Dr.K.M.Sajad Ibrahim
Al Qaeda terrorism has been an important threat to South Asian security ever since the end of cold war. As a terrorist movement, Al-Qaeda started its operations against Communist Soviet Union, and then turned against the US primarily to oust its influence in the Middle East. But the incident of 9/11 compelled to transform its strategies in the South Asian region, especially its safe base in Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US left the organization wounded, but not dead. In this context Al-Qaeda shifted its operations from Afghanistan to some other hilly regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qaeda realized the significance of South Asia as an ideal place to continue its operations by modifying its strategies. The presence of ethnic strife especially in India and Pakistan provided a breeding ground for the terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Similarly, the insurgency in Kashmir as a cross border terrorism provided an opportunity for Al-Qaeda to involve in the terrorist incidences in India. Although so many reports appeared about the Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist strikes in India, none of them were able to provide solid proof. It shows that the shadow of Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist incidences created much panic in India on matters related to security.
The government of India is keen in handling the issue by promoting greater cooperation with the US programme of war on terrorism. Of late, the terrorist strikes in Pakistan also pin point against the possible involvement of Al Qaeda as a reaction against Islamabad’s cooperation with the US in the Afghan war. In spite of these situations the two countries were not ready to formulate a policy to tackle the issue of terrorism because of the clash of national interest on Kashmir question. India blames Pakistan responsible for the cross border terrorism promoted by Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan claims its superior role in removing Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan during the US invasion. However, the question of Al Qaeda helped to ease the tension between India and Pakistan due to the security dilemma. Still, the phobia of Al Qaeda continues to dominate the major issue of security for both India and Pakistan.
Evolution and Ideology of Al Qaeda
Established around 1988 by Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seemed poised to invade Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahideen veterans to the Saudi government but was rebuffed by King Fahd. Instead the Saudis invited an American-led coalition into the Kingdom to wage war for the liberation of Kuwait. In the wake of the Afghan conflict, bin Laden and his colleagues considered Fahd’s invitation to the American superpower to be indistinguishable from the invitation of the Afghan communist regime had extended to the Soviet power in 1978.
Al Qaeda aims to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network; stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily Americans and Israelis from the Middle East. Usama bib Laden is the core group’s originator and leader. Egyptian Ayman Al Zawahiri who began his ‘career’ advocating within a national context, is generally referred to as the group’s second in command. In fact, Al Qaeda consists of cells of terrorist and support groups that provide financial aid, publicity, shelter and recruiting people. Its political philosophy is radical Islamism – the doctrine that governments must be forced to conform to Islamic law as they conceive it to be. Groups such as the Lebanese Hezbullah, Palestinian Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are suspected affiliation with Al Qaeda, but there is a lack of evidence supporting those suspicions. Al Qaeda believes in Jihad to remove western influences from Muslim areas, especially Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reestablishment of the Caliphate which will then wage jihad against the remainder of the of the non-Muslim world with the aim of conquering it. The activists’ ideology is based on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi and to some extent by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Usama bin Laden has added some twists, emphasising further radicalisation of those ideology. Islamism is not orthodox Islam as generally practiced, but Al Qaeda and bin Laden won a great deal of admiration throughout the Middle East because they are perceived as heroes who stand up to the west.
Al-Qaeda groups may cooperate with other Muslim fundamentalists and draw followers from them, but it is not ideology close to the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia or Shiite Islamist regime in Iran. Wahhanis are intimately connected with support for the Saudi regime and do not believe in overthrowing governments, unlike Al Qaeda. Prior to the events of 2001, Al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan and sheltered by the Taliban regime. With the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda has gone further underground. Its leaders are currently believed to hiding in a region of Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Bin Laden men use an extensive international network to maintain a loose connection between Muslim extremists in diverse countries.
Al Qaeda in the Post 9/11
Most of the study reveals that the Al Qaeda has lost its ground since the American war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The war in Afghanistan has deprived it of a safe haven and of the training camps it used to prepare thousands of recruits for various kinds of terrorist acts. Moreover, the war has also made it difficult for Usama bin Laden to communicate with others around the world. In the post 9/11, Al Qaeda has become much more of an international terrorist movement, a loose association of like-minded militants spread out around the world. The invasion of Afghanistan left the organisation wounded, but certainly not dead. The subsequent incursion of the US into Iraq provided Al Qaeda with room for manoeuvre and, above all, opportunity. They may plan attacks on their own, without bin Laden’s advance authorisation or even knowledge. Many of Al Qaeda’s former leaders have been killed or arrested in the US effort to defeat terrorism. This suggests that the leadership has devolved to key figures in local or regional cells around the world, and they are deciding what kinds of attacks to carry out.
