Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Monday, August 13, 2012
Pune Blasts: The Story Behind the Story By Amaresh Misra
Any journalist/writer/columnist of basic integrity has to question and express skepticism, about official version of events. Without being judgmental, he or she also bears the moral responsibility of pointing out contradictions in media reporting about procedures.
An odd thing happened on 2nd August 2012. For a full day, Delhi’s electronic media did not carry `breaking news’ of the involvement of Indian Mujahideen (IM) in the 1st August 2012, low intensity, Pune blasts.
Just the day before, on the evening of the blasts, all channels, talked about the existence of terror (read Muslim) modules in Pune and the like.
A 4th August 2012 Times of India news story clearly states that apart from known terror outfits like the IM, the Central Investigative agencies as well as the Maharashtra Police do not rule out the possibility of Maoists or right wing (read Hindutva) groups executing the Pune blasts (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/New-Indian-Mujahideen-module-may-have-struck-in-Pune/articleshow/15344835.cms) .
Speaking just an hour and a half after the blasts, the Pune Police Commissioner clearly stated on TV that no terror module was under suspicion. He also went on to say that the bombs looked like the work of some mischief makers.
Media’s flip flop over the Pune blasts is understandable. The blasts have come at a time when a turf war between different security forces of both Center and States, is going on. Several articles in nearly all Indian newspapers have carried reports about the inter-force rivalry aspect. This author has written about the turf war phenomenon in two blog articles (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-mainstream-maverick/entry/abu-jundal-prize-catch-or-a-victim-of-a-turf-war and http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-mainstream-maverick/entry/indian-security-agencies-unleash-home-grown-terror1)
The worrying part is that national security is getting affected by disputes between security agencies. The Pune blasts can be seen as an example. They occurred at a time when the tussle for Mumbai’s Police Commissioner Post is getting hot. One of the contenders for Mumbai’s top job is Rakesh Maria, the current Maharashtra ATS Chief.
Rakesh Maria has his admirers as well as detractors. Admirers laud him for solving the 1993 and 2003 Mumbai Blasts. Detractors—in Maharashtra Police and the IB—point out a more, seamier side. Written by Rana Ayyub, a news story in Tehelka Magazine, Vol 6, Issue 49, Dated December 12,2009(http://www.tehelka.com/story_main43.asp?filename=Ne121209in_the.asp) mentions that “a 2005 IB report cast doubts on the veracity of the intelligence Maria had provided about the terrorists (in the 2003 blasts)...”
The Tehelka news story goes on to say that “the report (IB) suggested that Maria and his team had concocted the names of terrorists who didn’t even exist…”
Following the IB report in “2005 itself, Maria’s team was disbanded by then Police Commissioner RS Sharma”; then “while a senior official suggested that the IB report was true, another senior official who refused to be named said it was a major frame up to cut Maria down to size.”
The point here is that whether the IB report was meant as a frame-up or was true—there indeed was a report. Even Maria supporters accept that there is a report! And the report mentions that Maria concocted the names of 2003 Mumbai blast accused! Even if Maria is given the benefit of doubt, in the interest of national security, it is imperative that the IB report is analyzed thoroughly.
It is common knowledge that the current Maharashtra ATS chief was in the Police control room when Karkare, Kaamte and Salaskar died fighting terrorists on the night of 26/11. Vinita Kaamte, wife of one of the slain officers, had a public spat with the current ATS chief (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-11-26/news/28381033_1_cama-hospital-vinita-kamte-ips-officer-ashok-kamte). Vinita suspected that he was the one who sent Kaamte to his death and did not respond to the calls of Karkare, Kaamte and Salaskar for back up. Then the current Maharashtra ATS chief refused to acknowledge that before dying, Kaamte indeed came out of his vehicle and fired bullets which hit Ajmal Kasab.
The role of the current Maharashtra ATS chief during 26/11 and the 1993 Mumbai blasts, remains controversial. Close colleagues of Rakesh Maria point out that Maria was one of the officers involved in the indiscriminate picking up of Muslim men, women and children after the 1993 blasts. Stories of horrible torture unleashed by the Mumbai Police abound. The editorial of 12th May, 1993 of the newspaper Pioneer mentions that “The metropolis’ policemen and their counterparts in Raigad district (where the smuggled consignments of explosive were landed) appear to have cast aside all norms of civilized behavior, democracy and the rule of law. Worse, they seem to have given free rein to their personal communal prejudices. A series of habeas corpus petitions before the Bombay High Court reveal that the police have been indiscriminately picking up ordinary citizen, invariably Muslims, booking them under TADA (a law meant exclusively for terrorists) and then detaining them for inordinately long periods.”
Remember, the Pioneer was and still is a newspaper considered right wing and pro-BJP. Chandan Mitra, Pioneer’s editor then and now, is a Rajya Sabha member from the BJP.
Justice Rajinder Sachar, then a functionary of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) said (http://www.nidokidos.org/threads/33017-Unleashed-terror-on-Muslims)“TADA was being misused…After Bombay (bomb blasts) many Muslims have been arrested under TADA.”
An Amnesty International delegation (http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15112001/17.htm) visited Mumbai to verify stories of unbelievable torture concerning 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts suspects. Here is what the Amnesty International report had to say about Police excesses: “particularly disturbing were the allegations that the police use ‘hostages’ to force the surrender of suspects in the wake of bombing which took place on March 12 1993...the police resorted to taking away...family members of suspects they could not find (http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/ASA20/026/2000/fr/da0239e8-f86f-11dd-a0a9-2bd73ca4d38a/asa200262000en.pdf)”.
The Pioneer also mentioned that “most reprehensible has been its (Mumbai police) treatment of women. One petition filed by a 21-year-old student speaks of how she was assaulted, insulted, and threatened with unspeakable atrocities in front of her father in a bid to get him to reveal the where about of her brother. The policemen willfully ignored basic norms that prohibit women being kept overnight in a lock-up or being interrogated except in the presence of policewomen. The Bombay and Raigad police have unleashed a virtual reign of terror in their respective areas. Their vindictiveness against Muslims has unnecessarily given a communal tinge to what was being seen as an impartial investigation in to a heinous crime.”
In June 2012, Qateel Siddiqui, an alleged IM operative, was murdered by two underworld `Hindu’ figures inside the high security `anda’ cell of Pune Yerwada jail.
IB sources say that Qateel was killed because he was originally arrested by the Delhi Police. The Maharashtra ATS got his custody on the ground that he was involved in 2011 Zhaveri Bazaar blasts in Mumbai, and that he had also planned the bombing of a temple. The Delhi Police Special Cell and the Maharashtra ATS are in loggerheads over several issues. In Janury 2012, the Maharashtra ATS arrested Naqi Ahmed, a Delhi Police informer, who was in fact helping the latter in catching terror suspects!
IB sources reveal that the Maharashtra ATS was unable to find a single piece of evidence against Qateel. According to IB sources “had Qateel lived to tell the tale, the Maharashtra ATS chief would have lost face before his arch rivals in the Delhi Police. In future, Delhi Police would have got the Home Ministry’s backing in refusing to hand over custody of terror suspects to the Maharashtra ATS”.
In 2006, Shahid Azmi, a Mumbai lawyer who was representing the 2006 Mumbai blasts Muslim under-trials was murdered in broad daylight inside his office. Maharashtra Police sources allege that all 2006 Mumbai train blast accused are innocent. And that Azmi was killed because he knew the truth.
It is common knowledge in Maharashtra Police circles that the 2006 blasts were designed as a false flag attack, to cover up the sentencing of the accused in the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts. As the current Maharashtra ATS chief earned his spurs investigating the 1993 blasts, acquittal of the accused by the special TADA court would have meant a body blow to him. To be sure, several key accused like Salim Khan Durrani were acquitted by the TADA court of the charges of conspiracy and harboring.
Allegedly, the 2006 Mumbai train blasts were set into motion to create an atmosphere for the pronouncements of death sentences to several 1993 blast accused. Both events happened one after the other, with the former preceding the latter.
Intelligence sources allege that terror incidents happen, to create an anti-Muslim mood, just before the pronouncement of controversial judgments involving Muslims. The judgment in the 2000 Red Fort case was preceded by Delhi blasts.
As late as July 2012, Faiz Usmani, a Muslim suspect, was picked up by the Maharashtra ATS headed by Rakesh Maria, for questioning in July 2011 Mumbal blasts. Faiz died in Police custody (http://twocircles.net/2011jul19/contact_me_if_innocents_detained_maha_ats_chief_muslim_leaders.html).
Back in 2008, it was the arrest of Afzal Usmani, a car thief that led to the naming of Atif Amin—the Azamgarh boy killed during the Batala House encounter—in 26th July 2008 Ahmedabad bombings. Faiz was Afzal’s brother.
Voices, a book written by Salim Khan Durrani, an accused in the 1993 blasts who was later exonerated by the TADA Court, alleges truly horrifying incidences. Here are some samples:
· Young naked Manzoor Ahmad was told to insert his penis into the mouth of Zaibunnisa Kazi, a woman of his mother’s age.
· Najma (the sister of Shahnawaz Querishi, an accused) was forced to fondle her father’s penis and eat his shit too.
· Then Mumbai Police Commissioner MN Singh told Salim Durrani, who belongs to a royal family of Tonk, Rajasthan, that he was being booked under TADA in the blast case especially because he was an ex-Muslim Nawab. Salim Durrani’s head was forced down into the toilet bowl to eat faeces. When his head could not reach deep down enough the detainee was force to use his hand.
· Nafeesa (accused Majid Khan’s wife) spent two months in jail in a single night suit, badly sinking and soaked in menstrual blood.
· Saaeda (accused Zakir Hussein’s sister) was viciously beaten up in front of her 41 days old infant child who too was slapped. She was not allowed to breast feed the baby for hours together.
· Accused Iqbal Haspatel was repeatedly taunted about the paternity of his children.
· Zahida (Haspatel’s daughter) was separated from her child and detained for 15 days at Srivardhan police station; she was callously refrained from breast feeding her baby.
· Mrs Anwar Theba a newly married convent educated girl was stripped and her naked body placed on ice slab while drunken policemen violated her naked body. Cigarette burns were inflicted on her body.
· Water was scarce even for drinking. Many women inmates were forced to drink their urine.
· Medical treatment was a taboo. Those who could manage to stand up were taken to the dispensary on foot. Hand cuffed they were forced to walk bare foot under the sun, being dragged by sneering and swearing cops who wilfully avoided shady pathways.
· Putting dirty chappals in the mouth was a regular practice.
· Pregnant Shabana was stripped naked and forced to beat her father with chappals.
· Inserting chilli powder into the private parts of was a regular part of the torture.
· Genitals of men and women were targeted in a most morbid manner.
· Urine and faeces were part of the food, spitting into mouth of prisoners and spitting by hired lepers was a regular affair. The police enjoyed all such incidents.
· Wives were `advised’, by lecherous policemen to become prostitutes.
· Small children and infants were incarcerated; they too were subjected to physical and sexual torture.
· Several individuals, including Raj Kumar Khurana, owner of the Stomach restaurant in Bandra committed suicide. The police wanted some information out of Khurana and he was shown what is being done to women and children. Fearing the worst Khurana went home shot his wife, children and then himself.
Only a proper investigation in these allegations can bring out the true picture. However bitter, Indians deserve to know the truth. Nothing less than national security is at stake. Since Mumbai-Pune zone has been under terror attacks for several years now, controversial officers ought to be investigated thoroughly before assigning top jobs.
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
A WORLD WITHOUT ISLAM: Graham E Fuller : Book Reveiw by SHAIKH MUJIBUR REHMAN
A WORLD WITHOUT ISLAM: Graham E Fuller; Little Brown, New York. Hachette India, 612-614, 6th Floor, Time Tower, M.G. Road, Sector 28, Gurgaon-122001. Rs. 595.
To those who are convinced that such titles are suggestive of Islamophobia, A world without Islam could be misleadingly provocative. Those who believe that there can never be a world without Islam or Muslims and that such a thought could be nurtured only at the cost of humanity will find it highly deceptive. The book vigorously argues that Islam has nothing to do with whatever violence, war, or ill-feeling is happening in its name.
What is surprising is that this robust pro-Islamic argument and fascinating pro-Muslim narrative comes from a very unlikely quarter. Graham Fuller, now in the academic field, has served as the vice-chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. That one with such a background will have so many nice things to say about Islam and Muslims is rather difficult to believe.
Graham Fuller attempts to make a convincing case for the innocence of Islam. A substantial part of the narrative is devoted to explaining the evolution of Islam, its relationship with other faiths, and how state power has its own dynamics that often makes Islam a convenient excuse for its wrongdoings and excesses. He argues that “[the] present crisis of East-West relations, or between the West and Islam, has really very little to do with religion and everything to do with political and cultural frictions, interests, rivalries, and clashes.” He goes on to add that three great Abrahamanic faiths — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — share more than they dispute, and it is the states that dispute.
Blame on evangelists
The author, in a very interesting chapter, titled ‘Muslims in the West', blames the evangelists for spreading the misconception about Muslims and Islam. By way of corroboration, he quotes how American evangelist Franklin Graham said things about Islam that are not just disrespectful, but factually incorrect. He observes that some Muslims, who seek to lead an Islamic life in the West, sincerely try to accommodate the western order and in the process make some compromises. He sounds quite convincing when he argues that some high-profile evangelists have been at the forefront in spreading canards about Muslims and Islam. The Islam-bashers are quick to blame Islam for whatever Osama bin Laden did. But, in the case of Adolf Hitler, they have little to blame in Christianity for his dark deeds. It is necessary that all peace-loving people do not fall for such easy unsubstantiated generalisations but seek to find out why such pernicious conflicts should persist for so long. In a multi-cultural world, the objective should be to build bridges across divides. Apparently, it is not just the evangelists, many among the western elite also subscribe to such sweeping generalisations about the Islamic community. British Prime Minister David Cameron's recent statement at a Munich conference calling for a rethink of the concept of multi-culturalism — in effect echoing what German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy had said earlier — is a measure of the deep prejudices and stereotypes the political elite of the West has about Islam and its adherents. Muslims in the West are indeed a global community drawn from diverse backgrounds and have contributed enormously to the enrichment of the western society.
