offered the basis for the principled foreign policy of Nehruvian state which drew its own legitimacy from the tumultuous anti-colonial struggle that brought about independence for the subcontinent in the late 1940s. But when India decided to establish its ties with Israel, it had far reaching implications including military and intelligence cooperation against Pakistan and Islamic terrorism. In fact, India’s relation with Israel was not a normal one as it expanded into different vital fields, even foiled India’s traditional relations with Arab countries and Iran. It was viewed as a tactic used by the US to bring India into its strategic orbit. As a result, it lost its independent foreign policy initiatives in the post-cold war period.
The traders and business lobby in India and Israel played a crucial role in fostering the ties between the two countries for promoting their interests. The Indian business lobby was not interested any matters regarding the case of Palestinians. Since Palestine has little to offer financially or technologically, while Israel can sell to India what the US refuses to India, these pragmatists insisted that New Delhi had no option but to court the more “valuable” Israel. The official Israeli figures show that Israel exports to India valued $1.270 billion in 2006 and imports $1.433 billion to Israel. Agricultural, water and IT technologies in addition to fertilisers and diamonds are major mutual trade concerns. The State Bank of India became the first foreign bank to open a branch in Israel’s diamond exchange.
The India-Israeli alliance strengthens the US strategic designs for India and the region. India holds significant place in the September 20, 2002 National Security Strategy of the US, a policy document to support the actions of the current US President, George Bush. Like Israel in West Asia, the US needed a close ally in South Asia to confront terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to overcome the challenges posed by China. The Indo-US nuclear deal is the most significant outcome of this kind of policy initiatives of the United States.
“Pakistan factor” was another aspect which cemented the relation between India and Israel. For India, the growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and its support to terrorism in Kashmir and different parts of India were most important challenges. In the case of Israel, the nuclear capability of Pakistan and its support to Palestinian extremists posed a threat to its security. In this context Pakistan was a common threat to India and Israel and any alliance in this direction was considered as most valuable. There were reports about the Israeli clandestine support to Indian nuclear explosion, Pokhran II in May 1998. Even the Sangh Parivar was demanding for an alliance with Israel way back in 1960s and 1970s to face the “Islamic threat” from Pakistan and Kashmir.
India’s relationship with the West Asian countries, most specifically Iran, has been a point of contention in the Indo-Israeli partnership. Israel’s relationship with Iran is extremely antagonistic and unstable. Israel viewed Iran as the most important threat to its security in the region due to the kind of support it extended to Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists. In the case of India, Iran is considered as the most important ally in the region. India paid a lot of respect to Iran on account of its support to Kashmir issue against Pakistan. So India treated Iran as an ideal power in the region to counter Pakistan influence in West Asia. But with the inception of Indo-Israeli ties India’s traditional relationship with Iran badly damaged. Israel’s spy satellite, Tecsar (Polaris), was launched by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence gathering capability. In fact, the real objective behind the launching of the satellite was to undermine the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, India voted twice on the IAEA governing body against Iran under the compulsion from the United States. All these created rifts between India and Iran.
However, it is not possible to follow a negative policy towards the Arab countries by taking into account of many realities. It is estimated that more than five million Indian expatriate work in the Arab countries. Moreover, nearly $25 billion worth of Indo-Arab trade, including 60 per cent of Indian oil and gas imports worth $20 billion, is the basic support of Indian economy. In this respect, India had to follow a soft policy towards the question of Palestine. In order to overcome this dilemma an attempt had been made by Indian foreign policy makers to separate its Israeli policy from the Arab-Israeli conflict. To realise this objective, India has taken a more tactical neutral position on the Palestine question, publicly stating its continued support for the Palestinian case and making deliberative effort to further strengthen ties with ties Arab neighbours.
Conclusion
As a result of India’s new foreign policy decisions, its traditional line of supporting national liberation movements and ant-colonial and anti-imperial stands has been fizzled out. The Palestinians have been waging a struggle for their nationhood for the last six decades against Israeli illegal occupation of lands. India was one of the leading countries which extended all support to the Palestinian cause. India has always opposed the continued illegal occupation of West Bank and Gaza. However, India’s changed policy since 1992 is a blatant contradiction to its avowed policy of supporting the Palestinian cause due to the transformation in the international politics resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, India had enough justifications in establishing ties with Israel by taking into account of the factors like the recognition of Israel by the P.L.O. and some Arab countries. However, the current phase of India’s relation with Israel goes beyond the level of normalcy and reached a stage of much clandestine cooperation for defence and strategic purposes. Ironically, India wants to borrow the ideas of Israeli tactics of eliminating the Palestinian leaders in its efforts to combat terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. For a long period India had been condemning these Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Now the cooperation in the same field with Israel is against its foreign policy principle and the support to the Palestinian struggle.
