India’s relation with Israel since 1992 has been viewed as an outcome of the post-cold war scenario. With the demise of the Soviet Union, India lost its long time military supplier and principal diplomatic crutch. It has also grown increasingly disenchanted with Arab sympathy for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. As a result of the diplomatic relations, India showed keen interest in developing high level military and commercial links with Israel, especially during the period of BJP led government of 1998-2004. Israel is now the second largest supplier of arms to India (after Russia). It provides India with missile radar, border monitoring equipment and other similar high-tech military hardwires. In addition, several thousand Indian soldiers have been provided with “anti-insurgency training in Israel”. The latest in the series was the launching of Israel’s spy satellite by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence-gathering capability. The geopolitical implications of the collaboration between India and Israel are grave and manifold. India’s close collaboration with Israel is fundamentally to woo the United States as well as to build a new strategic relation vis-à-vis Pakistan and China.
India and Palestine Question
India’s relation with the West Asia was formulated by Jawarlal Nehru in 1930s. Although Nehru took an impartial view regarding the Arab-Israeli differences in the initial period, he later took the stand of supporting the Arabs by taking into account of the denial of justice to the Palestinians. In the 1939 Resolution adopted by the Indian National Congress, it stated that “in Palestine the Jews have relied on British armed forces to advance their special privileges”. Even Gandhiji was not ready to recognize the Jewish nationalism, which was artificially created in Palestine at the cost of indigenous Arab population. Nehru indicted Zionism for fostering Jewish settlement in Palestine at the expense of the Arab population. Jayapraksh Narayan stated:
“No doubt the Jews were entitled as a persecuted people to compassion and some compensation for the wrongs heaped upon their innocent heads through the centuries. But it was certainly not the Arabs, least of all the Palestinians, who were the persecutors. If the Christian peoples and powers of the West, some of whom had tried mercilessly to exterminate the Jews, were anxious at least to salve their conscience and do a good turn to their victims, they had no right to do it at the cost of the Arabs”
Nehru in his letters to his daughter, Indira, during his prison days commented the British tactics in Palestine in favour of the Jewish immigrants violating the rights of the Palestine as another face of a colonial power. He saw the English in Palestine pitting “Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and (making) it appear that (their) presence is necessary to act as an arbiter and to keep the peace between the two”. All these were some of the basic perspectives of Indian leaders regarding the Jewish colonialism in the pre-independence period.
The first task before India in its post independence period was to examine an appropriate solution to the Palestine question by becoming a member in the Special UN Committee. India supported the minority plan which recommended a federation of two Arab and Jewish states by opposing the partition plan of Palestine. (During this period the third world countries were not emerged as members of the UN General Assembly). The decision of India was influenced by the perception of Indian leaders on the Palestine question as well as the partition of India.
When Israel became a reality in 1948, India had several reservations in granting recognition to it. Nehru openly stated the reason as a gesture of supporting the stand of Arab countries. Moreover, India opposed U.N. membership for Israel in 1949. By 1950 a series of efforts had been made to influence the Indian government to recognize the state of Israel by the Jewish lobby as well as its counterpart in India. Finally, India accorded its recognition to the State of Israel in late 1950 without establishing any formal ties until 1992.
India’s Support to Palestinian Struggle
When Israel invaded Sinai on October 29, 1956 as a reaction to Egypt’s decision to nationalize Suez Canal, India condemned it as a re-imposition of European colonialism in the Afro Asian world. The attack of Egypt by Israel along with British and French forces was viewed as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and all Indian political parties, from right to left, condemned it. India cosponsored resolutions in the General Assembly urging the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Egypt. In fact, the Suez crisis drew Egypt and India closer together and its relation with Israel to low point and ended all possibility for a bilateral tie.
The reemphasis given by India to the Arab cause out of Suez crisis of 1956 is reflected in the unstinting support of India to the case of Palestinian refugees. According to C.S. Jha, India’s permanent representative in the UN, stated in November 1959 that “the problem of Palestinian refugees is not merely an intensely human problem; it is one of great political importance and indeed affects the entire complex of political relations in the Middle East.” India’s hostility towards Israel increased even more after the death of Nehru in 1964. It was evident from India’s refusal to accept Israeli assistance in redeveloping the barren wastes of Rajastan. Similarly, Israeli offer of famine relief given in response to a plea by the UN Secretary General, U Thant was declined by India for political reasons. India condemned the Israeli invasion of Arab lands of Palestine in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In December 1967, D.P.Dhar, a member of Indian delegation to the UN Special Committee, reiterated Indian position, which recognized the Palestinian as a people and not merely as refugees. It also emphasized the need of for a lasting solutions to ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on the basis of UN resolution 194 (III).