In the post 9/11 bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign to make himself and his movement the primary symbols of Islamic resistance world wide. His ideas now attract more followers than ever. His goals remain the same, as does his basic ideology. In early 2002, Al Qaeda leaders hid in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border. As the fighters went underground the trail for the top three men (bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri) did not materialise. For the next two years, Al Qaeda focussed on surviving – and, with the Taliban, on building a new base of operations around Quetta, in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda also moved swiftly to develop a capability in Iraq, where it had little or no presence before 9/11. The terrorist attacks on westerners in 2002-03 periods were basically to drive out all the foreign forces from the West Asia. Similar attacks were carried out in Iraq to oust the US troops. The recovery of the Taliban since 2004 has been a moral boosting for the Al Qaeda net work in the region.
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 presented two new arenas in which to develop the Al Qaeda paradigm. The invasion itself was analogous to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There have been attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Yemen, as well as in Spain and London as a reaction to the new situation. Al Qaeda has affiliates and cells in many countries all over the world, especially in the Muslim world. Although bin Laden’s net work is still capable of global operations, the American led counter attacks has severely damaged its capacity. Without the Afghan training camps and the many cadres who were killed or captured there, Al Qaeda is struggling to regenerate its losses.
The importance of Al Qaeda as a network rather than just an organisation has increased dramatically since the invasion of Afghanistan. Defeat of the Taliban regime, which had hosted bin Laden and his followers since their expulsion from Sudan, has made it impossible for the terrorist organisation to maintain its hierarchical structure. If bin Laden is holed up in the remote southeast border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, his capacity to control or even influence the course of the terrorist campaign may be considerably reduced. However, the decentralised nature of the terrorist network allows it to be quite effective, albeit in a different way, with little or no direction from the centre. The Al Qaeda, as a parent organisation, provides inspiration, guidance and perhaps some material support rather than exercising direct control. The London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005 provide an example of this latest manifestation of Al Qaeda terror. In the post 9/11 incident the most important requirement for the Al Qaeda was safe places to operate their activities. It was in this context a greater nexus was developed Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in south Asia. As such, the terrorist groups located in Pakistan and Kashmir established cordial relations for the mutual benefit and posed a great challenge to south Asian security.
The current Al Qaeda stands more as an ideology than as an identifiable, unitary terrorist organisation. It has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing the remaining centre’s goals at once simultaneously and independently each other. Hence, unlike the hierarchical, pyramidal structure that justified terrorist groups of the past, the current Al Qaeda movement in the main is flatter, more linear and organisationally networked. The result is that today there are many Al Qaeda rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past. It is now more loosely organised and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational and operational styles whether dictated by particular missions or imposed by circumstances.
Al Qaeda and South Asian Security
The events of 9/11 changed South Asia’s security calculus in unexpected ways. Trans-national threats to US security, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia, brought a US military presence nearer to India. The US presence in the region after the attacks gave India an unexpected opportunity in its own war against terrorism. India expected the US action against Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir. However, Indian realised that the US was not interested in taking any action against Pakistan. On the other hand, the US saw Pakistan’s potential to eliminate these two groups and change the political structure in Afghanistan as more important. While dealing with the new situation India had to face two terrorist strikes, the militant attacks on Kashmir legislative assembly in October 2001 followed by a bloody assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. In response to the new situation, India mobilised its military in 2002 against the possible Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir terrorism. As a result of the Indian strategy, Pakistan’s military regime temporally curtailed the infiltration of militants into India. Traditionally, India had dealt with terrorism in Kashmir through defensive and reactive strategies. Yet, this approach was insufficient for coping with an endless flow of armed terrorist groups from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir. These groups had close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and many of them were trained in Afghanistan.