In the chapter on Indian Muslims, the author argues that Hindus and Muslims have demonstrated how by peaceful co-existence they have enriched each other's life. He analyses not just the impact of colonialism, but also Partition, the Bangladesh war, the Kashmir issue, and the Rajinder Sachar report. Some of these issues are extremely complex, and justice cannot be done to them in a single chapter. Yet his conclusion seems to be on right lines. In South Asia, the efforts of ethnic minorities towards faith-based societies have been counter-productive. However, it will be naïve to argue that multi-culturalism is free from danger in India. Fuller seems to be convinced that the war on terrorism is wrong and that its intellectual and moral bases need to be diligently scrutinised.
Clash of civilisations
This book has effectively articulated the challenge to what is popularly known in academic discourse as the “clash of civilisations” thesis. It is an excellent read for those who are interested in understanding the wide range of issues associated with the so-called ‘war on terror'. Moreover, to the extent that the book exposes how some Western regimes are manipulating Islam to advance their own interests, it will go a long way in removing the misconception about that religion and the Muslims as a community. The purpose would be best served if the book is recommended for study at the undergraduate level.
To those who are convinced that such titles are suggestive of Islamophobia, A world without Islam could be misleadingly provocative. Those who believe that there can never be a world without Islam or Muslims and that such a thought could be nurtured only at the cost of humanity will find it highly deceptive. The book vigorously argues that Islam has nothing to do with whatever violence, war, or ill-feeling is happening in its name.
What is surprising is that this robust pro-Islamic argument and fascinating pro-Muslim narrative comes from a very unlikely quarter. Graham Fuller, now in the academic field, has served as the vice-chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. That one with such a background will have so many nice things to say about Islam and Muslims is rather difficult to believe.
Graham Fuller attempts to make a convincing case for the innocence of Islam. A substantial part of the narrative is devoted to explaining the evolution of Islam, its relationship with other faiths, and how state power has its own dynamics that often makes Islam a convenient excuse for its wrongdoings and excesses. He argues that “[the] present crisis of East-West relations, or between the West and Islam, has really very little to do with religion and everything to do with political and cultural frictions, interests, rivalries, and clashes.” He goes on to add that three great Abrahamanic faiths — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — share more than they dispute, and it is the states that dispute.
Blame on evangelists
The author, in a very interesting chapter, titled ‘Muslims in the West', blames the evangelists for spreading the misconception about Muslims and Islam. By way of corroboration, he quotes how American evangelist Franklin Graham said things about Islam that are not just disrespectful, but factually incorrect. He observes that some Muslims, who seek to lead an Islamic life in the West, sincerely try to accommodate the western order and in the process make some compromises. He sounds quite convincing when he argues that some high-profile evangelists have been at the forefront in spreading canards about Muslims and Islam. The Islam-bashers are quick to blame Islam for whatever Osama bin Laden did. But, in the case of Adolf Hitler, they have little to blame in Christianity for his dark deeds. It is necessary that all peace-loving people do not fall for such easy unsubstantiated generalisations but seek to find out why such pernicious conflicts should persist for so long. In a multi-cultural world, the objective should be to build bridges across divides. Apparently, it is not just the evangelists, many among the western elite also subscribe to such sweeping generalisations about the Islamic community. British Prime Minister David Cameron's recent statement at a Munich conference calling for a rethink of the concept of multi-culturalism — in effect echoing what German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy had said earlier — is a measure of the deep prejudices and stereotypes the political elite of the West has about Islam and its adherents. Muslims in the West are indeed a global community drawn from diverse backgrounds and have contributed enormously to the enrichment of the western society.
In the chapter on Indian Muslims, the author argues that Hindus and Muslims have demonstrated how by peaceful co-existence they have enriched each other's life. He analyses not just the impact of colonialism, but also Partition, the Bangladesh war, the Kashmir issue, and the Rajinder Sachar report. Some of these issues are extremely complex, and justice cannot be done to them in a single chapter. Yet his conclusion seems to be on right lines. In South Asia, the efforts of ethnic minorities towards faith-based societies have been counter-productive. However, it will be naïve to argue that multi-culturalism is free from danger in India. Fuller seems to be convinced that the war on terrorism is wrong and that its intellectual and moral bases need to be diligently scrutinised.
Clash of civilisations
This book has effectively articulated the challenge to what is popularly known in academic discourse as the “clash of civilisations” thesis. It is an excellent read for those who are interested in understanding the wide range of issues associated with the so-called ‘war on terror'. Moreover, to the extent that the book exposes how some Western regimes are manipulating Islam to advance their own interests, it will go a long way in removing the misconception about that religion and the Muslims as a community. The purpose would be best served if the book is recommended for study at the undergraduate level.
Thursday, January 13, 2011
Divisions in Our World are Not the Result of Religion
Divisions in Our World are Not the Result of Religion
by ANDREA BISTRICH
Karen Armstrong was a Catholic nun for seven years before leaving her order and going to Oxford. Today, she is amongst the most renowned theologians and has written numerous bestsellers on the great religions and their founders. She is one of the 18 leading group members of the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative of the former UN General Secretary, Kofi Anan, whose purpose is to fight extremism and further dialogue between the western and Islamic worlds. She talks here to the German journalist, Andrea Bistrich, about politics, religion, extremism and commonalities.
ANDREA BISTRICH: 9/11 has become the symbol of major, insurmountable hostilities between Islam and the West. After the attacks many Americans asked: "Why do they hate us?" And experts in numerous round-table talks debated if Islam is an inherently violent religion. Is this so?
KAREN ARMSTRONG: Certainly not. There is far more violence in the Bible than in the Qur'an; the idea that Islam imposed itself by the sword is a Western fiction, fabricated during the time of the Crusades when, in fact, it was Western Christians who were fighting brutal holy wars against Islam. The Qur'an forbids aggressive warfare and permits war only in self-defence; the moment the enemy sues for peace, the Qur'an insists that Muslims must lay down their arms and accept whatever terms are offered, even if they are disadvantageous. Later, Muslim law forbade Muslims to attack a country where Muslims were permitted to practice their faith freely; the killing of civilians was prohibited, as were the destruction of property and the use of fire in warfare.
The sense of polarization has been sharpened by recent controversies — the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, over the Pope's remarks about Islam, over whether face-veils hinder integration. All these things have set relations between Islam and the West on edge. Harvard-Professor Samuel Huntington introduced the theory of a "clash of civilizations" we are witnessing today. Does such a fundamental incompatibility between the "Christian West" and the "Muslim World" indeed exist?
The divisions in our world are not the result of religion or of culture, but are politically based. There is an imbalance of power in the world, and the powerless are beginning to challenge the hegemony of the Great Powers, declaring their independence of them-often using religious language to do so. A lot of what we call "fundamentalism" can often be seen as a religious form of nationalism, an assertion of identity. The old 19th-century European nationalist ideal has become tarnished and has always been foreign to the Middle East. In the Muslim world people are redefining themselves according to their religion in an attempt to return to their roots after the great colonialist disruption.
What has made Fundamentalism, seemingly, so predominant today?
The militant piety that we call "fundamentalism" erupted in every single major world faith in the course of the twentieth century. There is fundamentalist Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, as well as fundamentalist Islam. Of the three monotheistic religions-Judaism, Christianity and Islam-Islam was the last to develop a fundamentalist strain during the 1960s.
Fundamentalism represents a revolt against secular modern society, which separates religion and politics. Wherever a Western secularist government is established, a religious counterculturalist protest movement rises up alongside it in conscious rejection. Fundamentalists want to bring God/religion from the sidelines to which they have been relegated in modern culture and back to centre stage. All fundamentalism is rooted in a profound fear of annihilation: whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim, fundamentalists are convinced that secular or liberal society wants to wipe them out. This is not paranoia: Jewish fundamentalism took two major strides forward, one after the Nazi Holocaust, the second after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In some parts of the Middle East, secularism was established so rapidly and aggressively that it was experienced as a lethal assault.
The fact that fundamentalism is also a phenomenon in politics was stressed only recently by former US president Jimmy Carter when he voiced his concerns over the increasing merging of religion and state in the Bush administration, and the element of fundamentalism in the White House. Carter sees that traits of religious fundamentalists are also applicable to neo-conservatives. There seems to be a major controversy between, on the one hand, so called hard-liners or conservatives and, on the other, the progressives. Is this a typical phenomenon of today's world?
The United States is not alone in this. Yes, there is a new intolerance and aggression in Europe too as well as in Muslim countries and the Middle East. Culture is always-and has always been-contested. There are always people who have a different view of their country and are ready to fight for it. American Christian fundamentalists are not in favour of democracy; and it is true that many of the Neo-Cons, many of whom incline towards this fundamentalism, have very hard-line, limited views. These are dangerous and difficult times and when people are frightened they tend to retreat into ideological ghettos and build new barriers against the "other". Democracy is really what religious people call "a state of grace." It is an ideal that is rarely achieved, that has constantly to be reaffirmed, lest it be lost. And it is very difficult to fulfil. We are all-Americans and Europeans-falling short of the democratic ideal during the so called "war against terror."
Could you specify the political reasons that you identified as the chief causes of the growing divide between Muslim and Western societies?
In the Middle East, modernization has been impeded by the Arab/Israeli conflict, which has become symbolic to Christian, Jewish and Muslim fundamentalists and is the bleeding heart of the problem. Unless a just political solution can be found that is satisfactory to everybody¸ there is no hope of peace. There is also the problem of oil, which has made some of these countries the target of Western greed. In the West, in order to preserve our strategic position and cheap oil supply, we have often supported rulers-such as the shahs of Iran, the Saudis and, initially, Saddam Hussein-who have established dictatorial regimes which suppressed any normal opposition. The only place where people felt free to express their distress has been the mosque.
The modern world has been very violent. Between 1914 and 1945, seventy million people died in Europe as a result of war. We should not be surprised that modern religion has become violent too; it often mimics the violence preached by secular politicians. Most of the violence and terror that concerns us in the Muslim world has grown up in regions where warfare, displacement and conflict have been traumatic and have even become chronic: the Middle East, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir.
In regard to the Arab-Israeli-conflict you have said that for Muslims it has become, "a symbol of their impotence in the modern world." What does that really mean?
The Arab-Israeli conflict began, on both sides, as a purely secular conflict about a land. Zionism began as a rebellion against religious Judaism and at the outset most Orthodox rabbis condemned Zionism as a blasphemous secularization of the Land of Israel, one of the most sacred symbols of Judaism. Similarly the ideology of the PLO was secular-many of the Palestinians, of course, are Christian. But unfortunately the conflict was allowed to fester; on both sides the conflict became sacralized and, therefore, far more difficult to sort out.
In most fundamentalist movements, certain issues acquire symbolic value and come to represent everything that is wrong with modernity. In Judaism, the secular state of Israel has inspired every single fundamentalist movement, because it represents so graphically the penetration of the secular ethos into Jewish religious life. Some Jewish fundamentalists are passionately for the state of Israel and see it as sacred and holy; involvement in Israeli politics is a sacred act of tikkun, restoration of the world; making a settlement in the occupied territories is also an act of tikkun and some believe that it will hasten the coming of the Messiah. But the ultra-Orthodox Jews are often against the state of Israel: some see it as an evil abomination (Jews are supposed to wait for the Messiah to restore a religious state in the Holy Land) and others regard it as purely neutral and hold aloof from it as far as they can. Many Jews too see Israel as a phoenix rising out of the ashes of Auschwitz-and have found it a way of coping with the Shoah.
But for many Muslims the plight of the Palestinians represents everything that is wrong with the modern world. The fact that in 1948, 750,000 Palestinians could lose their homes with the apparent approval of the world symbolizes the impotence of Islam in the modern world vis-à-vis the West. The Qur'an teaches that if Muslims live justly and decently, their societies will prosper because they will be in tune with the fundamental laws of the universe. Islam was always a religion of success, going from one triumph to another, but Muslims have been able to make no headway against the secular West and the plight of the Palestinians epitomizes this impotence. Jerusalem is also the third holiest place in the Islamic world, and when Muslims see their sacred shrines on the Haram al-Sharif [the Noble Sanctuary, also known as Temple Mount]-surrounded by the towering Israeli settlements and feel that their holy city is slipping daily from their grasp, this symbolizes their beleaguered identity. However it is important to note that the Palestinians only adopted a religiously articulated ideology relatively late-long after Islamic fundamentalism had become a force in countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. Their resistance movement remained secular in ethos until the first intifada in 1987. And it is also important to note that Hamas, for example, is very different from a movement like al-Qaeda, which has global ambitions. Hamas is a resistance movement; it does not attack Americans or British but concentrates on attacking the occupying power. It is yet another instance of "fundamentalism" as a religious form of nationalism.
The Arab Israeli conflict has also become pivotal to Christian fundamentalists in the United States. The Christian Right believes that unless the Jews are in their land, fulfilling the ancient prophecies, Christ cannot return in glory in the Second Coming. So they are passionate Zionists; but this ideology is also anti-Semitic, because in the Last Days they believe that the Antichrist will massacre the Jews in the Holy Land if they do not accept baptism.
Do you think the West has some responsibility for what is happening in Palestine?
Western people have a responsibility for everybody who is suffering in the world. We are among the richest and most powerful countries and cannot morally or religiously stand by and witness poverty, dispossession or injustice, whether that is happening in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya or Africa. But Western people have a particular responsibility for the Arab-Israeli situation. In the Balfour Declaration (1917), Britain approved of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and ignored the aspirations and plight of the native Palestinians. And today the United States supports Israel economically and politically and also tends to ignore the plight of the Palestinians. This is dangerous, because the Palestinians are not going to go away, and unless a solution is found that promises security to the Israelis and gives political independence and security to the dispossessed Palestinians, there is no hope for world peace.
In addition, you have stressed the importance of a "triple vision"-the ability to view the conflict from the perspective of the Islamic, Jewish and Christian communities. Could you explain this view?
The three religions of Abraham -- Judaism, Christianity and Islam -- can and should be viewed as one religious tradition that went in three different directions. I have always tried to see them in this way; none is superior to any of the others. Each has its own particular genius; each its own particular flaws. Jews, Christians and Muslims worship the same God and share the same moral values. In the book A History of God, I tried to show that throughout their history, Jews, Christians and Muslims have asked the same kind of questions about God and have reached remarkably similar solutions-so that there are Jewish and Muslim versions of the incarnation, for example, and very similar notions of prophecy. In The Battle for God, I tried to show how similar the fundamentalist movements are in all three faiths.