Moreover, India never used its relation with Israel to resolve the issue of Palestinians. At present India is in a commanding position of using its good offices to influence Israel. However, no attempt was made to pressurise Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. It is very unfortunate that on many occasions since 1992 India was not ready to condemn Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians by sticking to a passive stand of supporting a ‘peaceful solution’ to the crisis. The new diplomatic initiatives of India target only its vested interest against the traditional principle of solidarity with the third world countries. The current trends indicate India’s keen interest to develop close ties with imperialist global powers like the United States for economic and defence benefits undermining its values and principles. In other words, Indian foreign policy lost its direction as it is dictated by the external powers to realise their objectives.
Endnotes
N.V. Raj Kumar (Ed.), The Background of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1952), p.57
Leonard A. Gordon, “Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel”, Jewish Social Studies, 37, Summer-Fall, 1975, p.223.
Jayaprakash Narayan, “The Arab-Israeli Question”, Indian and Foreign Review, Vol.6, July 15, 1969, pp.1-2.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p.789.
For details see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No.11, Document A/364 (UNSCOP Report)
G.Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 2, 1950-52, “1 October 1950”, (Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Jawaharlal Nehru Trust, 1986), p.217.
Subhash Kapila, India – Israel Relations: The Imperatives For Enhanced Strategic Cooperation, South Asia Analysis Group : Papers, cited at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers2/paper131.html retrieved on 12-09-2008
Sudha Rao, The Arab-Israeli Conflict : The Indian View (Delhi: Orient Longman, 19720, p.60
Krishna Gopal and Kokila Krishna Gopal, West Asia and North Africa (New Delhi: V.I. Publications, 1981), pp.274-277.
Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years”, Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.5, May 1995, p.493
Krishna Gopal Swamy, n.9, pp.278-279
Farah Naaz, West Asia: Changing Perspectives (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), p.95.
See Indian Opinion on the West Asian Crisis (Bombay: Indo-Israeli Friendship League, 1967).
Arthur G. Rubinoff, n.10, p.498.
Ibid
K.R.Singh, “India and West Asia: Retrospects and Prospects” in Nancy Jetly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999). p.227.
Raja Swamy, “The Case against Collaboration between Indian and Israel”, MR Zine,
30-08-06 cited in http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/swamy300806.html, retrieved on 11-09-08
Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeil Peace Negotiations (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p.28.
Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 27, 1980.
New York Times , January 30, 1992.
Nicola Nasser, “Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi’s Palestinian Policy”, 12 July 2007, Arabic Media Internet Network, cited at http://www.amin.org/look/amin/en.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=7&NrArticle=41334&NrIssue=1&NrSection=3 , retrieved on 09-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, “India and Israel Eye Iran”, FPIF foreign Policy in Focus, February 13, 2008, cited at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4959 retrieved on 10-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, US plays matchmaker to India, Israel, Asia Times on line, June 10, 2003, cited http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EF10Df03.html retrieved on 21-09-2008
Subhash Kapila, n.7.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
Bansidhar Pradhan, “Globalisation and the Shift in India’s Palestine Policy”, in Anwar Alam (Ed.), India and West Asia in the Era of Globalisation (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2008), pp.296-297.
Harsh V. Pant, “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints”, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol8, No.4, December 2004, cited at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Ramtanu Maitra, “Palestinians Pay for Indian Ambitions”, Asian Times on line, September 10, 2003, cited at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EI10Df03.html, retrieved on 25-09-2008.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
S.R.Chaudhari, “Indo-Israeli N-Nexus”, The Hindu, February 10, 1999.