In the meantime, the Indian political atmosphere was not fully supporting the views of the government stand. The opposition parties in India, except the Communist parties, demanded a cautious approach in the 1967 war, promoting a neutral stand. The parties like Swathanthra party and Jana Sangh openly supported Israel. It happened on account of the neutral policy of Egypt during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of 1965. Similarly, the Indian press also took a negative approach to official Indian position in the 1967 war. The news papers like Times of India, Indian Express, Statesman and Hindustan Times made critical remarks on Indian policy of supporting the Arabs.
The first setback to India’s relation with West Asia came in 1969 when India was denied participation on the Rabat conference of Islamic leaders due to the opposition of Pakistan. The meeting was convened to condemn the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Moreover, under the initiative of Pakistan the meeting also condemned the communal riots in Ahmedabad. As a reaction to these developments, India recalled its Senior Envoys from Morocco and Jordan. Further, Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, Dinesh Singh held a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Abba Eban in New York, as a first sign of improving relations with Israel. During the Indo-Pak war in November 1971, countries like Egypt and Syria took a neutral stand while countries like Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned India. However, Israel took a pro-India stand by criticizing Pakistan actions in East Bengal.
However, India continued pro-Arab stand even in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. At the same time India gradually moved away from the policy of supporting individual Arab countries by focusing exclusively on Palestine question. Hence in the post-1973 war period India gave more importance to support the struggles of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. In this respect, India played considerable role in the UN to support the PLO’s bid for observer status in 1974. India became the first non-Arab government to extend formal diplomatic accreditation to the representatives of the PLO in January 1975. Moreover, India was a cosponsor of General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975.
When Janata party came to power in 1977, there were speculations about the shift of India’s policy towards Palestine. It was during this period Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign Minister made an unofficial visit to India. However, there was no official action in supporting the relationship with Israel. When Camp David Accord was signed in September 1978 between Israel and Egypt, India opposed it along with the Arab world. In 1980 Indira Gandhi returned to power with the continued support of Palestinian struggle. It was during this period India accorded full diplomatic recognition to the Office of PLO in New Delhi. Moreover, Yasser Arafat paid state visits to India in 1980 and 1982. This line of Indian policy continued until early 1990s. The situation in West Asian witnessed a sea change when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. It was during this period the Soviet Union was disappearing from the world map marking the era of unipolar world. In the meantime, the P.L.O. lost its prestige in West Asia on account of its support to Saddam Hussain. The United States took the initiative of holding international Middle East Peace Conference immediately after expelling Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This marked new era in West Asia due to different varieties of diplomatic manoeuvring. As a consequence to these developments, India also made drastic changes in its policy towards West Asia.
Ties with Israel and Shift in India’s Foreign Policy
The decision of establishing formal ties with Israel was taken by P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister of Congress government in January 1992. The decision was a surprising one, although it looked like a long awaited decision, as remarked by Indian media. In fact, the decision of India to start formal relation with Israel was based on changes in the international scenario. It was the beginning of post-cold war period war era with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s strong ally for a long period. In the new situation India desired the support and collaboration with major international powers like the United States, especially in the wake of the political turmoil in Kashmir. In this respect India had two objectives in promoting its relation with the US. Firstly, to overcome the propaganda unleashed by Pakistan on Kashmir situation. Secondly, India required strategic cooperation with the US due to the demise of the Soviet Union, the leading exporter of arms to India. It was imperative for India to modernise Indian weaponry. At the same time India was fully aware of the complexities in establishing strong ties with the US. In this context India found Israel as a best option of appeasing the US line of policy. It is to be noted that India announced its decision to formally establish relations with Israel on the eve of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to the US.