Jews, however, have always found it difficult to accept the later faiths of Christianity and Islam; Christianity has always had an uneasy relationship with Judaism, the parent faith, and has seen Islam as a blasphemous imitation of revelation. The Qur'an, however, has a positive view of both Judaism and Christianity and constantly asserts that Muhammad did not come to cancel out the faiths of "the People of the Book": you cannot be a Muslim unless you also revere the prophets Abraham, David, Noah, Moses and Jesus-whom the Muslims regard as prophets-as in fact do many of the New Testament writers. Luke's gospel calls Jesus a prophet from start to finish; the idea that Jesus was divine was a later development, often misunderstood by Christians.
Unfortunately, however, religious people like to see themselves as having a monopoly on truth; they see that they alone are the one true faith. But this is egotism and has nothing to do with true religion, which is about the abandonment of the ego.
Too often it seems that religious people are not necessarily more compassionate, more tolerant, more peaceful or more spiritual than others. America, for example, is a very religious country, and at the same time it is the most unequal socially and economically. What does this say about the purpose of religion?
The world religions all insist that the one, single test of any type of religiosity is that it must issue in practical compassion. They have nearly all developed a version of the Golden Rule: "Do not do to others what you would not have done to you." This demands that we look into our own hearts, discover what it is that gives us pain and then refuse, under any circumstances, to inflict that pain on anybody else. Compassion demands that we "feel with" the other; that we dethrone ourselves from the centre of our world and put another there. This is the bedrock message of the Qur'an, of the New Testament ("I can have faith that moves mountains," says St. Paul, "but if I lack charity it profits me nothing."). Rabbi Hillel, the older contemporary of Jesus, defined the Golden Rule as the essence of Judaism: everything else, he said, was "commentary." We have exactly the same teaching in Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism and Buddhism. I have tried to show this in one of my most recent books, The Great Transformation.
The traditions all insist that it is not enough simply to show compassion to your own group. You must have what the Chinese call jian ai, concern for everybody. Or as Jewish law puts it: "Honour the stranger." "Love your enemies," said Jesus: if you simply love your own kind, this is purely self-interest and a form of group egotism. The traditions also insist that it is the daily, hourly practice of compassion -not the adoption of the correct "beliefs" or the correct sexuality- that will bring us into the presence of what is called God, Nirvana, Brahman or the Dao. Religion is thus inseparable from altruism.
So why aren't religious people compassionate? What does that say about them? Compassion is not a popular virtue. Many religious people prefer to be right rather than compassionate. They don't want to give up their egos. They want religion to give them a little mild uplift once a week so that they can return to their ordinary selfish lives, unscathed by the demands of their tradition. Religion is hard work; not many people do it well. But are secularists any better? Many secularists would subscribe to the compassionate ideal but are just as selfish as religious people. The failure of religious people to be compassionate doesn't tell us something about religion, but about human nature. Religion is a method: you have to put it into practice to discover its truth. But, unfortunately, not many people do.
Islam and the West
Discussing Western ideas of justice and democracy in the Middle East, British foreign correspondent of The Independent, Robert Fisk, says: "We keep on saying that Arabs ... would like some of our shiny, brittle democracy, that they'd like freedom from the secret police and freedom from the dictators-who we largely put there. But they would also like freedom from us. And they want justice, which is sometimes more important than 'democracy'". Does the West need to realize that Muslims can run a modern state, but it is perhaps not the kind of democracy we want to see?
As Muslim intellectuals made clear, Islam is quite compatible with democracy, but unfortunately democracy has acquired a bad name in many Muslim countries. It seems that the West has said consistently: we believe in freedom and democracy, but you have to be ruled by dictators like the shahs or Saddam Hussein. There seems to have been a double standard. Robert Fisk is right: when I was in Pakistan recently and quoted Mr Bush-"They hate our freedom!"-the whole audience roared with laughter.
Democracy cannot be imposed by armies and tanks and coercion. The modern spirit has two essential ingredients; if these are not present, no matter how many fighter jets, computers or sky scrapers you have, your country is not really "modern".
The first of these is independence. The modernization of Europe from 16th to the 20th century was punctuated by declarations of independence on all fronts: religious, intellectual, political, economic. People demanded freedom to think, invent, and create as they chose.
The second quality is innovation as we modernized in the West: we were always creating something new; there was a dynamism and excitement to the process, even though it was often traumatic.
But in the Muslim world, modernity did not come with independence but with colonial subjugation; and still Muslims are not free, because the Western powers are often controlling their politics behind the scenes to secure the oil supply etc. Instead of independence there has been an unhealthy dependence and loss of freedom. Unless people feel free, any "democracy" is going to be superficial and flawed. And modernity did not come with innovation to the Muslims: because we were so far ahead, they could only copy us. So instead of innovation you have imitation.
We also know in our own lives that it is difficult-even impossible-to be creative when we feel under attack. Muslims often feel on the defensive and that makes it difficult to modernize and democratize creatively-especially when there are troops, tanks and occupying forces on the streets.
Do you see any common ground between Western world and Islam?
This will only be possible if the political issues are resolved. There is great common ground between the ideals of Islam and the modern Western ideal, and many Muslims have long realized this. At the beginning of the twentieth century, almost every single Muslim intellectual was in love with the West and wanted their countries to look just like Britain and France. Some even said that the West was more "Islamic" than the unmodernized Muslim countries, because in their modern economies they were able to come closer to the essential teaching of the Koran, which preaches the importance of social justice and equity. At this time, Muslims recognized the modern, democratic West as deeply congenial. In 1906, Muslim clerics campaigned alongside secularist intellectuals in Iran for representational government and constitutional rule. When they achieved their goal, the grand ayatollah said that the new constitution was the next best thing to the coming of the Shiite Messiah, because it would limit the tyranny of the shah and that was a project worthy of every Muslim. Unfortunately the British then discovered oil in Iran and never let the new parliament function freely. Muslims became disenchanted with the West as a result of Western foreign policy: Suez, Israel/Palestine, Western support of corrupt regimes, and so on.
What is needed from a very practical point of view to bridge the gap? What would you advise our leaders-our politicians and governments?
A revised foreign policy. A solution in Israel/Palestine that gives security to the Israelis and justice and autonomy to the Palestinians. No more support of corrupt, dictatorial regimes. A just solution to the unfolding horror in Iraq, which has been a "wonderful" help to groups like Al-Qaeda, playing right into their hands. No more situations like Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay. Money poured into Afghanistan and Palestine. A solution to Kashmir. No more short-term solutions for cheap oil. In Iraq and in Lebanon last summer we saw that our big armies are no longer viable against guerrilla and terror attacks. Diplomacy is essential. But suspicion of the West is now so entrenched that it may be too late.
____________________
ANDREA BISTRICH is a journalist based in Munich, Germany.
by ANDREA BISTRICH
Karen Armstrong was a Catholic nun for seven years before leaving her order and going to Oxford. Today, she is amongst the most renowned theologians and has written numerous bestsellers on the great religions and their founders. She is one of the 18 leading group members of the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative of the former UN General Secretary, Kofi Anan, whose purpose is to fight extremism and further dialogue between the western and Islamic worlds. She talks here to the German journalist, Andrea Bistrich, about politics, religion, extremism and commonalities.
ANDREA BISTRICH: 9/11 has become the symbol of major, insurmountable hostilities between Islam and the West. After the attacks many Americans asked: "Why do they hate us?" And experts in numerous round-table talks debated if Islam is an inherently violent religion. Is this so?
KAREN ARMSTRONG: Certainly not. There is far more violence in the Bible than in the Qur'an; the idea that Islam imposed itself by the sword is a Western fiction, fabricated during the time of the Crusades when, in fact, it was Western Christians who were fighting brutal holy wars against Islam. The Qur'an forbids aggressive warfare and permits war only in self-defence; the moment the enemy sues for peace, the Qur'an insists that Muslims must lay down their arms and accept whatever terms are offered, even if they are disadvantageous. Later, Muslim law forbade Muslims to attack a country where Muslims were permitted to practice their faith freely; the killing of civilians was prohibited, as were the destruction of property and the use of fire in warfare.
The sense of polarization has been sharpened by recent controversies — the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, over the Pope's remarks about Islam, over whether face-veils hinder integration. All these things have set relations between Islam and the West on edge. Harvard-Professor Samuel Huntington introduced the theory of a "clash of civilizations" we are witnessing today. Does such a fundamental incompatibility between the "Christian West" and the "Muslim World" indeed exist?
The divisions in our world are not the result of religion or of culture, but are politically based. There is an imbalance of power in the world, and the powerless are beginning to challenge the hegemony of the Great Powers, declaring their independence of them-often using religious language to do so. A lot of what we call "fundamentalism" can often be seen as a religious form of nationalism, an assertion of identity. The old 19th-century European nationalist ideal has become tarnished and has always been foreign to the Middle East. In the Muslim world people are redefining themselves according to their religion in an attempt to return to their roots after the great colonialist disruption.
What has made Fundamentalism, seemingly, so predominant today?
The militant piety that we call "fundamentalism" erupted in every single major world faith in the course of the twentieth century. There is fundamentalist Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, as well as fundamentalist Islam. Of the three monotheistic religions-Judaism, Christianity and Islam-Islam was the last to develop a fundamentalist strain during the 1960s.
Fundamentalism represents a revolt against secular modern society, which separates religion and politics. Wherever a Western secularist government is established, a religious counterculturalist protest movement rises up alongside it in conscious rejection. Fundamentalists want to bring God/religion from the sidelines to which they have been relegated in modern culture and back to centre stage. All fundamentalism is rooted in a profound fear of annihilation: whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim, fundamentalists are convinced that secular or liberal society wants to wipe them out. This is not paranoia: Jewish fundamentalism took two major strides forward, one after the Nazi Holocaust, the second after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In some parts of the Middle East, secularism was established so rapidly and aggressively that it was experienced as a lethal assault.
The fact that fundamentalism is also a phenomenon in politics was stressed only recently by former US president Jimmy Carter when he voiced his concerns over the increasing merging of religion and state in the Bush administration, and the element of fundamentalism in the White House. Carter sees that traits of religious fundamentalists are also applicable to neo-conservatives. There seems to be a major controversy between, on the one hand, so called hard-liners or conservatives and, on the other, the progressives. Is this a typical phenomenon of today's world?
The United States is not alone in this. Yes, there is a new intolerance and aggression in Europe too as well as in Muslim countries and the Middle East. Culture is always-and has always been-contested. There are always people who have a different view of their country and are ready to fight for it. American Christian fundamentalists are not in favour of democracy; and it is true that many of the Neo-Cons, many of whom incline towards this fundamentalism, have very hard-line, limited views. These are dangerous and difficult times and when people are frightened they tend to retreat into ideological ghettos and build new barriers against the "other". Democracy is really what religious people call "a state of grace." It is an ideal that is rarely achieved, that has constantly to be reaffirmed, lest it be lost. And it is very difficult to fulfil. We are all-Americans and Europeans-falling short of the democratic ideal during the so called "war against terror."
Could you specify the political reasons that you identified as the chief causes of the growing divide between Muslim and Western societies?
In the Middle East, modernization has been impeded by the Arab/Israeli conflict, which has become symbolic to Christian, Jewish and Muslim fundamentalists and is the bleeding heart of the problem. Unless a just political solution can be found that is satisfactory to everybody¸ there is no hope of peace. There is also the problem of oil, which has made some of these countries the target of Western greed. In the West, in order to preserve our strategic position and cheap oil supply, we have often supported rulers-such as the shahs of Iran, the Saudis and, initially, Saddam Hussein-who have established dictatorial regimes which suppressed any normal opposition. The only place where people felt free to express their distress has been the mosque.
The modern world has been very violent. Between 1914 and 1945, seventy million people died in Europe as a result of war. We should not be surprised that modern religion has become violent too; it often mimics the violence preached by secular politicians. Most of the violence and terror that concerns us in the Muslim world has grown up in regions where warfare, displacement and conflict have been traumatic and have even become chronic: the Middle East, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir.
In regard to the Arab-Israeli-conflict you have said that for Muslims it has become, "a symbol of their impotence in the modern world." What does that really mean?
The Arab-Israeli conflict began, on both sides, as a purely secular conflict about a land. Zionism began as a rebellion against religious Judaism and at the outset most Orthodox rabbis condemned Zionism as a blasphemous secularization of the Land of Israel, one of the most sacred symbols of Judaism. Similarly the ideology of the PLO was secular-many of the Palestinians, of course, are Christian. But unfortunately the conflict was allowed to fester; on both sides the conflict became sacralized and, therefore, far more difficult to sort out.
In most fundamentalist movements, certain issues acquire symbolic value and come to represent everything that is wrong with modernity. In Judaism, the secular state of Israel has inspired every single fundamentalist movement, because it represents so graphically the penetration of the secular ethos into Jewish religious life. Some Jewish fundamentalists are passionately for the state of Israel and see it as sacred and holy; involvement in Israeli politics is a sacred act of tikkun, restoration of the world; making a settlement in the occupied territories is also an act of tikkun and some believe that it will hasten the coming of the Messiah. But the ultra-Orthodox Jews are often against the state of Israel: some see it as an evil abomination (Jews are supposed to wait for the Messiah to restore a religious state in the Holy Land) and others regard it as purely neutral and hold aloof from it as far as they can. Many Jews too see Israel as a phoenix rising out of the ashes of Auschwitz-and have found it a way of coping with the Shoah.
But for many Muslims the plight of the Palestinians represents everything that is wrong with the modern world. The fact that in 1948, 750,000 Palestinians could lose their homes with the apparent approval of the world symbolizes the impotence of Islam in the modern world vis-à-vis the West. The Qur'an teaches that if Muslims live justly and decently, their societies will prosper because they will be in tune with the fundamental laws of the universe. Islam was always a religion of success, going from one triumph to another, but Muslims have been able to make no headway against the secular West and the plight of the Palestinians epitomizes this impotence. Jerusalem is also the third holiest place in the Islamic world, and when Muslims see their sacred shrines on the Haram al-Sharif [the Noble Sanctuary, also known as Temple Mount]-surrounded by the towering Israeli settlements and feel that their holy city is slipping daily from their grasp, this symbolizes their beleaguered identity. However it is important to note that the Palestinians only adopted a religiously articulated ideology relatively late-long after Islamic fundamentalism had become a force in countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. Their resistance movement remained secular in ethos until the first intifada in 1987. And it is also important to note that Hamas, for example, is very different from a movement like al-Qaeda, which has global ambitions. Hamas is a resistance movement; it does not attack Americans or British but concentrates on attacking the occupying power. It is yet another instance of "fundamentalism" as a religious form of nationalism.