Adam C Castillo, India and Israel: A balancing alliance, International Relations and Security Network, cited at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=19199 retrieved on 23-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Frederick Stakelbeck, Jr., "India and Israel Shape a New Strategic Relationship”, Global Politician , cited at http://www.globalpolitician.com/2345-israel
Friday, March 21, 2008
Al Qaeda Terrorism in the Post 9/11: The South Asian Response to Security Dilemma
Dr.K.M.Sajad Ibrahim
Al Qaeda terrorism has been an important threat to South Asian security ever since the end of cold war. As a terrorist movement, Al-Qaeda started its operations against Communist Soviet Union, and then turned against the US primarily to oust its influence in the Middle East. But the incident of 9/11 compelled to transform its strategies in the South Asian region, especially its safe base in Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US left the organization wounded, but not dead. In this context Al-Qaeda shifted its operations from Afghanistan to some other hilly regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qaeda realized the significance of South Asia as an ideal place to continue its operations by modifying its strategies. The presence of ethnic strife especially in India and Pakistan provided a breeding ground for the terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Similarly, the insurgency in Kashmir as a cross border terrorism provided an opportunity for Al-Qaeda to involve in the terrorist incidences in India. Although so many reports appeared about the Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist strikes in India, none of them were able to provide solid proof. It shows that the shadow of Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist incidences created much panic in India on matters related to security.
The government of India is keen in handling the issue by promoting greater cooperation with the US programme of war on terrorism. Of late, the terrorist strikes in Pakistan also pin point against the possible involvement of Al Qaeda as a reaction against Islamabad’s cooperation with the US in the Afghan war. In spite of these situations the two countries were not ready to formulate a policy to tackle the issue of terrorism because of the clash of national interest on Kashmir question. India blames Pakistan responsible for the cross border terrorism promoted by Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan claims its superior role in removing Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan during the US invasion. However, the question of Al Qaeda helped to ease the tension between India and Pakistan due to the security dilemma. Still, the phobia of Al Qaeda continues to dominate the major issue of security for both India and Pakistan.
Evolution and Ideology of Al Qaeda
Established around 1988 by Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seemed poised to invade Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahideen veterans to the Saudi government but was rebuffed by King Fahd. Instead the Saudis invited an American-led coalition into the Kingdom to wage war for the liberation of Kuwait. In the wake of the Afghan conflict, bin Laden and his colleagues considered Fahd’s invitation to the American superpower to be indistinguishable from the invitation of the Afghan communist regime had extended to the Soviet power in 1978.
Al Qaeda aims to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network; stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily Americans and Israelis from the Middle East. Usama bib Laden is the core group’s originator and leader. Egyptian Ayman Al Zawahiri who began his ‘career’ advocating within a national context, is generally referred to as the group’s second in command. In fact, Al Qaeda consists of cells of terrorist and support groups that provide financial aid, publicity, shelter and recruiting people. Its political philosophy is radical Islamism – the doctrine that governments must be forced to conform to Islamic law as they conceive it to be. Groups such as the Lebanese Hezbullah, Palestinian Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are suspected affiliation with Al Qaeda, but there is a lack of evidence supporting those suspicions. Al Qaeda believes in Jihad to remove western influences from Muslim areas, especially Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reestablishment of the Caliphate which will then wage jihad against the remainder of the of the non-Muslim world with the aim of conquering it. The activists’ ideology is based on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi and to some extent by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Usama bin Laden has added some twists, emphasising further radicalisation of those ideology. Islamism is not orthodox Islam as generally practiced, but Al Qaeda and bin Laden won a great deal of admiration throughout the Middle East because they are perceived as heroes who stand up to the west.
Al-Qaeda groups may cooperate with other Muslim fundamentalists and draw followers from them, but it is not ideology close to the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia or Shiite Islamist regime in Iran. Wahhanis are intimately connected with support for the Saudi regime and do not believe in overthrowing governments, unlike Al Qaeda. Prior to the events of 2001, Al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan and sheltered by the Taliban regime. With the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda has gone further underground. Its leaders are currently believed to hiding in a region of Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Bin Laden men use an extensive international network to maintain a loose connection between Muslim extremists in diverse countries.