The 2002 military mobilisation shows that, after Kargil, Indian strategy had graduated from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to terrorism. In fact, India’s strategy was influenced by the response to the September 11 attacks and subsequent US antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s posture in South Asia has been significantly affected by the new international security environment and particularly its participation in the US led war on terrorism. To assure its national security, Pakistan could ill afford to remain isolated and be singled out as a rogue state. It had to disassociate itself from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, cooperate in the installation of a new government in Kabul, and rethink its policy choices on Jammu and Kashmir. Geopolitical factors made Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism all the more necessary.
Similarly, the strategic future in South Asia is vulnerable; any attack similar to Indian Parliament in December 2001 could bring about a new crisis. Although the distinction between terrorist and military acts was apparent earlier, this is no longer the case. The distinctions between regular armies, irregular armies, and Mujahideen have been confused. This implies that Indian military forces should be kept at a high state of readiness. Pakistan now also finds itself increasingly vulnerable to major terrorist attacks. Musharraf and some of his top military commanders repeatedly have experienced assassination attempts. The assassination of Benazir Bhuto during the election campaign in December 2007 exposes the vulnerability of the security issue faced by Pakistan from the terrorists. In fact, the new situation of security vulnerability led to a new understanding of the need to stabilise Indo-Pak relations. The Vajpayee government began the process in April 2002 by extending his hand in friendship to Pakistan on Kashmir soil. In fact, 9/11 has served as a catalyst to move diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan forward.
There were many reports about the intensification of Al Qaeda activities in India with the cooperation of Kashmiri terrorist groups. Yet, there is no evidence supporting Al Qaeda operations in Indian soil since most of such reports were based on speculations and fake phone calls. It shows that many terrorist groups use the banner of Al Qaeda to create panic of terrorism among Indians and to test the security nature provided the government. According to one report Usama bin Laden has set up a loose confederation of organisations, the International Islamic front (IIF) with the help of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islamic.[1] A similar report shows that Al Qaeda had established a wing in Kashmir.[2]
The nexus between Pakistan and Al Qaeda-Taliban ended with the US attack on Afghanistan and the subsequent cooperation extended by the Musharaf regime to uproot the terrorist bases from its soil. In fact, the US was keen for the first time to develop friendly relations between India and Pakistan to combat terrorism. It was under the US pressure, Musharraf has stated that “no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir….Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organisation found involved in terrorism within or outside country”.[3]
Conclusion
In the post 9/11, the global war against terrorism affected the South Asian security in an unprecedented manner. When Al Qaeda lost its base in Afghanistan, it has shifted its operation in some other regions in South Asia, especially in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It provided the chance for the greater collaboration between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Hence all the terrorist strikes in India and Pakistan were treated as a part of Al Qaeda involvement. The case of India is more vulnerable than any other country in the region since terrorism has been the most important issue for the last several decades. The attack on Indian Parliament was the most serious issue in this respect. India’s support to US’s war on terrorism backfired when the latter sought Pakistan help in its war against Afghanistan. Moreover, it was recognition of Pakistan as potential state to fight against terrorism despite its contrary position against India by supporting cross border terrorism in Kashmir. In fact, in the later stage, both India and Pakistan realised its threat from the forces like Al Qaeda. As such, since 2003 both the countries moved towards tackling the issue of terrorism with the involvement of the United States. However, both the countries could not locate the new culprits behind the terrorist incidents with a blind calculation of Al Qaeda involvement.
The most serious threat of south Asian security comes not from Al Qaeda but the terrorist groups operate in the name of Al Qaeda. Moreover, the ideology promoted by the Al Qaeda posed more threat to Asian countries than the attacks. Many Kashmiri groups and others get much inspiration from the ideology of Al Qaeda. Hence, the South Asian states, particularly India and Pakistan, have the duty to locate the groups responsible for terrorism. In this respect, India has no trust on Pakistan, considering its past records. It was in this context India sought the help of the US to support India’s anti-terrorist policy. In the post-Benazir period Pakistan faces tough challenges from Al Qaeda and similar groups than India due to its political instability. Hence, containing terrorist groups is the need of the hour for both India and Pakistan in the post 9/11 era. For this, strengthening relations through bilateral dialogues is the best possible process. This is possible only if both the countries are ready to sort out their differences on crucial issues like Kashmir and cross border terrorism.