The Arab Israeli conflict has also become pivotal to Christian fundamentalists in the United States. The Christian Right believes that unless the Jews are in their land, fulfilling the ancient prophecies, Christ cannot return in glory in the Second Coming. So they are passionate Zionists; but this ideology is also anti-Semitic, because in the Last Days they believe that the Antichrist will massacre the Jews in the Holy Land if they do not accept baptism.
Do you think the West has some responsibility for what is happening in Palestine?
Western people have a responsibility for everybody who is suffering in the world. We are among the richest and most powerful countries and cannot morally or religiously stand by and witness poverty, dispossession or injustice, whether that is happening in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya or Africa. But Western people have a particular responsibility for the Arab-Israeli situation. In the Balfour Declaration (1917), Britain approved of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and ignored the aspirations and plight of the native Palestinians. And today the United States supports Israel economically and politically and also tends to ignore the plight of the Palestinians. This is dangerous, because the Palestinians are not going to go away, and unless a solution is found that promises security to the Israelis and gives political independence and security to the dispossessed Palestinians, there is no hope for world peace.
In addition, you have stressed the importance of a "triple vision"-the ability to view the conflict from the perspective of the Islamic, Jewish and Christian communities. Could you explain this view?
The three religions of Abraham -- Judaism, Christianity and Islam -- can and should be viewed as one religious tradition that went in three different directions. I have always tried to see them in this way; none is superior to any of the others. Each has its own particular genius; each its own particular flaws. Jews, Christians and Muslims worship the same God and share the same moral values. In the book A History of God, I tried to show that throughout their history, Jews, Christians and Muslims have asked the same kind of questions about God and have reached remarkably similar solutions-so that there are Jewish and Muslim versions of the incarnation, for example, and very similar notions of prophecy. In The Battle for God, I tried to show how similar the fundamentalist movements are in all three faiths.
Jews, however, have always found it difficult to accept the later faiths of Christianity and Islam; Christianity has always had an uneasy relationship with Judaism, the parent faith, and has seen Islam as a blasphemous imitation of revelation. The Qur'an, however, has a positive view of both Judaism and Christianity and constantly asserts that Muhammad did not come to cancel out the faiths of "the People of the Book": you cannot be a Muslim unless you also revere the prophets Abraham, David, Noah, Moses and Jesus-whom the Muslims regard as prophets-as in fact do many of the New Testament writers. Luke's gospel calls Jesus a prophet from start to finish; the idea that Jesus was divine was a later development, often misunderstood by Christians.
Unfortunately, however, religious people like to see themselves as having a monopoly on truth; they see that they alone are the one true faith. But this is egotism and has nothing to do with true religion, which is about the abandonment of the ego.
Too often it seems that religious people are not necessarily more compassionate, more tolerant, more peaceful or more spiritual than others. America, for example, is a very religious country, and at the same time it is the most unequal socially and economically. What does this say about the purpose of religion?
The world religions all insist that the one, single test of any type of religiosity is that it must issue in practical compassion. They have nearly all developed a version of the Golden Rule: "Do not do to others what you would not have done to you." This demands that we look into our own hearts, discover what it is that gives us pain and then refuse, under any circumstances, to inflict that pain on anybody else. Compassion demands that we "feel with" the other; that we dethrone ourselves from the centre of our world and put another there. This is the bedrock message of the Qur'an, of the New Testament ("I can have faith that moves mountains," says St. Paul, "but if I lack charity it profits me nothing."). Rabbi Hillel, the older contemporary of Jesus, defined the Golden Rule as the essence of Judaism: everything else, he said, was "commentary." We have exactly the same teaching in Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism and Buddhism. I have tried to show this in one of my most recent books, The Great Transformation.
The traditions all insist that it is not enough simply to show compassion to your own group. You must have what the Chinese call jian ai, concern for everybody. Or as Jewish law puts it: "Honour the stranger." "Love your enemies," said Jesus: if you simply love your own kind, this is purely self-interest and a form of group egotism. The traditions also insist that it is the daily, hourly practice of compassion -not the adoption of the correct "beliefs" or the correct sexuality- that will bring us into the presence of what is called God, Nirvana, Brahman or the Dao. Religion is thus inseparable from altruism.
So why aren't religious people compassionate? What does that say about them? Compassion is not a popular virtue. Many religious people prefer to be right rather than compassionate. They don't want to give up their egos. They want religion to give them a little mild uplift once a week so that they can return to their ordinary selfish lives, unscathed by the demands of their tradition. Religion is hard work; not many people do it well. But are secularists any better? Many secularists would subscribe to the compassionate ideal but are just as selfish as religious people. The failure of religious people to be compassionate doesn't tell us something about religion, but about human nature. Religion is a method: you have to put it into practice to discover its truth. But, unfortunately, not many people do.
Islam and the West
Discussing Western ideas of justice and democracy in the Middle East, British foreign correspondent of The Independent, Robert Fisk, says: "We keep on saying that Arabs ... would like some of our shiny, brittle democracy, that they'd like freedom from the secret police and freedom from the dictators-who we largely put there. But they would also like freedom from us. And they want justice, which is sometimes more important than 'democracy'". Does the West need to realize that Muslims can run a modern state, but it is perhaps not the kind of democracy we want to see?
As Muslim intellectuals made clear, Islam is quite compatible with democracy, but unfortunately democracy has acquired a bad name in many Muslim countries. It seems that the West has said consistently: we believe in freedom and democracy, but you have to be ruled by dictators like the shahs or Saddam Hussein. There seems to have been a double standard. Robert Fisk is right: when I was in Pakistan recently and quoted Mr Bush-"They hate our freedom!"-the whole audience roared with laughter.
Democracy cannot be imposed by armies and tanks and coercion. The modern spirit has two essential ingredients; if these are not present, no matter how many fighter jets, computers or sky scrapers you have, your country is not really "modern".
The first of these is independence. The modernization of Europe from 16th to the 20th century was punctuated by declarations of independence on all fronts: religious, intellectual, political, economic. People demanded freedom to think, invent, and create as they chose.
The second quality is innovation as we modernized in the West: we were always creating something new; there was a dynamism and excitement to the process, even though it was often traumatic.
But in the Muslim world, modernity did not come with independence but with colonial subjugation; and still Muslims are not free, because the Western powers are often controlling their politics behind the scenes to secure the oil supply etc. Instead of independence there has been an unhealthy dependence and loss of freedom. Unless people feel free, any "democracy" is going to be superficial and flawed. And modernity did not come with innovation to the Muslims: because we were so far ahead, they could only copy us. So instead of innovation you have imitation.
We also know in our own lives that it is difficult-even impossible-to be creative when we feel under attack. Muslims often feel on the defensive and that makes it difficult to modernize and democratize creatively-especially when there are troops, tanks and occupying forces on the streets.
Do you see any common ground between Western world and Islam?
This will only be possible if the political issues are resolved. There is great common ground between the ideals of Islam and the modern Western ideal, and many Muslims have long realized this. At the beginning of the twentieth century, almost every single Muslim intellectual was in love with the West and wanted their countries to look just like Britain and France. Some even said that the West was more "Islamic" than the unmodernized Muslim countries, because in their modern economies they were able to come closer to the essential teaching of the Koran, which preaches the importance of social justice and equity. At this time, Muslims recognized the modern, democratic West as deeply congenial. In 1906, Muslim clerics campaigned alongside secularist intellectuals in Iran for representational government and constitutional rule. When they achieved their goal, the grand ayatollah said that the new constitution was the next best thing to the coming of the Shiite Messiah, because it would limit the tyranny of the shah and that was a project worthy of every Muslim. Unfortunately the British then discovered oil in Iran and never let the new parliament function freely. Muslims became disenchanted with the West as a result of Western foreign policy: Suez, Israel/Palestine, Western support of corrupt regimes, and so on.
What is needed from a very practical point of view to bridge the gap? What would you advise our leaders-our politicians and governments?
A revised foreign policy. A solution in Israel/Palestine that gives security to the Israelis and justice and autonomy to the Palestinians. No more support of corrupt, dictatorial regimes. A just solution to the unfolding horror in Iraq, which has been a "wonderful" help to groups like Al-Qaeda, playing right into their hands. No more situations like Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay. Money poured into Afghanistan and Palestine. A solution to Kashmir. No more short-term solutions for cheap oil. In Iraq and in Lebanon last summer we saw that our big armies are no longer viable against guerrilla and terror attacks. Diplomacy is essential. But suspicion of the West is now so entrenched that it may be too late.
____________________
ANDREA BISTRICH is a journalist based in Munich, Germany.
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Towards Understanding Islam in the Postcolonial World Order
Towards Understanding Islam in the Postcolonial World Order
Taj Hashmi
Honolulu, Hawaii
Email: taj_hashmi@hotmail.com
Overview
As the discord between modern and traditional Muslims is ideological by nature, so is the conflict between Islam and the West. And ideology is more about power, influence and identity than a mere reflection of culture and belief system. While modern Muslim elites are unwilling to concede power and privileges to the mullahs, most mullahs and their followers – mostly rural and small town lower elites with traditional Islamic or “vernacular” education – are also unwavering about not conceding any ground to non-traditional “Westernized” Muslims. The Iranian Revolution and the Taliban/al-Qaeda experiment in Afghanistan have inspired mullahs and their followers to go the Khomeini or Taliban way. Meanwhile Western duplicities and open support for Islamists during the Cold War had further emboldened Islamists within and beyond the Muslim World. State-sponsorship of Islamism by Saudi Arabia, Gulf States and Pakistan, among other states, has also been a contributing factor to the rise of political Islam. Arab autocrats promote Sunni orthodoxy to contain Shiite Iranian influence; and Pakistani rulers sometimes promote Islamists to bleed archrival India and to neutralize secular democratic opposition at home.
For distancing ourselves from any pseudo-history of Islamism, we need to understand that postcolonial Islamist re-assertion is a legacy of defeats and humiliation for the Ummah. “The death of Nasserism… in the Six-Day War of 1967”, one analyst observes, “brought Islamism as the alternative ideology in the Muslim World.” We also need an understanding of the Muslim psyche vis-à-vis the Muslim experience in Palestine, Kashmir, Iran, Algeria, Egypt, and among other places, Iraq and Afghanistan. How the Cold War allies – Muslims and the West – turned into adversaries or competitors in an uneven “elite conflict” in the Globalized World for conflicting hegemonies and ideologies demands our attention.
We also need to discern the Cold War Islamism from the post-Cold War one. While during the Cold War, Muslims considered the West a “suspect-cum-ally”. Nevertheless, Muslims regarded the West as a friend against their common enemy, communism. Although the end of the Cold War following the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan had heightened Muslim optimism, they were soon crestfallen by the not-so-benign role of the West. Instead of ushering in a new dawn of hope and empowerment for Muslims, the New World Order did not bring anything new to the Muslim World. By 1991, almost all the Muslim-majority countries – barring Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia – had remain autocratic; and by 2003 three of them – Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan – had been invaded by Western troops. In short, the cumulative unpleasant post-Cold War Muslim experience has led to the beginning of another Cold War. “Islam vs. the West” has become the new catchword. Meanwhile, pre-modern ultra-orthodox obscurantist forces had gained upper hand in many Muslim-majority countries. Interestingly, enamoured by the concept of transnational Muslim solidarity, Muslims in postcolonial societies are grabbing the elusive Ummah as their security blanket as weak and marginalized people find security in number. We may impute the prevalent obscurantism among sections of Muslims to their backwardness, lack of education and opportunities for various historical factors, but we cannot turn a blind eye to Western duplicities and hegemonic designs in the Muslim World. One can at best consider the Western lip-service to “democracy and freedom” in the Muslim World as condescending, insincere and deceitful; its insistence on bringing peace without justice from Algeria to Iraq and Palestine to Kashmir is simply shocking and terrifying.
Islamism, a Postcolonial Syndrome
Since most Muslim countries with a handful of exceptions were European colonies, the Muslim-West conflict is at least as old as colonialism. One may trace the roots of the conflict to early medieval era, even predating the Crusades. The inter-state conflicts between Muslim neighbours are by-products of colonialism. European colonial powers’ arbitrarily drawing lines “across the desert”, which created artificial states like Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia and truncated entities like Syria and Iraq; have further accentuated the conflict. The postcolonial ascendancy of the Pax Americana, which coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, divided the Muslim World between pro-American and pro-Russian camps. However, the end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of another between the Muslim World and the West. In the wake of the Cold War, the overwhelming Muslim majorities globally turned anti-Western in general and anti-American in particular. They were disillusioned with the West for its continued support for Israel and regimes hostile to their interests in the Muslim World. As substantial part of the global disempowered people, they also believe the West-sponsored Globalization process has not been beneficial to their interests at all. We must contextualize Islamic reforms, resurgence and Islamist militancy and terrorism to the dilemma of postcolonial Muslim community. They can neither forget their pre-colonial and colonial pasts, nor can they fully integrate themselves into the modern world due to various cultural and economic constraints.