Moreover, the P.L.O. had already recognised the state of Israel to join as a party of the peace process in the Middle East. So India found a favourable occasion in justifying its ties with Israel. It was also remarked that India’s normal relation with Israel was helpful to get the status of a mediator in the on going peace negotiations. India’s relationship with Israel also marked the shift of India’s foreign policy from the traditional line of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist to economic and strategic developments. In the decade following this normalisation of ties, successive governments of both the centrist Congress and the rightist BJP, irrespective of party ideology, have rapidly forged extensive military, economic and political relationship. In fact, the shift within the Indian ruling classes from the official position of non-alignment and state-centred economic development towards a pro-United States policy facilitated and encouraged this change attitude towards Israel.
Milestones in the India-Israel Relations
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israel relationship was that India emrged Israel’s second largest trading partner in Asia after Hon Kong and Israel became India’s largest supplier of military equipment after Russia. Although India’s relation with Israel started at a low profile, a sea change took place after the NDA came to power in 1998. India soon became Israel’s closest ally in Asia with strategic, defence and intelligence cooperation growing rapidly. India became the biggest market for Israeli arms. Israel supplied not only military hard wares but also several high-techs, critical weaponry such as wide array of surveillance items, electronic warfare systems, a ground based Green Pine ABM radar, and phalcon airborne warning and control systems. These arms sales were part of a declared NDA policy to forge an alliance among India, United States and Israel.
The United States has given clearance to Israel’s delivery of phalcon reconnaissance aircraft to India, in marked contrast to Washington’s vigorous opposition to supplying them to China in 1998. The US forced Israel to cancel the deal to sell the phalcons to China out of concern altering the balance of power between China and Taiwan. In February 2003 an agreement was made to supply advanced Israeli avionic systems for the Indian Air Force’s new MIG-27 combat aircraft. There were reports about the collaboration between India and Israel on a missile defence system based on the Israel Arrow technology.
India-Israeli partnership has intensified since 1998 and later led to the visiting of India’s Home Minister, L.K.Advani and India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh to Israel in quick succession in mid 2000. The delegates of the Indian team with L.K.Advani consisted of Heads of India’s intelligence agencies, RAW, IB, and Central Police Organisations fighting terrorism. In addition to this, India’s National Security Advisor, Brijesh Mishra and Services Chiefs have paid their visit to Israel since 1998, underlining the growing strategic cooperation between India and Israel. The top officials of Indian Navy also conducted goodwill visits to Israel.
The Israeli aid during the Kargil war in 1999 was considered by India as a cementing factor in the Indo-Israeli relationship. It was during the visit of Shimon Pares to India in January 2002 India and Israel made major agreements to fight ‘terrorism’. Ironically, the word ‘terrorism’ used by Israel was about the national liberation struggle of the Palestinians, which had been strongly supported by India until late 1980s. An Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesman said during the visit of Pares: “India finds it increasingly beneficial to learn from Israel’s experience in dealing with terrorism”. This line of Indian policy was in contradiction with the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy, supporting all national liberation movements.
The most significant event in the Indo-Israeli relationship was the visit of Israeli Prime Minster, Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003. In fact, the visit engineered much controversy in the wake of the assassination of Palestinian leaders by Israeli military forces during the period. There were series of protests in different parts of India against the Israeli Prime Minister. However, the Indian government adopted a cautious step of either displeasing Sharon or giving much honour against the public sentiments. At the same time, there were many agreements during his visit as Sharon was accompanied by a large delegation of about 30 influential businessmen, eager to forge new contracts and open new markets in India.
When the UPA government under the Congress leadership came to power in mid-2004, it decided to follow the same line of the policy adopted by the earlier NDA regime. During the NDA rule the Congress party had criticised some of the close cooperation between India and Israel. But UPA government followed its relations with Israel without changing any policies. India’s Navel Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Israel in January 2008 to finalise several key defence projects. It was reported that Mehta had reviewed efforts to enhance the Israeli-origin barak missiles defence system.
Major implications in the Indo-Israeli Relationship
The most important outcome in the Indo-Israeli relation is the aberration in the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy. In the first four decades after independence, successive governments sought to project India as country dedicated to decolonisation. This posture offered the basis for the principled foreign policy of Nehruvian state which drew its own legitimacy from the tumultuous anti-colonial struggle that brought about independence for the subcontinent in the late 1940s. But when India decided to establish its ties with Israel, it had far reaching implications including military and intelligence cooperation against Pakistan and Islamic terrorism. In fact, India’s relation with Israel was not a normal one as it expanded into different vital fields, even foiled India’s traditional relations with Arab countries and Iran. It was viewed as a tactic used by the US to bring India into its strategic orbit. As a result, it lost its independent foreign policy initiatives in the post-cold war period.