Al Qaeda terrorism has been an important threat to South Asian security ever since the end of cold war. As a terrorist movement, Al-Qaeda started its operations against Communist Soviet Union, and then turned against the US primarily to oust its influence in the Middle East. But the incident of 9/11 compelled to transform its strategies in the South Asian region, especially its safe base in Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US left the organization wounded, but not dead. In this context Al-Qaeda shifted its operations from Afghanistan to some other hilly regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qaeda realized the significance of South Asia as an ideal place to continue its operations by modifying its strategies. The presence of ethnic strife especially in India and Pakistan provided a breeding ground for the terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Similarly, the insurgency in Kashmir as a cross border terrorism provided an opportunity for Al-Qaeda to involve in the terrorist incidences in India. Although so many reports appeared about the Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist strikes in India, none of them were able to provide solid proof. It shows that the shadow of Al Qaeda involvement in terrorist incidences created much panic in India on matters related to security.
The government of India is keen in handling the issue by promoting greater cooperation with the US programme of war on terrorism. Of late, the terrorist strikes in Pakistan also pin point against the possible involvement of Al Qaeda as a reaction against Islamabad’s cooperation with the US in the Afghan war. In spite of these situations the two countries were not ready to formulate a policy to tackle the issue of terrorism because of the clash of national interest on Kashmir question. India blames Pakistan responsible for the cross border terrorism promoted by Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan claims its superior role in removing Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan during the US invasion. However, the question of Al Qaeda helped to ease the tension between India and Pakistan due to the security dilemma. Still, the phobia of Al Qaeda continues to dominate the major issue of security for both India and Pakistan.
Evolution and Ideology of Al Qaeda
Established around 1988 by Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seemed poised to invade Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahideen veterans to the Saudi government but was rebuffed by King Fahd. Instead the Saudis invited an American-led coalition into the Kingdom to wage war for the liberation of Kuwait. In the wake of the Afghan conflict, bin Laden and his colleagues considered Fahd’s invitation to the American superpower to be indistinguishable from the invitation of the Afghan communist regime had extended to the Soviet power in 1978.
Al Qaeda aims to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network; stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily Americans and Israelis from the Middle East. Usama bib Laden is the core group’s originator and leader. Egyptian Ayman Al Zawahiri who began his ‘career’ advocating within a national context, is generally referred to as the group’s second in command. In fact, Al Qaeda consists of cells of terrorist and support groups that provide financial aid, publicity, shelter and recruiting people. Its political philosophy is radical Islamism – the doctrine that governments must be forced to conform to Islamic law as they conceive it to be. Groups such as the Lebanese Hezbullah, Palestinian Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are suspected affiliation with Al Qaeda, but there is a lack of evidence supporting those suspicions. Al Qaeda believes in Jihad to remove western influences from Muslim areas, especially Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and reestablishment of the Caliphate which will then wage jihad against the remainder of the of the non-Muslim world with the aim of conquering it. The activists’ ideology is based on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi and to some extent by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Usama bin Laden has added some twists, emphasising further radicalisation of those ideology. Islamism is not orthodox Islam as generally practiced, but Al Qaeda and bin Laden won a great deal of admiration throughout the Middle East because they are perceived as heroes who stand up to the west.
Al-Qaeda groups may cooperate with other Muslim fundamentalists and draw followers from them, but it is not ideology close to the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia or Shiite Islamist regime in Iran. Wahhanis are intimately connected with support for the Saudi regime and do not believe in overthrowing governments, unlike Al Qaeda. Prior to the events of 2001, Al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan and sheltered by the Taliban regime. With the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda has gone further underground. Its leaders are currently believed to hiding in a region of Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Bin Laden men use an extensive international network to maintain a loose connection between Muslim extremists in diverse countries.
Al Qaeda in the Post 9/11
Most of the study reveals that the Al Qaeda has lost its ground since the American war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The war in Afghanistan has deprived it of a safe haven and of the training camps it used to prepare thousands of recruits for various kinds of terrorist acts. Moreover, the war has also made it difficult for Usama bin Laden to communicate with others around the world. In the post 9/11, Al Qaeda has become much more of an international terrorist movement, a loose association of like-minded militants spread out around the world. The invasion of Afghanistan left the organisation wounded, but certainly not dead. The subsequent incursion of the US into Iraq provided Al Qaeda with room for manoeuvre and, above all, opportunity. They may plan attacks on their own, without bin Laden’s advance authorisation or even knowledge. Many of Al Qaeda’s former leaders have been killed or arrested in the US effort to defeat terrorism. This suggests that the leadership has devolved to key figures in local or regional cells around the world, and they are deciding what kinds of attacks to carry out.