Al Qaeda in the Post 9/11
Most of the study reveals that the Al Qaeda has lost its ground since the American war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The war in Afghanistan has deprived it of a safe haven and of the training camps it used to prepare thousands of recruits for various kinds of terrorist acts. Moreover, the war has also made it difficult for Usama bin Laden to communicate with others around the world. In the post 9/11, Al Qaeda has become much more of an international terrorist movement, a loose association of like-minded militants spread out around the world. The invasion of Afghanistan left the organisation wounded, but certainly not dead. The subsequent incursion of the US into Iraq provided Al Qaeda with room for manoeuvre and, above all, opportunity. They may plan attacks on their own, without bin Laden’s advance authorisation or even knowledge. Many of Al Qaeda’s former leaders have been killed or arrested in the US effort to defeat terrorism. This suggests that the leadership has devolved to key figures in local or regional cells around the world, and they are deciding what kinds of attacks to carry out.
In the post 9/11 bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign to make himself and his movement the primary symbols of Islamic resistance world wide. His ideas now attract more followers than ever. His goals remain the same, as does his basic ideology. In early 2002, Al Qaeda leaders hid in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border. As the fighters went underground the trail for the top three men (bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri) did not materialise. For the next two years, Al Qaeda focussed on surviving – and, with the Taliban, on building a new base of operations around Quetta, in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda also moved swiftly to develop a capability in Iraq, where it had little or no presence before 9/11. The terrorist attacks on westerners in 2002-03 periods were basically to drive out all the foreign forces from the West Asia. Similar attacks were carried out in Iraq to oust the US troops. The recovery of the Taliban since 2004 has been a moral boosting for the Al Qaeda net work in the region.
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 presented two new arenas in which to develop the Al Qaeda paradigm. The invasion itself was analogous to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There have been attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Yemen, as well as in Spain and London as a reaction to the new situation. Al Qaeda has affiliates and cells in many countries all over the world, especially in the Muslim world. Although bin Laden’s net work is still capable of global operations, the American led counter attacks has severely damaged its capacity. Without the Afghan training camps and the many cadres who were killed or captured there, Al Qaeda is struggling to regenerate its losses.
The importance of Al Qaeda as a network rather than just an organisation has increased dramatically since the invasion of Afghanistan. Defeat of the Taliban regime, which had hosted bin Laden and his followers since their expulsion from Sudan, has made it impossible for the terrorist organisation to maintain its hierarchical structure. If bin Laden is holed up in the remote southeast border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, his capacity to control or even influence the course of the terrorist campaign may be considerably reduced. However, the decentralised nature of the terrorist network allows it to be quite effective, albeit in a different way, with little or no direction from the centre. The Al Qaeda, as a parent organisation, provides inspiration, guidance and perhaps some material support rather than exercising direct control. The London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005 provide an example of this latest manifestation of Al Qaeda terror. In the post 9/11 incident the most important requirement for the Al Qaeda was safe places to operate their activities. It was in this context a greater nexus was developed Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in south Asia. As such, the terrorist groups located in Pakistan and Kashmir established cordial relations for the mutual benefit and posed a great challenge to south Asian security.
The current Al Qaeda stands more as an ideology than as an identifiable, unitary terrorist organisation. It has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing the remaining centre’s goals at once simultaneously and independently each other. Hence, unlike the hierarchical, pyramidal structure that justified terrorist groups of the past, the current Al Qaeda movement in the main is flatter, more linear and organisationally networked. The result is that today there are many Al Qaeda rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past. It is now more loosely organised and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational and operational styles whether dictated by particular missions or imposed by circumstances.
Al Qaeda and South Asian Security
The events of 9/11 changed South Asia’s security calculus in unexpected ways. Trans-national threats to US security, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia, brought a US military presence nearer to India. The US presence in the region after the attacks gave India an unexpected opportunity in its own war against terrorism. India expected the US action against Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir. However, Indian realised that the US was not interested in taking any action against Pakistan. On the other hand, the US saw Pakistan’s potential to eliminate these two groups and change the political structure in Afghanistan as more important. While dealing with the new situation India had to face two terrorist strikes, the militant attacks on Kashmir legislative assembly in October 2001 followed by a bloody assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. In response to the new situation, India mobilised its military in 2002 against the possible Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir terrorism. As a result of the Indian strategy, Pakistan’s military regime temporally curtailed the infiltration of militants into India. Traditionally, India had dealt with terrorism in Kashmir through defensive and reactive strategies. Yet, this approach was insufficient for coping with an endless flow of armed terrorist groups from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir. These groups had close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and many of them were trained in Afghanistan.