The Ummah represents a racially, culturally, politically and economically diverse global Muslim community. As Muslims have economic, political and sectarian differences, they also have different ways of resolving problems, organizing dissent and protest, violently or peacefully, in the name of Islam or with secular agenda. Algerian Muslims, for example, fought a protracted bloody war of liberation against France. Algerian Muslims having the tradition of fighting a people’s war against oppressive regimes are more likely to take up arms against their enemies than Muslims in some other countries. They are not that different from Afghans. As the French colonial rulers did not allow representative self-governing institutions and relatively free press, unlike what the British experimented in its colonies; Algerians lack the tradition of organizing protests and demonstrations against their rulers in a peaceful constitutional way. The French allowed no Gandhis in their colonies either. Consequently, as Fanon has argued, the “colonized, underdeveloped man” in Algeria metamorphosed himself into a “political creature in the most global sense”. Unlike the “colonized intellectual”, the relatively free peasants posed the biggest threat to the French in Algeria. [1] The postcolonial Algerian government’s maintaining the colonial hierarchical systems, especially in the realm of education by continuing with the French and Arabic medium schools to create the employable and under-employable, French and “Vernacular” elites respectively. According to Roy, Algerian Islamist “lumpen-intellectuals”, mostly with science or engineering background, had been striving for “lumpen-Islamism”. He has demonstrated how corrupt autocracy in Algeria was responsible in culturally Islamizing the polity by toying with Islamism for the sake of legitimacy.[2]
The situation in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia is not that different from Algeria; the only major difference being their different colonial experiences. Unlike Algeria, Egypt was notsharply polarized between Western and Vernacular elites, as the titular heads of state or the khedives (later glorified as kings up to 1952) ran the administration with both Western and Arabic elites. By gagging the freedom of expression, proscribing all opposition parties and even executing dissenting politicians, postcolonial rulers have left no space for constitutional politics either in Egypt. As under Nasser and Sadat, Hosni Mubarak’s government also does not allow political dissent. Since April 2008, there has been a crackdown on the anti-Mubarak “Facebook Revolution” by Ahmed Maher. This youth movement through Facebook and Twitter has been mobilizing support for boycotting sham elections under Mubarak.[3] Dissident Muslim Brotherhood and others also face persecution on a regular basis. This has paved the way for clandestine organizations, especially the Jihadists. It is noteworthy that Pan-Islamist thinker Jamal al-Din Afghani’s Egyptian “great-grand-disciple”, Hassan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Banna’s disciple, Sayyid Qutb directly inspired Ayman al-Zawahiri “who in 1967 established the first jihadist cell in the Arab world”. [4]
It is noteworthy that Indian (Pakistani after 1947) Islamist Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam) in 1941, was both influenced by the Brotherhood and his writings also influenced the latter. However, Jamaat and Brotherhood were (are) different as well; while Maududi admired fascism, Banna had admiration for socialism and wanted social justice for the poor. Interestingly, although the Egyptian Brotherhood holds a supranational ideology, the FIS in Algeria has been primarily an Algerian nationalist movement for “Islamo-nationalism”.[5]
Islamism is not a new factor in Sudan. In 1881 Muhammad ibn Abdallah proclaimed himself the Mahdi or Messiah and declared “jihad” against Ottoman rule. The Mahdi, and after him his son Sadiq al Mahdi, ran a theocratic Mahdi State (1883-1898) in northern Sudan. The country became a military-backed theocracy during 1989 and 1999 while General Omar Bashir and the “de facto ruler”, militant cleric Hassan-el-Turabi, were in good terms. Since its relatively smooth transition to democracy after the first multi-party elections in April 2010, we may see the end of Islamist resurgence and militancy, which dogged the country for almost two decades. Sudan provides an example of how international pressure to de-Islamize the polity and the fear of total disintegration of the country worked towards democratic transition. Then again, we must not lose sight of the fact that Western biased media, leaders and people with extreme prejudice against everything Islamic or Muslim represent did not miss the opportunity to misrepresent the tribal civil war in Darfur as an “Arab and Islamic” onslaught on “non-Arabs” – Muslim and Christian – in southern Darfur.
Somalia is another example of colonial misgovernance and plunder. Once resourceful and fertile, Somalia went through about a century of Egyptian, Italian, British and French colonial rule. Italy and Britain controlled the country for eighty years up to 1960. While northwestern Somalia, which was under the “benign” British has a semblance of governance and law and order; the “not-so-benign” Italian controlled (1880-1960) southeastern region, under Islamist warlords and pirates is one of the least governable regions in the world posing grave threat to the security of the entire region. It seems Somalian Islamist groups, the Al-Shabab and their likes, are being inspired by the fighting traditions of Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the “Mad Mullah” of the British colonial rulers up to World War I. [6]
The unique Islamist regime of Saudi Arabia, which openly practices and promotes the age-old Shariah code beyond its perimeter, is a Western ally. Although scholars and leaders across the world despise the pre-modern Wahhabism, the state-ideology of the country, the oil-rich monarchy has love-hate relationship with the West. Ultra-orthodox Wahhabism emerged as an alternative to the colonial Ottoman caliphate which ran the country and the neighboring regions of Iraq-Kuwait and Greater Syria up to the end of World War I. Had there been some space for liberal nationalist movements under the autocratic Turkish caliphate, the more stringent and backward-looking Wahhabis would not have succeeded in establishing what Saudi orthodoxy represents today. The Saudi promotion of Sunni orthodoxy reflects the regime’s paranoia about pro-Iranian, anti-monarchical “Shiite heresy” and the growing Muslim Brotherhood-Iranian understanding.[7]
Iran is very different from other Muslim-majority countries in many respects. Although never formally colonized by any European power, this predominantly Shiite polity remained subservient to the West until the 1979 Revolution. Iranian mullahs did not always oppose the West. The well-entrenched formally hierarchical clergy, a class of privileged landed gentry that virtually was “running a state within the state” under Muhammad Reza Shah; unlike Sunni clerics, have been well-educated in Western sciences and philosophy, including comparative religion and Marxism. [8] Had the Shah left the ayatollahs and mujtahids to themselves by not adversely affecting them by his problematic land reform program or the White Revolution, there would not have been any Islamic Revolution. [9]
In neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamic resurgence is a by-product of what foreign invasions, ethno-national conflicts and civil wars turned them into, failing if not totally failed states. Saddam Hussein’s minority Sunni autocracy in Iraq; and more than three decade-long civil wars – fought on ethno-national / tribal and even on sectarian lines – caused and accentuated by foreign invasions and interventions in Afghanistan, led to the ongoing Islamist terrorism and ethnic cleansing in these countries. Colonial rulers’ arbitrarily drawn lines to reconstruct the political geography; and the postcolonial rulers’ denial of any space to civil societies and freedom of expression in both Iraq and Afghanistan made room for Islamism, a hotchpotch of tribal, sectarian, ethnic and other identities. Al Qaeda’s exploitative-cum-hegemonic mobilization of Sunni and Pashtun ethno-national groups, respectively in Iraq and Afghanistan; and most importantly, American (Western) sponsorship of the “jihad” against Soviet Union in 1980 were the catalysts of Islamism in both Iraq and Afghanistan and beyond. Islamist violence in Iraq may be attributed to the Shiite assertion, Sunni retaliation and the invasion of 2003, the Afghan situation is quite complex; tribalism, ethno-nationalism, narcoterrorism and proxy wars by India, Pakistan and Iran are the main factors behind the Afghan crisis, or “quagmire” as some analysts love to use the expression with regard to Western intervention in the country. Despite the hyperboles about the “success” of the “Surge” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact remains that even if they emerge as stable democracies in the distant future, the Ummah is least likely to forget and forgive the US and its allies for directly or indirectly killing around a million Muslims in these countries since 1991. Tom Friedman has aptly described the bleak, undesirable situation in Afghanistan on the CNN. To paraphrase him: “Americans’ Training Afghans to fight is like someone training Brazilians to play soccer…. Who are training the Taliban? They even don’t have maps and don’t know how to use one….America needs nation-building at home, spending another trillion dollars in Afghanistan won’t work …. American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan may be compared with an unemployed couple’s adopting a child.”[10]
While the situation in Pakistan to some extent is similar to that in Bangladesh vis-à-vis Islamist politics, Pakistan has probably more in common with Afghanistan and what Algeria was going through in the 1990s with regard to Islamist terrorism. It is rather too early to assume that Islamist terror in these countries is going through its passing phase. Undoubtedly al-Qaeda and the Taliban are retreating, having very little support among Pakistanis, and their support base has always been very weak and insignificant in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet, both these countries are paying the price of state-sponsorship of political Islam. Again, factors responsible for the growth of proto-fascist intolerance and extremism – secular or religious – such as youth bulge, mass poverty, illiteracy, misgovernance and corruption are very much around in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Last but not least, they are still struggling over their identities. The polities are not sure if they are primarily multi-ethnic / multi-lingual or “Islamic”.
Although India is not a Muslim-Majority country, it has the second or third largest concentration of Muslims after Indonesia and Pakistan; some 150 million or more. Although perennial communal conflicts between more advanced Hindu majority and less advanced Muslim minority eventually led to the communal partition in 1947; and occasional rioting and even mass killing of Muslims in postcolonial India has been quite common, yet Indian Muslims in general do not believe in carving out another “Muslim Homeland” out of India. However, the situation in Indian-occupied Kashmir since 1947 is anything but normal. Denying the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination by violating UN resolutions since 1948, India has kept more than one-third of its regular army and thousands of paramilitary troops in this Muslim-majority state where violations of human rights has been endemic since long. Since long leading human rights activists, including Arundhati Roy, have been publicly asking India to stop what they call the genocide of Kashmiri Muslims and to concede to the majority Kashmiris’ demand for independence.[11] The marginalization of Muslims in India and the frequent incidents of large-scale attacks on them by Hindu mobs – mainly instigated by proto-fascist Hindu extremist groups such as the Shiv Sena and RSS in collusion with communal Hindu law-enforcers – have been breeding Islamist militancy in northern and western India. The Muslim pogroms in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in 1992 and the Gujarat killings of 2002 may be mentioned in this regard. One finds vivid accounts of discriminations and marginalization of Indian Muslims in the (Justice Rajinder) Sachar Committee Report, appointed by the Government of India. [12] Despite their “second class treatment” and discriminations by the Indian government, Muslim masses in general and clerics in particular have been opposed to terrorism in the name of Islam. In 2008, 6,000 Muslim clerics from around the country gathered in Hydrabad to register their disapproval for terrorism in the name of Islam.[13] In a personal correspondence with the author, Professor Harbans Mukhia wrote (February 28, 2009): “I think in the Indian milieu of being surrounded by a vast majority of Hindus, who have no notion of the ultimate truth, the Day of Judgment and therefore no notion of proselytisation, the Indian Muslims have been far less prone to fundamentalist manifestations than others, especially as among the Arabs.”
Islamism in Southeast Asia has differences and similarities with the syndrome elsewhere in the world, having its unique intra- and inter-state variations. However, prior to the recent Islamist terrorist attacks in Bali, southern Philippines and southern Thailand, scholars, political leaders and security practitioners had been complacent about any impending threat of Islamism in the entire region. They considered Indonesian and Malay Muslims’ syncretism as the main antidote to religious extremism, which is often a by-product of puritanism. Sukarno, so far the most charismatic leader of Indonesia, also played an important role in retaining its syncretistic heritage and keeping the largest Muslim-majority country relatively secular. However, Suharto’s ascendancy changed things almost overnight. He used Islamist fanatics in the mass killing of actual or so-called communists to strengthen his position; and thus legitimized Islamism and promoted political Islam for the sake of legitimacy, taking full advantage of Western “soft corner” for Islam during the prime of the Cold War. Later the emboldened and crest-fallen Islamists turned into his adversaries, turning the Jemaah Islamiyah into the most powerful Islamist organization in Southeast Asia. An al-Qaeda affiliate, JI believes in global jihad and wants to establish an Islamist state in the region, encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei southern Philippines and southern Thailand. [14] Ethno-nationalist separatist movements of Malay Muslims in Southern Philippines and Thailand during the last two decades have metamorphosed into Islamist movements, thanks to the growing resurgence of Global Islam.
The so-called Globalized Islam possibly exists among the Muslim Diaspora, refugees and marginalized people having no stable identity or sense of belonging to a nation or community besides the elusive transnational Ummah. [15] These “nowhere men” do not represent any civilization to fight for it; they are just angry people who have fled the “burning grounds of Islam”, carrying the fire with them and angry at the world around them.[16] There are, however, conflicting views as to why Islamists among the Diaspora resort to terrorism and even suicide attacks. As one analyst explains the British suicide attacks in July 2005:
For an earlier generation of Muslims their religion was not so strong that it prevented them from identifying with Britain. Today many young British Muslims identify more with Islam than Britain primarily because there no longer seems much that is compelling about being British. Of course, there is little to romanticise about in old-style Britishness with its often racist vision of belonging.[17]
If we accept the above as the right explanation of terrorism by members of the Muslim Diaspora, one wonders as to how about twenty Somali-American young men from Minnesota “vanished” in 2008; went to Somalia to fight for al-Qaeda and one of them, Shirwa Ahmed, last October blew himself up killing dozens of Somali opponents of their “jihad”. These young Somali-Americans came to the US in their early childhood.[18] And the US does not promote multiculturalism. It is difficult to explain the “home-grown” Islamist terrorism; Major Nidal Hasan’s killing thirteen fellow American soldiers for example, in terms of some cultural or economic explanations. American and its allies support for Israel in general; and their invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular have been the last straws. Muslims resort to terrorism not necessarily due to religious factors. As Rami Khouri has explained the Pakistani American Feisal Shehzad’s justifications for the attempted bombing of Times Square in New York, Muslims’ sense of collective humiliation at local, national or global level by their rulers or foreign occupation forces may turn them into terrorists.[19] One cannot agree more with Evelin Lindner, renowned psychologist and founder of the Center for Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, that:
Basically all human beings yearn for recognition and respect; their denial or withdrawal is experienced as humiliation. Humiliation is the strongest force that creates rifts and breaks down relationship among people….Men such as Osama bin Laden would never have followers if there were no victims of humiliation in many parts of the world….The rich and powerful West has long been blind to the fact that its superiority may have humiliating effects on those who are less privileged.[20]
Throughout history, most of the time, Muslims primarily fought among themselves; more Muslims than non-Muslims fell victim of Muslim wrath everywhere. The situation has remained the same; especially in the wake of the US- led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. They have wide-ranging problems of poverty, backwardness, bad governance, and above all, the crises of identity and integration into the modern world. Again, Muslims are not the only people reviving their faith during the last fifty-odd years; Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Hindus have been on the same path to rebel against “secularist hegemony and started to wrest religion out of its marginal position and back to center stage”. We may agree with Karen Armstrong that no religion has so far been able to withstand changes over the last four hundred years in science and technology, philosophy and ideas, and socio-political and economic systems and structures. Religious revival is not just retrogressive but an attempt to cope with these changes and challenges of rationalism against myths and superstitions.[21] Again, the lines between “ethnic” and “religious” are too blurred to locate the real factors behind many conflicts.