In the post 9/11 bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign to make himself and his movement the primary symbols of Islamic resistance world wide. His ideas now attract more followers than ever. His goals remain the same, as does his basic ideology. In early 2002, Al Qaeda leaders hid in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border. As the fighters went underground the trail for the top three men (bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri) did not materialise. For the next two years, Al Qaeda focussed on surviving – and, with the Taliban, on building a new base of operations around Quetta, in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda also moved swiftly to develop a capability in Iraq, where it had little or no presence before 9/11. The terrorist attacks on westerners in 2002-03 periods were basically to drive out all the foreign forces from the West Asia. Similar attacks were carried out in Iraq to oust the US troops. The recovery of the Taliban since 2004 has been a moral boosting for the Al Qaeda net work in the region.
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 presented two new arenas in which to develop the Al Qaeda paradigm. The invasion itself was analogous to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There have been attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Yemen, as well as in Spain and London as a reaction to the new situation. Al Qaeda has affiliates and cells in many countries all over the world, especially in the Muslim world. Although bin Laden’s net work is still capable of global operations, the American led counter attacks has severely damaged its capacity. Without the Afghan training camps and the many cadres who were killed or captured there, Al Qaeda is struggling to regenerate its losses.
The importance of Al Qaeda as a network rather than just an organisation has increased dramatically since the invasion of Afghanistan. Defeat of the Taliban regime, which had hosted bin Laden and his followers since their expulsion from Sudan, has made it impossible for the terrorist organisation to maintain its hierarchical structure. If bin Laden is holed up in the remote southeast border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, his capacity to control or even influence the course of the terrorist campaign may be considerably reduced. However, the decentralised nature of the terrorist network allows it to be quite effective, albeit in a different way, with little or no direction from the centre. The Al Qaeda, as a parent organisation, provides inspiration, guidance and perhaps some material support rather than exercising direct control. The London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005 provide an example of this latest manifestation of Al Qaeda terror. In the post 9/11 incident the most important requirement for the Al Qaeda was safe places to operate their activities. It was in this context a greater nexus was developed Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in south Asia. As such, the terrorist groups located in Pakistan and Kashmir established cordial relations for the mutual benefit and posed a great challenge to south Asian security.
The current Al Qaeda stands more as an ideology than as an identifiable, unitary terrorist organisation. It has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing the remaining centre’s goals at once simultaneously and independently each other. Hence, unlike the hierarchical, pyramidal structure that justified terrorist groups of the past, the current Al Qaeda movement in the main is flatter, more linear and organisationally networked. The result is that today there are many Al Qaeda rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past. It is now more loosely organised and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational and operational styles whether dictated by particular missions or imposed by circumstances.
Al Qaeda and South Asian Security
The events of 9/11 changed South Asia’s security calculus in unexpected ways. Trans-national threats to US security, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia, brought a US military presence nearer to India. The US presence in the region after the attacks gave India an unexpected opportunity in its own war against terrorism. India expected the US action against Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir. However, Indian realised that the US was not interested in taking any action against Pakistan. On the other hand, the US saw Pakistan’s potential to eliminate these two groups and change the political structure in Afghanistan as more important. While dealing with the new situation India had to face two terrorist strikes, the militant attacks on Kashmir legislative assembly in October 2001 followed by a bloody assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. In response to the new situation, India mobilised its military in 2002 against the possible Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir terrorism. As a result of the Indian strategy, Pakistan’s military regime temporally curtailed the infiltration of militants into India. Traditionally, India had dealt with terrorism in Kashmir through defensive and reactive strategies. Yet, this approach was insufficient for coping with an endless flow of armed terrorist groups from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir. These groups had close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and many of them were trained in Afghanistan.