The traders and business lobby in India and Israel played a crucial role in fostering the ties between the two countries for promoting their interests. The Indian business lobby was not interested any matters regarding the case of Palestinians. Since Palestine has little to offer financially or technologically, while Israel can sell to India what the US refuses to India, these pragmatists insisted that New Delhi had no option but to court the more “valuable” Israel. The official Israeli figures show that Israel exports to India valued $1.270 billion in 2006 and imports $1.433 billion to Israel. Agricultural, water and IT technologies in addition to fertilisers and diamonds are major mutual trade concerns. The State Bank of India became the first foreign bank to open a branch in Israel’s diamond exchange.
The India-Israeli alliance strengthens the US strategic designs for India and the region. India holds significant place in the September 20, 2002 National Security Strategy of the US, a policy document to support the actions of the current US President, George Bush. Like Israel in West Asia, the US needed a close ally in South Asia to confront terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to overcome the challenges posed by China. The Indo-US nuclear deal is the most significant outcome of this kind of policy initiatives of the United States.
“Pakistan factor” was another aspect which cemented the relation between India and Israel. For India, the growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and its support to terrorism in Kashmir and different parts of India were most important challenges. In the case of Israel, the nuclear capability of Pakistan and its support to Palestinian extremists posed a threat to its security. In this context Pakistan was a common threat to India and Israel and any alliance in this direction was considered as most valuable. There were reports about the Israeli clandestine support to Indian nuclear explosion, Pokhran II in May 1998. Even the Sangh Parivar was demanding for an alliance with Israel way back in 1960s and 1970s to face the “Islamic threat” from Pakistan and Kashmir.
India’s relationship with the West Asian countries, most specifically Iran, has been a point of contention in the Indo-Israeli partnership. Israel’s relationship with Iran is extremely antagonistic and unstable. Israel viewed Iran as the most important threat to its security in the region due to the kind of support it extended to Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists. In the case of India, Iran is considered as the most important ally in the region. India paid a lot of respect to Iran on account of its support to Kashmir issue against Pakistan. So India treated Iran as an ideal power in the region to counter Pakistan influence in West Asia. But with the inception of Indo-Israeli ties India’s traditional relationship with Iran badly damaged. Israel’s spy satellite, Tecsar (Polaris), was launched by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence gathering capability. In fact, the real objective behind the launching of the satellite was to undermine the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, India voted twice on the IAEA governing body against Iran under the compulsion from the United States. All these created rifts between India and Iran.
However, it is not possible to follow a negative policy towards the Arab countries by taking into account of many realities. It is estimated that more than five million Indian expatriate work in the Arab countries. Moreover, nearly $25 billion worth of Indo-Arab trade, including 60 per cent of Indian oil and gas imports worth $20 billion, is the basic support of Indian economy. In this respect, India had to follow a soft policy towards the question of Palestine. In order to overcome this dilemma an attempt had been made by Indian foreign policy makers to separate its Israeli policy from the Arab-Israeli conflict. To realise this objective, India has taken a more tactical neutral position on the Palestine question, publicly stating its continued support for the Palestinian case and making deliberative effort to further strengthen ties with ties Arab neighbours.
Conclusion
As a result of India’s new foreign policy decisions, its traditional line of supporting national liberation movements and ant-colonial and anti-imperial stands has been fizzled out. The Palestinians have been waging a struggle for their nationhood for the last six decades against Israeli illegal occupation of lands. India was one of the leading countries which extended all support to the Palestinian cause. India has always opposed the continued illegal occupation of West Bank and Gaza. However, India’s changed policy since 1992 is a blatant contradiction to its avowed policy of supporting the Palestinian cause due to the transformation in the international politics resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, India had enough justifications in establishing ties with Israel by taking into account of the factors like the recognition of Israel by the P.L.O. and some Arab countries. However, the current phase of India’s relation with Israel goes beyond the level of normalcy and reached a stage of much clandestine cooperation for defence and strategic purposes. Ironically, India wants to borrow the ideas of Israeli tactics of eliminating the Palestinian leaders in its efforts to combat terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. For a long period India had been condemning these Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Now the cooperation in the same field with Israel is against its foreign policy principle and the support to the Palestinian struggle.