The Muslim World and the West have been at loggerheads for centuries. During the 8th and 17th centuries, Muslim caliphates and empires had been the most formidable superpowers from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean World. Europeans in general either remained subserviently awe stricken by their Muslim hegemons or hell-bent to turn the table to their own advantage. One gets the reflection of this love-hate relationship in the corpus of European and Turco-Arabic literature, travel accounts and history. As Dante’s The Divine Comedy (written between 1308 and1321) is an epitome of hatred for Islam and its Prophet, so is Voltaire’s play, Fanaticism or Mahomet the Prophet (written in 1736). Hegel, Francis Bacon, Marx or Max Weber, among other Western scholars, had hardly any kind word for Islam either. Hegel and Marx through their discourse of “Oriental Despotism” portrayed the Orient, including the Muslim World, as inferior to the glamorous and enlightened West. The “Orientalists” only noticed despotism, splendour, cruelty and sensuality in the Muslim World to legitimize Western colonial hegemony in the orient.[22] British colonial rulers used expressions like “mad mullah” and “the noble savage” to undermine Muslim rebels and their followers in the Middle East and South Asia.[23]
Some Muslim leaders throughout history had been extremely prejudicial and discriminatory to their non-Muslim subjects and adopted oppressive policies against Jews, Christians and Hindus. The extermination of around a million Armenians by Turks in 1915-17 may be mentioned in this regard. Not only Muslim clerics and laymen but also sections of the intelligentsia and politicians glorify early and late medieval “Islamic Empires”. One just cannot ignore Europeans’ collective memories of subjugation of their ancestors under Muslim rule as an important factor to the growth of Islamophobia in the West. Similarly, one cannot deny the history of Western colonial rule of almost the entire Muslim World; and even worse, the postcolonial Western treatment of the Muslims in general and Arabs in particular as important factors in the promotion of Westophobia among Muslims. Only Turkey may be singled out as a Muslim-majority country, which ran a parallel and rival colonial empire in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Middle East for centuries. However, the loss of Turkey’s last vestiges of its empire soon after World War I sent two ominous signals to Muslims, especially in the Subcontinent: a) that while the Muslim World was under European (Christian) domination, Muslim supremacy and conquests of non-Muslim territories (often glorified by Muslim scholars and laymen) had become history; and b) that with the demise of the Ottoman caliphate, Indian Muslims had no one else to “help them out of British paramountcy”.
We must not lose sight of the extra-territoriality of transnational “jihads”. Al Qaeda, Taliban and their likes not only fight for the “liberation” of Arabia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir, but they also champion the cause of establishing an alternative Global Islamic Order. Islamists always claim to be the peace-loving champions of justice against injustice and freedom against (Western) hegemony. Very similar to Communism, Islam and Islamism promote transnational camaraderie and fraternity among their adherents. Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “formal declaration of jihad” against Soviet Union from Pakistan, and the decade-long US sponsorship of the mujahedeen refurbished their image as the greatest “freedom fighters” of all times. Lessons learnt in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1980s should never be forgotten. Exploiting ethno-national and class conflicts, Islamist extremists have turned yester-years’ “freedom fighters” into transnational insurgents and terrorists today.
Islamism is a political ideology to regulate Muslims’ private and public affairs in accordance with Islamists’ version of the faith. Again, it is not all about violence and terrorism; there are Islamists who believe in peaceful and democratic means of establishing their version of the utopian “Islamic State”. Both terrorist and peace-loving Muslims converge on one point that it is Muslims who have been at the receiving end of Western prejudice and exploitation since the beginning of Western colonialism. Consequently it is essential that we know and empathize with the Muslim discourse of “What went wrong with the Muslim World?”, or in other words, “Is the West and its allies hell-bent on destroying Islam and Muslims?” This is not a new discourse; Muslim scholars, saints, poets and politicians have been posing these soul-searching questions for the last 200-odd years, from Egypt to Arabia and Afghanistan to India and Indonesia.[24]Islamism got a new lease of life in 1979. Two events that shook the world took place in that year: the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Never before in history, leaders, scholars and analysts in the world took so much interest in Islam and Muslims as have they been taking since 1979. Since then, more Muslims than non-Muslims have fallen victim to Western and Islamist wrath and attacks. However, despite their differences and history of bloody conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, they often close ranks against the West. While the First Gulf War of 1991 agitated Muslims against West; US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after Nine-Eleven have simply antagonized most Muslims towards the West. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of Muslims who are critical of the invasions have never been sympathetic to the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. Islamist ideologues, who espouse the cause of “global jihad” against their Muslim and non-Muslim enemies, have benefitted most by exploiting the average Muslims’ hatred for postcolonial Western duplicities and hegemonic designs in the Muslim World. They love to hate anything Western, including pro-Western governments, leaders and culture. Paradoxically, some West-bashing Muslims also aspire for “Western-Style” democracy, justice and peace in the Muslim World. Since Nine-Eleven both the West and the Ummah in general are confused; and afraid of each other. By demonizing the “others”, Western and Muslim leaders, scholars and laymen justify the “inevitability” of the “Clash of Civilizations”. Muslim bewilderment and fear of Western retaliation against them led to the proliferation of denials and conspiracy theories after Nine-Eleven, which portray Jews and American government as the masterminds behind the attacks.
Calling all ethno-national freedom fighters “terrorists” does not resolve any issue but takes us all to a dark cul-de-sac. This is reminiscent of how European colonial rulers used to portray armed freedom fighters as “robbers” and “outlaws” and their armed resistance as “disturbances” or “problems of law and order”. Similarly, since the heydays of the Cold War we find Western policymakers, media and intellectuals denigrating all rebels and freedom fighters fighting Western interests as “terrorists” or “communists”. Western ambivalence towards religion-based polities is noteworthy. While it despises the Islamic regime in Iran; the West is prepared to go to any extent to defend the Zionist state of Israel. An understanding of violent Islamist extremism hinges on the understanding of what the postcolonial Third World in general and the Muslim World in particular think of Western hegemony and arrogance. Evelin Lindner has beautifully explained it through her personal field work experience in Rwanda and Somalia in 1998. She conveys the perceptions of the downtrodden Rwandans and Somalis about the West in the following manner:
You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to help or do science, but you just want to have some fun….You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment! You are a hypocrite! We feel deeply humiliated by your arrogant and self-congratulatory help! First you colonize us. Then you leave us with a so-called democratic state that is alien to us. After that you watch us getting dictatorial leaders. Then you give them weapons to kill half of us. Finally you come along to “measure our suffering.[25]
[1] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grover Press, New York 2005, Ch V, pp.181-234
[2] Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London 1994, pp. 75-88
[3] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The April 6 Youth Movement”, September 22, 2010 http://egyptelections.carngieendowment.org/2010/09/22/the-april-6-youth-movement (accessed November 22, 2010)
[4] Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy, Harcourt, Inc. New York 2006, p.37
[5] Ibid, pp. 129-30
[6] Ioan Lewis and Anita Adam, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History and Society, C Hurst & Co, London 2008, p.5
[7] Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London 1994, pp.120-21
[8] Ibid, pp.172-3
[9] M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A political History, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1989, pp.192-230
[10] CNN, Fareed Zakariya GPS, June 27, 2010
[11] Arundhati Roy, “Kashmir’s Fruits of Discord”, NYT, November 8, 2010
[12] Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Sachar Committee Report, New Delhi 2006
[13] Harbans Mukhia, “Indian Muslims: One of a Kind”, Times of India, 20 December 2008
[14] See Greg Barton, Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And the Soul of Islam, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney 2005
[15] Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University Press, New York 2004, pp.67-9
[16] Fouad Ajami, “The Clash”, New York Times Sunday Book Review, January 6, 2008;
[17] Kenan Malik, “multiculturalism has fanned the flames of Islamic extremism”, The Times, July 16, 2005
[18] Dan Ephron and Mark Hosenball, “Recruited for Jihad?”Newsweek, February 2, 2009
[19] Rami Khouri, “Terrorists AreAlso Spawned by Humiliation”, NYT, June 29, 2010
[20] Evelin Gerda Lindner, “Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New Paradigm”, Peace Studies, 33(2), 2001, p.59
[21] Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God, Ballantine Books, New York 2001, “Introduction”
[22] Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, New York 1979, passim
Taj Hashmi
Honolulu, Hawaii
Email: taj_hashmi@hotmail.com
Overview
As the discord between modern and traditional Muslims is ideological by nature, so is the conflict between Islam and the West. And ideology is more about power, influence and identity than a mere reflection of culture and belief system. While modern Muslim elites are unwilling to concede power and privileges to the mullahs, most mullahs and their followers – mostly rural and small town lower elites with traditional Islamic or “vernacular” education – are also unwavering about not conceding any ground to non-traditional “Westernized” Muslims. The Iranian Revolution and the Taliban/al-Qaeda experiment in Afghanistan have inspired mullahs and their followers to go the Khomeini or Taliban way. Meanwhile Western duplicities and open support for Islamists during the Cold War had further emboldened Islamists within and beyond the Muslim World. State-sponsorship of Islamism by Saudi Arabia, Gulf States and Pakistan, among other states, has also been a contributing factor to the rise of political Islam. Arab autocrats promote Sunni orthodoxy to contain Shiite Iranian influence; and Pakistani rulers sometimes promote Islamists to bleed archrival India and to neutralize secular democratic opposition at home.
For distancing ourselves from any pseudo-history of Islamism, we need to understand that postcolonial Islamist re-assertion is a legacy of defeats and humiliation for the Ummah. “The death of Nasserism… in the Six-Day War of 1967”, one analyst observes, “brought Islamism as the alternative ideology in the Muslim World.” We also need an understanding of the Muslim psyche vis-à-vis the Muslim experience in Palestine, Kashmir, Iran, Algeria, Egypt, and among other places, Iraq and Afghanistan. How the Cold War allies – Muslims and the West – turned into adversaries or competitors in an uneven “elite conflict” in the Globalized World for conflicting hegemonies and ideologies demands our attention.
We also need to discern the Cold War Islamism from the post-Cold War one. While during the Cold War, Muslims considered the West a “suspect-cum-ally”. Nevertheless, Muslims regarded the West as a friend against their common enemy, communism. Although the end of the Cold War following the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan had heightened Muslim optimism, they were soon crestfallen by the not-so-benign role of the West. Instead of ushering in a new dawn of hope and empowerment for Muslims, the New World Order did not bring anything new to the Muslim World. By 1991, almost all the Muslim-majority countries – barring Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia – had remain autocratic; and by 2003 three of them – Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan – had been invaded by Western troops. In short, the cumulative unpleasant post-Cold War Muslim experience has led to the beginning of another Cold War. “Islam vs. the West” has become the new catchword. Meanwhile, pre-modern ultra-orthodox obscurantist forces had gained upper hand in many Muslim-majority countries. Interestingly, enamoured by the concept of transnational Muslim solidarity, Muslims in postcolonial societies are grabbing the elusive Ummah as their security blanket as weak and marginalized people find security in number. We may impute the prevalent obscurantism among sections of Muslims to their backwardness, lack of education and opportunities for various historical factors, but we cannot turn a blind eye to Western duplicities and hegemonic designs in the Muslim World. One can at best consider the Western lip-service to “democracy and freedom” in the Muslim World as condescending, insincere and deceitful; its insistence on bringing peace without justice from Algeria to Iraq and Palestine to Kashmir is simply shocking and terrifying.
Islamism, a Postcolonial Syndrome
Since most Muslim countries with a handful of exceptions were European colonies, the Muslim-West conflict is at least as old as colonialism. One may trace the roots of the conflict to early medieval era, even predating the Crusades. The inter-state conflicts between Muslim neighbours are by-products of colonialism. European colonial powers’ arbitrarily drawing lines “across the desert”, which created artificial states like Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia and truncated entities like Syria and Iraq; have further accentuated the conflict. The postcolonial ascendancy of the Pax Americana, which coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, divided the Muslim World between pro-American and pro-Russian camps. However, the end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of another between the Muslim World and the West. In the wake of the Cold War, the overwhelming Muslim majorities globally turned anti-Western in general and anti-American in particular. They were disillusioned with the West for its continued support for Israel and regimes hostile to their interests in the Muslim World. As substantial part of the global disempowered people, they also believe the West-sponsored Globalization process has not been beneficial to their interests at all. We must contextualize Islamic reforms, resurgence and Islamist militancy and terrorism to the dilemma of postcolonial Muslim community. They can neither forget their pre-colonial and colonial pasts, nor can they fully integrate themselves into the modern world due to various cultural and economic constraints.
The Ummah represents a racially, culturally, politically and economically diverse global Muslim community. As Muslims have economic, political and sectarian differences, they also have different ways of resolving problems, organizing dissent and protest, violently or peacefully, in the name of Islam or with secular agenda. Algerian Muslims, for example, fought a protracted bloody war of liberation against France. Algerian Muslims having the tradition of fighting a people’s war against oppressive regimes are more likely to take up arms against their enemies than Muslims in some other countries. They are not that different from Afghans. As the French colonial rulers did not allow representative self-governing institutions and relatively free press, unlike what the British experimented in its colonies; Algerians lack the tradition of organizing protests and demonstrations against their rulers in a peaceful constitutional way. The French allowed no Gandhis in their colonies either. Consequently, as Fanon has argued, the “colonized, underdeveloped man” in Algeria metamorphosed himself into a “political creature in the most global sense”. Unlike the “colonized intellectual”, the relatively free peasants posed the biggest threat to the French in Algeria. [1] The postcolonial Algerian government’s maintaining the colonial hierarchical systems, especially in the realm of education by continuing with the French and Arabic medium schools to create the employable and under-employable, French and “Vernacular” elites respectively. According to Roy, Algerian Islamist “lumpen-intellectuals”, mostly with science or engineering background, had been striving for “lumpen-Islamism”. He has demonstrated how corrupt autocracy in Algeria was responsible in culturally Islamizing the polity by toying with Islamism for the sake of legitimacy.[2]
The situation in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia is not that different from Algeria; the only major difference being their different colonial experiences. Unlike Algeria, Egypt was notsharply polarized between Western and Vernacular elites, as the titular heads of state or the khedives (later glorified as kings up to 1952) ran the administration with both Western and Arabic elites. By gagging the freedom of expression, proscribing all opposition parties and even executing dissenting politicians, postcolonial rulers have left no space for constitutional politics either in Egypt. As under Nasser and Sadat, Hosni Mubarak’s government also does not allow political dissent. Since April 2008, there has been a crackdown on the anti-Mubarak “Facebook Revolution” by Ahmed Maher. This youth movement through Facebook and Twitter has been mobilizing support for boycotting sham elections under Mubarak.[3] Dissident Muslim Brotherhood and others also face persecution on a regular basis. This has paved the way for clandestine organizations, especially the Jihadists. It is noteworthy that Pan-Islamist thinker Jamal al-Din Afghani’s Egyptian “great-grand-disciple”, Hassan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Banna’s disciple, Sayyid Qutb directly inspired Ayman al-Zawahiri “who in 1967 established the first jihadist cell in the Arab world”. [4]
It is noteworthy that Indian (Pakistani after 1947) Islamist Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam) in 1941, was both influenced by the Brotherhood and his writings also influenced the latter. However, Jamaat and Brotherhood were (are) different as well; while Maududi admired fascism, Banna had admiration for socialism and wanted social justice for the poor. Interestingly, although the Egyptian Brotherhood holds a supranational ideology, the FIS in Algeria has been primarily an Algerian nationalist movement for “Islamo-nationalism”.[5]
Islamism is not a new factor in Sudan. In 1881 Muhammad ibn Abdallah proclaimed himself the Mahdi or Messiah and declared “jihad” against Ottoman rule. The Mahdi, and after him his son Sadiq al Mahdi, ran a theocratic Mahdi State (1883-1898) in northern Sudan. The country became a military-backed theocracy during 1989 and 1999 while General Omar Bashir and the “de facto ruler”, militant cleric Hassan-el-Turabi, were in good terms. Since its relatively smooth transition to democracy after the first multi-party elections in April 2010, we may see the end of Islamist resurgence and militancy, which dogged the country for almost two decades. Sudan provides an example of how international pressure to de-Islamize the polity and the fear of total disintegration of the country worked towards democratic transition. Then again, we must not lose sight of the fact that Western biased media, leaders and people with extreme prejudice against everything Islamic or Muslim represent did not miss the opportunity to misrepresent the tribal civil war in Darfur as an “Arab and Islamic” onslaught on “non-Arabs” – Muslim and Christian – in southern Darfur.