The 2002 military mobilisation shows that, after Kargil, Indian strategy had graduated from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to terrorism. In fact, India’s strategy was influenced by the response to the September 11 attacks and subsequent US antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s posture in South Asia has been significantly affected by the new international security environment and particularly its participation in the US led war on terrorism. To assure its national security, Pakistan could ill afford to remain isolated and be singled out as a rogue state. It had to disassociate itself from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, cooperate in the installation of a new government in Kabul, and rethink its policy choices on Jammu and Kashmir. Geopolitical factors made Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism all the more necessary.
Similarly, the strategic future in South Asia is vulnerable; any attack similar to Indian Parliament in December 2001 could bring about a new crisis. Although the distinction between terrorist and military acts was apparent earlier, this is no longer the case. The distinctions between regular armies, irregular armies, and Mujahideen have been confused. This implies that Indian military forces should be kept at a high state of readiness. Pakistan now also finds itself increasingly vulnerable to major terrorist attacks. Musharraf and some of his top military commanders repeatedly have experienced assassination attempts. The assassination of Benazir Bhuto during the election campaign in December 2007 exposes the vulnerability of the security issue faced by Pakistan from the terrorists. In fact, the new situation of security vulnerability led to a new understanding of the need to stabilise Indo-Pak relations. The Vajpayee government began the process in April 2002 by extending his hand in friendship to Pakistan on Kashmir soil. In fact, 9/11 has served as a catalyst to move diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan forward.
There were many reports about the intensification of Al Qaeda activities in India with the cooperation of Kashmiri terrorist groups. Yet, there is no evidence supporting Al Qaeda operations in Indian soil since most of such reports were based on speculations and fake phone calls. It shows that many terrorist groups use the banner of Al Qaeda to create panic of terrorism among Indians and to test the security nature provided the government. According to one report Usama bin Laden has set up a loose confederation of organisations, the International Islamic front (IIF) with the help of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islamic.[1] A similar report shows that Al Qaeda had established a wing in Kashmir.[2]
The nexus between Pakistan and Al Qaeda-Taliban ended with the US attack on Afghanistan and the subsequent cooperation extended by the Musharaf regime to uproot the terrorist bases from its soil. In fact, the US was keen for the first time to develop friendly relations between India and Pakistan to combat terrorism. It was under the US pressure, Musharraf has stated that “no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir….Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organisation found involved in terrorism within or outside country”.[3]
Conclusion
In the post 9/11, the global war against terrorism affected the South Asian security in an unprecedented manner. When Al Qaeda lost its base in Afghanistan, it has shifted its operation in some other regions in South Asia, especially in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It provided the chance for the greater collaboration between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Hence all the terrorist strikes in India and Pakistan were treated as a part of Al Qaeda involvement. The case of India is more vulnerable than any other country in the region since terrorism has been the most important issue for the last several decades. The attack on Indian Parliament was the most serious issue in this respect. India’s support to US’s war on terrorism backfired when the latter sought Pakistan help in its war against Afghanistan. Moreover, it was recognition of Pakistan as potential state to fight against terrorism despite its contrary position against India by supporting cross border terrorism in Kashmir. In fact, in the later stage, both India and Pakistan realised its threat from the forces like Al Qaeda. As such, since 2003 both the countries moved towards tackling the issue of terrorism with the involvement of the United States. However, both the countries could not locate the new culprits behind the terrorist incidents with a blind calculation of Al Qaeda involvement.
The most serious threat of south Asian security comes not from Al Qaeda but the terrorist groups operate in the name of Al Qaeda. Moreover, the ideology promoted by the Al Qaeda posed more threat to Asian countries than the attacks. Many Kashmiri groups and others get much inspiration from the ideology of Al Qaeda. Hence, the South Asian states, particularly India and Pakistan, have the duty to locate the groups responsible for terrorism. In this respect, India has no trust on Pakistan, considering its past records. It was in this context India sought the help of the US to support India’s anti-terrorist policy. In the post-Benazir period Pakistan faces tough challenges from Al Qaeda and similar groups than India due to its political instability. Hence, containing terrorist groups is the need of the hour for both India and Pakistan in the post 9/11 era. For this, strengthening relations through bilateral dialogues is the best possible process. This is possible only if both the countries are ready to sort out their differences on crucial issues like Kashmir and cross border terrorism.