The 2002 military mobilisation shows that, after Kargil, Indian strategy had graduated from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to terrorism. In fact, India’s strategy was influenced by the response to the September 11 attacks and subsequent US antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s posture in South Asia has been significantly affected by the new international security environment and particularly its participation in the US led war on terrorism. To assure its national security, Pakistan could ill afford to remain isolated and be singled out as a rogue state. It had to disassociate itself from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, cooperate in the installation of a new government in Kabul, and rethink its policy choices on Jammu and Kashmir. Geopolitical factors made Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism all the more necessary.
Similarly, the strategic future in South Asia is vulnerable; any attack similar to Indian Parliament in December 2001 could bring about a new crisis. Although the distinction between terrorist and military acts was apparent earlier, this is no longer the case. The distinctions between regular armies, irregular armies, and Mujahideen have been confused. This implies that Indian military forces should be kept at a high state of readiness. Pakistan now also finds itself increasingly vulnerable to major terrorist attacks. Musharraf and some of his top military commanders repeatedly have experienced assassination attempts. The assassination of Benazir Bhuto during the election campaign in December 2007 exposes the vulnerability of the security issue faced by Pakistan from the terrorists. In fact, the new situation of security vulnerability led to a new understanding of the need to stabilise Indo-Pak relations. The Vajpayee government began the process in April 2002 by extending his hand in friendship to Pakistan on Kashmir soil. In fact, 9/11 has served as a catalyst to move diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan forward.
There were many reports about the intensification of Al Qaeda activities in India with the cooperation of Kashmiri terrorist groups. Yet, there is no evidence supporting Al Qaeda operations in Indian soil since most of such reports were based on speculations and fake phone calls. It shows that many terrorist groups use the banner of Al Qaeda to create panic of terrorism among Indians and to test the security nature provided the government. According to one report Usama bin Laden has set up a loose confederation of organisations, the International Islamic front (IIF) with the help of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islamic.[1] A similar report shows that Al Qaeda had established a wing in Kashmir.[2]
The nexus between Pakistan and Al Qaeda-Taliban ended with the US attack on Afghanistan and the subsequent cooperation extended by the Musharaf regime to uproot the terrorist bases from its soil. In fact, the US was keen for the first time to develop friendly relations between India and Pakistan to combat terrorism. It was under the US pressure, Musharraf has stated that “no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir….Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organisation found involved in terrorism within or outside country”.[3]
Conclusion
In the post 9/11, the global war against terrorism affected the South Asian security in an unprecedented manner. When Al Qaeda lost its base in Afghanistan, it has shifted its operation in some other regions in South Asia, especially in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It provided the chance for the greater collaboration between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Hence all the terrorist strikes in India and Pakistan were treated as a part of Al Qaeda involvement. The case of India is more vulnerable than any other country in the region since terrorism has been the most important issue for the last several decades. The attack on Indian Parliament was the most serious issue in this respect. India’s support to US’s war on terrorism backfired when the latter sought Pakistan help in its war against Afghanistan. Moreover, it was recognition of Pakistan as potential state to fight against terrorism despite its contrary position against India by supporting cross border terrorism in Kashmir. In fact, in the later stage, both India and Pakistan realised its threat from the forces like Al Qaeda. As such, since 2003 both the countries moved towards tackling the issue of terrorism with the involvement of the United States. However, both the countries could not locate the new culprits behind the terrorist incidents with a blind calculation of Al Qaeda involvement.
The most serious threat of south Asian security comes not from Al Qaeda but the terrorist groups operate in the name of Al Qaeda. Moreover, the ideology promoted by the Al Qaeda posed more threat to Asian countries than the attacks. Many Kashmiri groups and others get much inspiration from the ideology of Al Qaeda. Hence, the South Asian states, particularly India and Pakistan, have the duty to locate the groups responsible for terrorism. In this respect, India has no trust on Pakistan, considering its past records. It was in this context India sought the help of the US to support India’s anti-terrorist policy. In the post-Benazir period Pakistan faces tough challenges from Al Qaeda and similar groups than India due to its political instability. Hence, containing terrorist groups is the need of the hour for both India and Pakistan in the post 9/11 era. For this, strengthening relations through bilateral dialogues is the best possible process. This is possible only if both the countries are ready to sort out their differences on crucial issues like Kashmir and cross border terrorism.