Somalia is another example of colonial misgovernance and plunder. Once resourceful and fertile, Somalia went through about a century of Egyptian, Italian, British and French colonial rule. Italy and Britain controlled the country for eighty years up to 1960. While northwestern Somalia, which was under the “benign” British has a semblance of governance and law and order; the “not-so-benign” Italian controlled (1880-1960) southeastern region, under Islamist warlords and pirates is one of the least governable regions in the world posing grave threat to the security of the entire region. It seems Somalian Islamist groups, the Al-Shabab and their likes, are being inspired by the fighting traditions of Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the “Mad Mullah” of the British colonial rulers up to World War I. [6]
The unique Islamist regime of Saudi Arabia, which openly practices and promotes the age-old Shariah code beyond its perimeter, is a Western ally. Although scholars and leaders across the world despise the pre-modern Wahhabism, the state-ideology of the country, the oil-rich monarchy has love-hate relationship with the West. Ultra-orthodox Wahhabism emerged as an alternative to the colonial Ottoman caliphate which ran the country and the neighboring regions of Iraq-Kuwait and Greater Syria up to the end of World War I. Had there been some space for liberal nationalist movements under the autocratic Turkish caliphate, the more stringent and backward-looking Wahhabis would not have succeeded in establishing what Saudi orthodoxy represents today. The Saudi promotion of Sunni orthodoxy reflects the regime’s paranoia about pro-Iranian, anti-monarchical “Shiite heresy” and the growing Muslim Brotherhood-Iranian understanding.[7]
Iran is very different from other Muslim-majority countries in many respects. Although never formally colonized by any European power, this predominantly Shiite polity remained subservient to the West until the 1979 Revolution. Iranian mullahs did not always oppose the West. The well-entrenched formally hierarchical clergy, a class of privileged landed gentry that virtually was “running a state within the state” under Muhammad Reza Shah; unlike Sunni clerics, have been well-educated in Western sciences and philosophy, including comparative religion and Marxism. [8] Had the Shah left the ayatollahs and mujtahids to themselves by not adversely affecting them by his problematic land reform program or the White Revolution, there would not have been any Islamic Revolution. [9]
In neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamic resurgence is a by-product of what foreign invasions, ethno-national conflicts and civil wars turned them into, failing if not totally failed states. Saddam Hussein’s minority Sunni autocracy in Iraq; and more than three decade-long civil wars – fought on ethno-national / tribal and even on sectarian lines – caused and accentuated by foreign invasions and interventions in Afghanistan, led to the ongoing Islamist terrorism and ethnic cleansing in these countries. Colonial rulers’ arbitrarily drawn lines to reconstruct the political geography; and the postcolonial rulers’ denial of any space to civil societies and freedom of expression in both Iraq and Afghanistan made room for Islamism, a hotchpotch of tribal, sectarian, ethnic and other identities. Al Qaeda’s exploitative-cum-hegemonic mobilization of Sunni and Pashtun ethno-national groups, respectively in Iraq and Afghanistan; and most importantly, American (Western) sponsorship of the “jihad” against Soviet Union in 1980 were the catalysts of Islamism in both Iraq and Afghanistan and beyond. Islamist violence in Iraq may be attributed to the Shiite assertion, Sunni retaliation and the invasion of 2003, the Afghan situation is quite complex; tribalism, ethno-nationalism, narcoterrorism and proxy wars by India, Pakistan and Iran are the main factors behind the Afghan crisis, or “quagmire” as some analysts love to use the expression with regard to Western intervention in the country. Despite the hyperboles about the “success” of the “Surge” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact remains that even if they emerge as stable democracies in the distant future, the Ummah is least likely to forget and forgive the US and its allies for directly or indirectly killing around a million Muslims in these countries since 1991. Tom Friedman has aptly described the bleak, undesirable situation in Afghanistan on the CNN. To paraphrase him: “Americans’ Training Afghans to fight is like someone training Brazilians to play soccer…. Who are training the Taliban? They even don’t have maps and don’t know how to use one….America needs nation-building at home, spending another trillion dollars in Afghanistan won’t work …. American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan may be compared with an unemployed couple’s adopting a child.”[10]
While the situation in Pakistan to some extent is similar to that in Bangladesh vis-à-vis Islamist politics, Pakistan has probably more in common with Afghanistan and what Algeria was going through in the 1990s with regard to Islamist terrorism. It is rather too early to assume that Islamist terror in these countries is going through its passing phase. Undoubtedly al-Qaeda and the Taliban are retreating, having very little support among Pakistanis, and their support base has always been very weak and insignificant in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet, both these countries are paying the price of state-sponsorship of political Islam. Again, factors responsible for the growth of proto-fascist intolerance and extremism – secular or religious – such as youth bulge, mass poverty, illiteracy, misgovernance and corruption are very much around in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Last but not least, they are still struggling over their identities. The polities are not sure if they are primarily multi-ethnic / multi-lingual or “Islamic”.
Although India is not a Muslim-Majority country, it has the second or third largest concentration of Muslims after Indonesia and Pakistan; some 150 million or more. Although perennial communal conflicts between more advanced Hindu majority and less advanced Muslim minority eventually led to the communal partition in 1947; and occasional rioting and even mass killing of Muslims in postcolonial India has been quite common, yet Indian Muslims in general do not believe in carving out another “Muslim Homeland” out of India. However, the situation in Indian-occupied Kashmir since 1947 is anything but normal. Denying the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination by violating UN resolutions since 1948, India has kept more than one-third of its regular army and thousands of paramilitary troops in this Muslim-majority state where violations of human rights has been endemic since long. Since long leading human rights activists, including Arundhati Roy, have been publicly asking India to stop what they call the genocide of Kashmiri Muslims and to concede to the majority Kashmiris’ demand for independence.[11] The marginalization of Muslims in India and the frequent incidents of large-scale attacks on them by Hindu mobs – mainly instigated by proto-fascist Hindu extremist groups such as the Shiv Sena and RSS in collusion with communal Hindu law-enforcers – have been breeding Islamist militancy in northern and western India. The Muslim pogroms in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in 1992 and the Gujarat killings of 2002 may be mentioned in this regard. One finds vivid accounts of discriminations and marginalization of Indian Muslims in the (Justice Rajinder) Sachar Committee Report, appointed by the Government of India. [12] Despite their “second class treatment” and discriminations by the Indian government, Muslim masses in general and clerics in particular have been opposed to terrorism in the name of Islam. In 2008, 6,000 Muslim clerics from around the country gathered in Hydrabad to register their disapproval for terrorism in the name of Islam.[13] In a personal correspondence with the author, Professor Harbans Mukhia wrote (February 28, 2009): “I think in the Indian milieu of being surrounded by a vast majority of Hindus, who have no notion of the ultimate truth, the Day of Judgment and therefore no notion of proselytisation, the Indian Muslims have been far less prone to fundamentalist manifestations than others, especially as among the Arabs.”
Islamism in Southeast Asia has differences and similarities with the syndrome elsewhere in the world, having its unique intra- and inter-state variations. However, prior to the recent Islamist terrorist attacks in Bali, southern Philippines and southern Thailand, scholars, political leaders and security practitioners had been complacent about any impending threat of Islamism in the entire region. They considered Indonesian and Malay Muslims’ syncretism as the main antidote to religious extremism, which is often a by-product of puritanism. Sukarno, so far the most charismatic leader of Indonesia, also played an important role in retaining its syncretistic heritage and keeping the largest Muslim-majority country relatively secular. However, Suharto’s ascendancy changed things almost overnight. He used Islamist fanatics in the mass killing of actual or so-called communists to strengthen his position; and thus legitimized Islamism and promoted political Islam for the sake of legitimacy, taking full advantage of Western “soft corner” for Islam during the prime of the Cold War. Later the emboldened and crest-fallen Islamists turned into his adversaries, turning the Jemaah Islamiyah into the most powerful Islamist organization in Southeast Asia. An al-Qaeda affiliate, JI believes in global jihad and wants to establish an Islamist state in the region, encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei southern Philippines and southern Thailand. [14] Ethno-nationalist separatist movements of Malay Muslims in Southern Philippines and Thailand during the last two decades have metamorphosed into Islamist movements, thanks to the growing resurgence of Global Islam.
The so-called Globalized Islam possibly exists among the Muslim Diaspora, refugees and marginalized people having no stable identity or sense of belonging to a nation or community besides the elusive transnational Ummah. [15] These “nowhere men” do not represent any civilization to fight for it; they are just angry people who have fled the “burning grounds of Islam”, carrying the fire with them and angry at the world around them.[16] There are, however, conflicting views as to why Islamists among the Diaspora resort to terrorism and even suicide attacks. As one analyst explains the British suicide attacks in July 2005:
For an earlier generation of Muslims their religion was not so strong that it prevented them from identifying with Britain. Today many young British Muslims identify more with Islam than Britain primarily because there no longer seems much that is compelling about being British. Of course, there is little to romanticise about in old-style Britishness with its often racist vision of belonging.[17]
If we accept the above as the right explanation of terrorism by members of the Muslim Diaspora, one wonders as to how about twenty Somali-American young men from Minnesota “vanished” in 2008; went to Somalia to fight for al-Qaeda and one of them, Shirwa Ahmed, last October blew himself up killing dozens of Somali opponents of their “jihad”. These young Somali-Americans came to the US in their early childhood.[18] And the US does not promote multiculturalism. It is difficult to explain the “home-grown” Islamist terrorism; Major Nidal Hasan’s killing thirteen fellow American soldiers for example, in terms of some cultural or economic explanations. American and its allies support for Israel in general; and their invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular have been the last straws. Muslims resort to terrorism not necessarily due to religious factors. As Rami Khouri has explained the Pakistani American Feisal Shehzad’s justifications for the attempted bombing of Times Square in New York, Muslims’ sense of collective humiliation at local, national or global level by their rulers or foreign occupation forces may turn them into terrorists.[19] One cannot agree more with Evelin Lindner, renowned psychologist and founder of the Center for Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, that:
Basically all human beings yearn for recognition and respect; their denial or withdrawal is experienced as humiliation. Humiliation is the strongest force that creates rifts and breaks down relationship among people….Men such as Osama bin Laden would never have followers if there were no victims of humiliation in many parts of the world….The rich and powerful West has long been blind to the fact that its superiority may have humiliating effects on those who are less privileged.[20]
Throughout history, most of the time, Muslims primarily fought among themselves; more Muslims than non-Muslims fell victim of Muslim wrath everywhere. The situation has remained the same; especially in the wake of the US- led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. They have wide-ranging problems of poverty, backwardness, bad governance, and above all, the crises of identity and integration into the modern world. Again, Muslims are not the only people reviving their faith during the last fifty-odd years; Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Hindus have been on the same path to rebel against “secularist hegemony and started to wrest religion out of its marginal position and back to center stage”. We may agree with Karen Armstrong that no religion has so far been able to withstand changes over the last four hundred years in science and technology, philosophy and ideas, and socio-political and economic systems and structures. Religious revival is not just retrogressive but an attempt to cope with these changes and challenges of rationalism against myths and superstitions.[21] Again, the lines between “ethnic” and “religious” are too blurred to locate the real factors behind many conflicts.
The Muslim World and the West have been at loggerheads for centuries. During the 8th and 17th centuries, Muslim caliphates and empires had been the most formidable superpowers from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean World. Europeans in general either remained subserviently awe stricken by their Muslim hegemons or hell-bent to turn the table to their own advantage. One gets the reflection of this love-hate relationship in the corpus of European and Turco-Arabic literature, travel accounts and history. As Dante’s The Divine Comedy (written between 1308 and1321) is an epitome of hatred for Islam and its Prophet, so is Voltaire’s play, Fanaticism or Mahomet the Prophet (written in 1736). Hegel, Francis Bacon, Marx or Max Weber, among other Western scholars, had hardly any kind word for Islam either. Hegel and Marx through their discourse of “Oriental Despotism” portrayed the Orient, including the Muslim World, as inferior to the glamorous and enlightened West. The “Orientalists” only noticed despotism, splendour, cruelty and sensuality in the Muslim World to legitimize Western colonial hegemony in the orient.[22] British colonial rulers used expressions like “mad mullah” and “the noble savage” to undermine Muslim rebels and their followers in the Middle East and South Asia.[23]
Some Muslim leaders throughout history had been extremely prejudicial and discriminatory to their non-Muslim subjects and adopted oppressive policies against Jews, Christians and Hindus. The extermination of around a million Armenians by Turks in 1915-17 may be mentioned in this regard. Not only Muslim clerics and laymen but also sections of the intelligentsia and politicians glorify early and late medieval “Islamic Empires”. One just cannot ignore Europeans’ collective memories of subjugation of their ancestors under Muslim rule as an important factor to the growth of Islamophobia in the West. Similarly, one cannot deny the history of Western colonial rule of almost the entire Muslim World; and even worse, the postcolonial Western treatment of the Muslims in general and Arabs in particular as important factors in the promotion of Westophobia among Muslims. Only Turkey may be singled out as a Muslim-majority country, which ran a parallel and rival colonial empire in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Middle East for centuries. However, the loss of Turkey’s last vestiges of its empire soon after World War I sent two ominous signals to Muslims, especially in the Subcontinent: a) that while the Muslim World was under European (Christian) domination, Muslim supremacy and conquests of non-Muslim territories (often glorified by Muslim scholars and laymen) had become history; and b) that with the demise of the Ottoman caliphate, Indian Muslims had no one else to “help them out of British paramountcy”.