Al Qaeda terrorism has been an important threat to South Asian security ever since the end of cold war. As a terrorist movement, Al-Qaeda started its operations against Communist Soviet Union, and then turned against the US primarily to oust its influence in the Middle East. But the incident of 9/11 compelled to transform its strategies in the South Asian region, especially its safe base in Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US left the organization wounded, but not dead. In this context Al-Qaeda shifted its operations from Afghanistan to some other hilly regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qaeda realized the significance of South Asia as an ideal place to continue its operations by modifying its strategies. The presence of ethnic strife especially in India and Pakistan provided a breeding ground for the terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Similarly, the insurgency in Kashmir as a cross border terrorism provided an opportunity for Al-Qaeda to involve in the terrorist incidences in India. Although so many reports appeared about the Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist strikes in India, none of them were able to provide solid proof. It shows that the shadow of Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist incidences created much panic in India on matters related to security.
The government of India is keen in handling the issue by promoting greater cooperation with the US programme of war on terrorism. Of late, the terrorist strikes in Pakistan also pin point against the possible involvement of Al Qaeda as a reaction against Islamabad’s cooperation with the US in the Afghan war. In spite of these situations the two countries were not ready to formulate a policy to tackle the issue of terrorism because of the clash of national interest on Kashmir question. India blames Pakistan responsible for the cross border terrorism promoted by Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan claims its superior role in removing Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan during the US invasion. However, the question of Al Qaeda helped to ease the tension between India and Pakistan due to the security dilemma. Still, the phobia of Al Qaeda continues to dominate the major issue of security for both India and Pakistan.
Evolution and Ideology of Al Qaeda
Established around 1988 by Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seemed poised to invade Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahideen veterans to the Saudi government but was rebuffed by King Fahd. Instead the Saudis invited an American-led coalition into the Kingdom to wage war for the liberation of Kuwait. In the wake of the Afghan conflict, bin Laden and his colleagues considered Fahd’s invitation to the American superpower to be indistinguishable from the invitation of the Afghan communist regime had extended to the Soviet power in 1978.
Al Qaeda aims to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network; stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily Americans and Israelis from the Middle East. Usama bib Laden is the core group’s originator and leader. Egyptian Ayman Al Zawahiri who began his ‘career’ advocating within a national context, is generally referred to as the group’s second in command. In fact, Al Qaeda consists of cells of terrorist and support groups that provide financial aid, publicity, shelter and recruiting people. Its political philosophy is radical Islamism – the doctrine that governments must be forced to conform to Islamic law as they conceive it to be. Groups such as the Lebanese Hezbullah, Palestinian Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are suspected affiliation with Al Qaeda, but there is a lack of evidence supporting those suspicions. Al Qaeda believes in Jihad to remove western influences from Muslim areas, especially Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reestablishment of the Caliphate which will then wage jihad against the remainder of the of the non-Muslim world with the aim of conquering it. The activists’ ideology is based on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi and to some extent by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Usama bin Laden has added some twists, emphasising further radicalisation of those ideology. Islamism is not orthodox Islam as generally practiced, but Al Qaeda and bin Laden won a great deal of admiration throughout the Middle East because they are perceived as heroes who stand up to the west.
Al-Qaeda groups may cooperate with other Muslim fundamentalists and draw followers from them, but it is not ideology close to the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia or Shiite Islamist regime in Iran. Wahhanis are intimately connected with support for the Saudi regime and do not believe in overthrowing governments, unlike Al Qaeda. Prior to the events of 2001, Al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan and sheltered by the Taliban regime. With the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda has gone further underground. Its leaders are currently believed to hiding in a region of Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Bin Laden men use an extensive international network to maintain a loose connection between Muslim extremists in diverse countries.