Moreover, India never used its relation with Israel to resolve the issue of Palestinians. At present India is in a commanding position of using its good offices to influence Israel. However, no attempt was made to pressurise Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. It is very unfortunate that on many occasions since 1992 India was not ready to condemn Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians by sticking to a passive stand of supporting a ‘peaceful solution’ to the crisis. The new diplomatic initiatives of India target only its vested interest against the traditional principle of solidarity with the third world countries. The current trends indicate India’s keen interest to develop close ties with imperialist global powers like the United States for economic and defence benefits undermining its values and principles. In other words, Indian foreign policy lost its direction as it is dictated by the external powers to realise their objectives.
Endnotes
N.V. Raj Kumar (Ed.), The Background of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1952), p.57
Leonard A. Gordon, “Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel”, Jewish Social Studies, 37, Summer-Fall, 1975, p.223.
Jayaprakash Narayan, “The Arab-Israeli Question”, Indian and Foreign Review, Vol.6, July 15, 1969, pp.1-2.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p.789.
For details see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No.11, Document A/364 (UNSCOP Report)
G.Parthasarathi (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964, Vol. 2, 1950-52, “1 October 1950”, (Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Jawaharlal Nehru Trust, 1986), p.217.
Subhash Kapila, India – Israel Relations: The Imperatives For Enhanced Strategic Cooperation, South Asia Analysis Group : Papers, cited at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers2/paper131.html retrieved on 12-09-2008
Sudha Rao, The Arab-Israeli Conflict : The Indian View (Delhi: Orient Longman, 19720, p.60
Krishna Gopal and Kokila Krishna Gopal, West Asia and North Africa (New Delhi: V.I. Publications, 1981), pp.274-277.
Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years”, Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.5, May 1995, p.493
Krishna Gopal Swamy, n.9, pp.278-279
Farah Naaz, West Asia: Changing Perspectives (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), p.95.
See Indian Opinion on the West Asian Crisis (Bombay: Indo-Israeli Friendship League, 1967).
Arthur G. Rubinoff, n.10, p.498.
Ibid
K.R.Singh, “India and West Asia: Retrospects and Prospects” in Nancy Jetly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999). p.227.
Raja Swamy, “The Case against Collaboration between Indian and Israel”, MR Zine,
30-08-06 cited in http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/swamy300806.html, retrieved on 11-09-08
Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeil Peace Negotiations (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p.28.
Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 27, 1980.
New York Times , January 30, 1992.
Nicola Nasser, “Indian - Israeli Ties Could Neutralize Delhi’s Palestinian Policy”, 12 July 2007, Arabic Media Internet Network, cited at http://www.amin.org/look/amin/en.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=7&NrArticle=41334&NrIssue=1&NrSection=3 , retrieved on 09-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, “India and Israel Eye Iran”, FPIF foreign Policy in Focus, February 13, 2008, cited at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4959 retrieved on 10-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, US plays matchmaker to India, Israel, Asia Times on line, June 10, 2003, cited http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EF10Df03.html retrieved on 21-09-2008
Subhash Kapila, n.7.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
Bansidhar Pradhan, “Globalisation and the Shift in India’s Palestine Policy”, in Anwar Alam (Ed.), India and West Asia in the Era of Globalisation (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2008), pp.296-297.
Harsh V. Pant, “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints”, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol8, No.4, December 2004, cited at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Ramtanu Maitra, “Palestinians Pay for Indian Ambitions”, Asian Times on line, September 10, 2003, cited at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EI10Df03.html, retrieved on 25-09-2008.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Ninan Koshy, n.23.
S.R.Chaudhari, “Indo-Israeli N-Nexus”, The Hindu, February 10, 1999.
Adam C Castillo, India and Israel: A balancing alliance, International Relations and Security Network, cited at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=19199 retrieved on 23-09-2008
Ninan Koshy, n.22.
Nicola Nasser, n.21.
Frederick Stakelbeck, Jr., "India and Israel Shape a New Strategic Relationship”, Global Politician , cited at http://www.globalpolitician.com/2345-israel