Al Qaeda in the Post 9/11
Most of the study reveals that the Al Qaeda has lost its ground since the American war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The war in Afghanistan has deprived it of a safe haven and of the training camps it used to prepare thousands of recruits for various kinds of terrorist acts. Moreover, the war has also made it difficult for Usama bin Laden to communicate with others around the world. In the post 9/11, Al Qaeda has become much more of an international terrorist movement, a loose association of like-minded militants spread out around the world. The invasion of Afghanistan left the organisation wounded, but certainly not dead. The subsequent incursion of the US into Iraq provided Al Qaeda with room for manoeuvre and, above all, opportunity. They may plan attacks on their own, without bin Laden’s advance authorisation or even knowledge. Many of Al Qaeda’s former leaders have been killed or arrested in the US effort to defeat terrorism. This suggests that the leadership has devolved to key figures in local or regional cells around the world, and they are deciding what kinds of attacks to carry out.
In the post 9/11 bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign to make himself and his movement the primary symbols of Islamic resistance world wide. His ideas now attract more followers than ever. His goals remain the same, as does his basic ideology. In early 2002, Al Qaeda leaders hid in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border. As the fighters went underground the trail for the top three men (bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri) did not materialise. For the next two years, Al Qaeda focussed on surviving – and, with the Taliban, on building a new base of operations around Quetta, in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda also moved swiftly to develop a capability in Iraq, where it had little or no presence before 9/11. The terrorist attacks on westerners in 2002-03 periods were basically to drive out all the foreign forces from the West Asia. Similar attacks were carried out in Iraq to oust the US troops. The recovery of the Taliban since 2004 has been a moral boosting for the Al Qaeda net work in the region.
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 presented two new arenas in which to develop the Al Qaeda paradigm. The invasion itself was analogous to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There have been attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Yemen, as well as in Spain and London as a reaction to the new situation. Al Qaeda has affiliates and cells in many countries all over the world, especially in the Muslim world. Although bin Laden’s net work is still capable of global operations, the American led counter attacks has severely damaged its capacity. Without the Afghan training camps and the many cadres who were killed or captured there, Al Qaeda is struggling to regenerate its losses.
The importance of Al Qaeda as a network rather than just an organisation has increased dramatically since the invasion of Afghanistan. Defeat of the Taliban regime, which had hosted bin Laden and his followers since their expulsion from Sudan, has made it impossible for the terrorist organisation to maintain its hierarchical structure. If bin Laden is holed up in the remote southeast border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, his capacity to control or even influence the course of the terrorist campaign may be considerably reduced. However, the decentralised nature of the terrorist network allows it to be quite effective, albeit in a different way, with little or no direction from the centre. The Al Qaeda, as a parent organisation, provides inspiration, guidance and perhaps some material support rather than exercising direct control. The London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005 provide an example of this latest manifestation of Al Qaeda terror. In the post 9/11 incident the most important requirement for the Al Qaeda was safe places to operate their activities. It was in this context a greater nexus was developed Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in south Asia. As such, the terrorist groups located in Pakistan and Kashmir established cordial relations for the mutual benefit and posed a great challenge to south Asian security.
The current Al Qaeda stands more as an ideology than as an identifiable, unitary terrorist organisation. It has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing the remaining centre’s goals at once simultaneously and independently each other. Hence, unlike the hierarchical, pyramidal structure that justified terrorist groups of the past, the current Al Qaeda movement in the main is flatter, more linear and organisationally networked. The result is that today there are many Al Qaeda rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past. It is now more loosely organised and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational and operational styles whether dictated by particular missions or imposed by circumstances.
Al Qaeda and South Asian Security
The events of 9/11 changed South Asia’s security calculus in unexpected ways. Trans-national threats to US security, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia, brought a US military presence nearer to India. The US presence in the region after the attacks gave India an unexpected opportunity in its own war against terrorism. India expected the US action against Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir. However, Indian realised that the US was not interested in taking any action against Pakistan. On the other hand, the US saw Pakistan’s potential to eliminate these two groups and change the political structure in Afghanistan as more important. While dealing with the new situation India had to face two terrorist strikes, the militant attacks on Kashmir legislative assembly in October 2001 followed by a bloody assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. In response to the new situation, India mobilised its military in 2002 against the possible Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir terrorism. As a result of the Indian strategy, Pakistan’s military regime temporally curtailed the infiltration of militants into India. Traditionally, India had dealt with terrorism in Kashmir through defensive and reactive strategies. Yet, this approach was insufficient for coping with an endless flow of armed terrorist groups from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir. These groups had close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and many of them were trained in Afghanistan.
The 2002 military mobilisation shows that, after Kargil, Indian strategy had graduated from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to terrorism. In fact, India’s strategy was influenced by the response to the September 11 attacks and subsequent US antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s posture in South Asia has been significantly affected by the new international security environment and particularly its participation in the US led war on terrorism. To assure its national security, Pakistan could ill afford to remain isolated and be singled out as a rogue state. It had to disassociate itself from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, cooperate in the installation of a new government in Kabul, and rethink its policy choices on Jammu and Kashmir. Geopolitical factors made Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism all the more necessary.
Similarly, the strategic future in South Asia is vulnerable; any attack similar to Indian Parliament in December 2001 could bring about a new crisis. Although the distinction between terrorist and military acts was apparent earlier, this is no longer the case. The distinctions between regular armies, irregular armies, and Mujahideen have been confused. This implies that Indian military forces should be kept at a high state of readiness. Pakistan now also finds itself increasingly vulnerable to major terrorist attacks. Musharraf and some of his top military commanders repeatedly have experienced assassination attempts. The assassination of Benazir Bhuto during the election campaign in December 2007 exposes the vulnerability of the security issue faced by Pakistan from the terrorists. In fact, the new situation of security vulnerability led to a new understanding of the need to stabilise Indo-Pak relations. The Vajpayee government began the process in April 2002 by extending his hand in friendship to Pakistan on Kashmir soil. In fact, 9/11 has served as a catalyst to move diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan forward.
There were many reports about the intensification of Al Qaeda activities in India with the cooperation of Kashmiri terrorist groups. Yet, there is no evidence supporting Al Qaeda operations in Indian soil since most of such reports were based on speculations and fake phone calls. It shows that many terrorist groups use the banner of Al Qaeda to create panic of terrorism among Indians and to test the security nature provided the government. According to one report Usama bin Laden has set up a loose confederation of organisations, the International Islamic front (IIF) with the help of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islamic.[1] A similar report shows that Al Qaeda had established a wing in Kashmir.[2]
The nexus between Pakistan and Al Qaeda-Taliban ended with the US attack on Afghanistan and the subsequent cooperation extended by the Musharaf regime to uproot the terrorist bases from its soil. In fact, the US was keen for the first time to develop friendly relations between India and Pakistan to combat terrorism. It was under the US pressure, Musharraf has stated that “no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir….Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organisation found involved in terrorism within or outside country”.[3]
Conclusion
In the post 9/11, the global war against terrorism affected the South Asian security in an unprecedented manner. When Al Qaeda lost its base in Afghanistan, it has shifted its operation in some other regions in South Asia, especially in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It provided the chance for the greater collaboration between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Hence all the terrorist strikes in India and Pakistan were treated as a part of Al Qaeda involvement. The case of India is more vulnerable than any other country in the region since terrorism has been the most important issue for the last several decades. The attack on Indian Parliament was the most serious issue in this respect. India’s support to US’s war on terrorism backfired when the latter sought Pakistan help in its war against Afghanistan. Moreover, it was recognition of Pakistan as potential state to fight against terrorism despite its contrary position against India by supporting cross border terrorism in Kashmir. In fact, in the later stage, both India and Pakistan realised its threat from the forces like Al Qaeda. As such, since 2003 both the countries moved towards tackling the issue of terrorism with the involvement of the United States. However, both the countries could not locate the new culprits behind the terrorist incidents with a blind calculation of Al Qaeda involvement.
The most serious threat of south Asian security comes not from Al Qaeda but the terrorist groups operate in the name of Al Qaeda. Moreover, the ideology promoted by the Al Qaeda posed more threat to Asian countries than the attacks. Many Kashmiri groups and others get much inspiration from the ideology of Al Qaeda. Hence, the South Asian states, particularly India and Pakistan, have the duty to locate the groups responsible for terrorism. In this respect, India has no trust on Pakistan, considering its past records. It was in this context India sought the help of the US to support India’s anti-terrorist policy. In the post-Benazir period Pakistan faces tough challenges from Al Qaeda and similar groups than India due to its political instability. Hence, containing terrorist groups is the need of the hour for both India and Pakistan in the post 9/11 era. For this, strengthening relations through bilateral dialogues is the best possible process. This is possible only if both the countries are ready to sort out their differences on crucial issues like Kashmir and cross border terrorism.
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