We must not lose sight of the extra-territoriality of transnational “jihads”. Al Qaeda, Taliban and their likes not only fight for the “liberation” of Arabia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir, but they also champion the cause of establishing an alternative Global Islamic Order. Islamists always claim to be the peace-loving champions of justice against injustice and freedom against (Western) hegemony. Very similar to Communism, Islam and Islamism promote transnational camaraderie and fraternity among their adherents. Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “formal declaration of jihad” against Soviet Union from Pakistan, and the decade-long US sponsorship of the mujahedeen refurbished their image as the greatest “freedom fighters” of all times. Lessons learnt in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1980s should never be forgotten. Exploiting ethno-national and class conflicts, Islamist extremists have turned yester-years’ “freedom fighters” into transnational insurgents and terrorists today.
Islamism is a political ideology to regulate Muslims’ private and public affairs in accordance with Islamists’ version of the faith. Again, it is not all about violence and terrorism; there are Islamists who believe in peaceful and democratic means of establishing their version of the utopian “Islamic State”. Both terrorist and peace-loving Muslims converge on one point that it is Muslims who have been at the receiving end of Western prejudice and exploitation since the beginning of Western colonialism. Consequently it is essential that we know and empathize with the Muslim discourse of “What went wrong with the Muslim World?”, or in other words, “Is the West and its allies hell-bent on destroying Islam and Muslims?” This is not a new discourse; Muslim scholars, saints, poets and politicians have been posing these soul-searching questions for the last 200-odd years, from Egypt to Arabia and Afghanistan to India and Indonesia.[24]Islamism got a new lease of life in 1979. Two events that shook the world took place in that year: the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Never before in history, leaders, scholars and analysts in the world took so much interest in Islam and Muslims as have they been taking since 1979. Since then, more Muslims than non-Muslims have fallen victim to Western and Islamist wrath and attacks. However, despite their differences and history of bloody conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, they often close ranks against the West. While the First Gulf War of 1991 agitated Muslims against West; US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after Nine-Eleven have simply antagonized most Muslims towards the West. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of Muslims who are critical of the invasions have never been sympathetic to the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. Islamist ideologues, who espouse the cause of “global jihad” against their Muslim and non-Muslim enemies, have benefitted most by exploiting the average Muslims’ hatred for postcolonial Western duplicities and hegemonic designs in the Muslim World. They love to hate anything Western, including pro-Western governments, leaders and culture. Paradoxically, some West-bashing Muslims also aspire for “Western-Style” democracy, justice and peace in the Muslim World. Since Nine-Eleven both the West and the Ummah in general are confused; and afraid of each other. By demonizing the “others”, Western and Muslim leaders, scholars and laymen justify the “inevitability” of the “Clash of Civilizations”. Muslim bewilderment and fear of Western retaliation against them led to the proliferation of denials and conspiracy theories after Nine-Eleven, which portray Jews and American government as the masterminds behind the attacks.
Calling all ethno-national freedom fighters “terrorists” does not resolve any issue but takes us all to a dark cul-de-sac. This is reminiscent of how European colonial rulers used to portray armed freedom fighters as “robbers” and “outlaws” and their armed resistance as “disturbances” or “problems of law and order”. Similarly, since the heydays of the Cold War we find Western policymakers, media and intellectuals denigrating all rebels and freedom fighters fighting Western interests as “terrorists” or “communists”. Western ambivalence towards religion-based polities is noteworthy. While it despises the Islamic regime in Iran; the West is prepared to go to any extent to defend the Zionist state of Israel. An understanding of violent Islamist extremism hinges on the understanding of what the postcolonial Third World in general and the Muslim World in particular think of Western hegemony and arrogance. Evelin Lindner has beautifully explained it through her personal field work experience in Rwanda and Somalia in 1998. She conveys the perceptions of the downtrodden Rwandans and Somalis about the West in the following manner:
You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to help or do science, but you just want to have some fun….You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment! You are a hypocrite! We feel deeply humiliated by your arrogant and self-congratulatory help! First you colonize us. Then you leave us with a so-called democratic state that is alien to us. After that you watch us getting dictatorial leaders. Then you give them weapons to kill half of us. Finally you come along to “measure our suffering.[25]
[1] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grover Press, New York 2005, Ch V, pp.181-234
[2] Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London 1994, pp. 75-88
[3] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The April 6 Youth Movement”, September 22, 2010 http://egyptelections.carngieendowment.org/2010/09/22/the-april-6-youth-movement (accessed November 22, 2010)
[4] Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy, Harcourt, Inc. New York 2006, p.37
[5] Ibid, pp. 129-30
[6] Ioan Lewis and Anita Adam, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History and Society, C Hurst & Co, London 2008, p.5
[7] Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London 1994, pp.120-21
[8] Ibid, pp.172-3
[9] M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A political History, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1989, pp.192-230
[10] CNN, Fareed Zakariya GPS, June 27, 2010
[11] Arundhati Roy, “Kashmir’s Fruits of Discord”, NYT, November 8, 2010
[12] Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Sachar Committee Report, New Delhi 2006
[13] Harbans Mukhia, “Indian Muslims: One of a Kind”, Times of India, 20 December 2008
[14] See Greg Barton, Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah And the Soul of Islam, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney 2005
[15] Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University Press, New York 2004, pp.67-9
[16] Fouad Ajami, “The Clash”, New York Times Sunday Book Review, January 6, 2008;
[17] Kenan Malik, “multiculturalism has fanned the flames of Islamic extremism”, The Times, July 16, 2005
[18] Dan Ephron and Mark Hosenball, “Recruited for Jihad?”Newsweek, February 2, 2009
[19] Rami Khouri, “Terrorists AreAlso Spawned by Humiliation”, NYT, June 29, 2010
[20] Evelin Gerda Lindner, “Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New Paradigm”, Peace Studies, 33(2), 2001, p.59
[21] Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God, Ballantine Books, New York 2001, “Introduction”
[22] Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, New York 1979, passim
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Impact of Religious Fundamentalism on Mulsim Youth in Kerala (Study in Progress)
Some of the early trends in the ongoing study of Muslim youth behaviour seem to be very distressing. The field survey is in progress in Thiruvananthapuram & Malappuram. It is expected to finish the survey in these districts by the end of November 2009. The next round of survey work will begin by the beginning of December 2009 in Kannur & Ernakulam. Some of the feed back received from the field are as follows:
1. Muslim youth support the NDF/Popular Front activities.
2. NDF has strong presence in almost all parts of Kerala.
3. People who have NDF links are not interested to cooperate with the survey. Still, many youth made their comments.
4.Muslim youth in Thiruvananthapuram lost their faith in Indian secularism.
5.There are strong reaction against the performance of Muslim League. (Details will be published later along with the whole findings).
6.Muslim youth still feel isolated from the mainstream India as per the reaction from Thiruvananthapuram.
7. Malppuram strongly trust in Indian Secularism.
8. Conditions of Muslim Youth in Malappuram are very pathetic, as sizable number of youth are unemployed,poor and drug/tobacco addict.
Of course, there are a lot to say....
1. Muslim youth support the NDF/Popular Front activities.
2. NDF has strong presence in almost all parts of Kerala.
3. People who have NDF links are not interested to cooperate with the survey. Still, many youth made their comments.
4.Muslim youth in Thiruvananthapuram lost their faith in Indian secularism.
5.There are strong reaction against the performance of Muslim League. (Details will be published later along with the whole findings).
6.Muslim youth still feel isolated from the mainstream India as per the reaction from Thiruvananthapuram.
7. Malppuram strongly trust in Indian Secularism.
8. Conditions of Muslim Youth in Malappuram are very pathetic, as sizable number of youth are unemployed,poor and drug/tobacco addict.
Of course, there are a lot to say....
Sunday, June 07, 2009
Islamophobia and European Extreme Right
Abstract
In particular since the turn of the millennium, social scientists have identified anti-Muslim sentiment as a key feature of the European extreme-right. This article will discuss the history and validity of the term 'Islamophobia', and will probe into the development of the theme of 'Eurabia' in extreme-right wing ideology. The author will analyze the manner in which visions of a Muslim settlement and 'takeover' of Europe have the potential to create a cross-national reconfiguration of extreme-right ideology, a thematic shift, and a movement toward convergence between different sides of the ideological spectrum. The author argues that this ideology is not static, and that its potential new direction challenges significant assumptions of the current literature on the extreme-right.
Introduction
Islamophobia is a word that is practically ubiquitous in today's discourse on Islam. The situation of Muslim minorities in the West is frequently framed both by academics and by pundits in terms of the 'need' to combat the 'evils' of Islamophobia. The United Nations has organized seminars on 'Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding',1 and such websites as Islamophobia Watch were created to denounce 'opinion columns and news items that we believe advocate Islamophobia and those writers and organizations taking a stand against Islamophobia'.2 The Vienna-based European Union agency European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC—since March 2007 it became the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights—FRA), with a specific focus on Europe, released a much-publicized, cross-national report on 'discrimination and manifestations of Islamophobia' since 2001.3
Yet the widespread mention of Islamophobia is a recent development. The 1997 document that officially established the EUMC includes no reference to Islamophobia, but rather specifies the 'phenomena of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism'.4 Literature on the European extreme right has mirrored the increasing ubiquitousness of the term Islamophobia in the public sphere. Though there is an ongoing debate on the definition of 'extreme right' and its shortcomings,5 the consensus has been to ascribe the label to highly nationalist, anti-system, and exclusionary (often racist) parties. In this light, Jean-Yves Camus, for example, has pointed out the emergence in the extreme right imagination of Islam as the 'new enemy',6 and has noted that 'racist rhetoric today [has] an undeniable Islamophobic dimension'.7 In academia, however, Islamophobia was not until recently seen as a basic feature of the extreme right's ideological and value system. The term itself was absent in early literature. It is true that Islam has been a target of some extreme-right parties for a considerable time. For instance, Identit, a Front National (National Front) magazine, dedicated a 1990 issue to the 'awakening' of Islam, and stressed both its 'incompatibility' with European culture and that it constituted once again in history 'a danger for Europe'.8 The scholarly tendency, however, has been to consider 'Islamophobia' as primarily a dimension of xenophobia,9 and 'anti-Muslim' narratives as part of a broader anti-immigration outlook of extreme-right parties,10 or as a consequence of aggressive foreign policy visions in post-communist Russia.11
However, in the early 21st century, and particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the threat that the Crescent will rise over the continent and the spectre of a Muslim Europe have become basic ideological features and themes of the European extreme right. Thus, the concept of 'Islam' galvanizes group action: as the group rallies a 'defence' against Islamization, new issues emerge, existent issues heighten or decline in prominence, party objectives become reconsidered, and new alliances form against the 'threat' of this 'common enemy'.
I thus accept the premise that extreme right ideology is not static but, within some limits, evolves and is shaped by the surrounding environment.12 This study focuses on a variety of parties across Europe, from Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, and Italy. The reason behind the choice of parties with different electoral fortunes and each emerging from diverse national traditions is to show how, despite their differences, they display commonalities in their approach to Islam. Because this paper's goal is to capture the overall narrative towards Islam, a primary focus on the parties' literature (such as manifestos, press releases, official party publications, speeches) as well as interviews of leaders and members both to the media and to the author, seems appropriate. Additionally, secondary sources (from mainstream newspapers, websites and outside groups) that yield insight into the parties' worldview are also incorporated.
In the pages that follow, and in the light of the increased weight that the issue of Islam has gained, I will pose a number of key questions, seek to analyze ideological developments of the extreme right, and probe into the challenges that these potential shifts and re-alignments offer to the literature on the subject. Bearing in mind that each development by itself could form the basis for a new article and invite further scrutiny, this paper aims to provide an overview of trends that, in my view, open new avenues of research into the ideology of the extreme-right party family.
Islamophobia or anti-Islamic?
As a preliminary note, it is necessary to point out not only that the term 'Islamophobia' is present both in and outside academia, as I mentioned in the introduction, but also that there is a growing alarmism regarding the issue. This perception of imminent danger is epitomized by the following words of the vice president of the American Humanist Association: 'It's like the beginning of a thunderstorm; you can sense the electricity in the air. Islamophobia is raising its ugly head in the United States as in Europe … We are teetering on the brink of a kind of mass hysteria—Islamophobia—that can set us back a generation or more in our quest for a world at peace'.13 Yet this perceived 'hysteria' seems to be over a term about which there is a lack of agreement regarding its meaning or to what exactly it refers. The last European Union report on 'Discrimination and Islamophobia' specifically states that the definition, application, and use of the term 'remains a contested issue'.14 The introduction to a cross-national report on 'Secularization and Religious Divides in Europe' notes that 'we therefore intend to use the term “Islamophobia” as a starting point' of analysis, but 'will not take the term for granted'.15 Regardless of these caveats, the fact of the matter is that the term shows staying power and has increasingly become the norm in the discussion of the situation of Muslims in Europe. Thus, Islamophobia designates the stigmatization of all Muslims, and is defined as a widespread mindset and fear-laden discourse in which people make blanket judgments of Islam as the enemy, as the 'other', as a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that it is the natural subject of well-deserved hostility from Westerners.16
Owing to a 'failure' in explaining what Islamophobia is, there have been calls for a new definition of Islamophobia, either broader or more constrained than the current one.17 There are, however, important reasons to rethink such widespread use of the term. Several criticisms have been levelled against it, some more compelling than others. For instance, Csari has mentioned the fact that 'the term can be misleading' because it may subsume other forms of discrimination (such as racial or class) under religious discrimination.18 In my view there are two compelling reasons that the employment by social scientists of the term 'Islamophobia' should be restrained. The first stems from the term's indistinctiveness: It places under the broad umbrella of 'fear or hatred of Islam', discourses and criticisms that have different sources, motivations, and goals. Vincent Geisser, for example, accuses pundits and social scientists who criticize Islam in the name of liberal values, of being driven essentially by a 'fear' that manifests in symptoms of a somewhat undefined 'latent islamophobia'.19 Against this 'catch-all' dynamic, I adopt an approach similar to that of Marcel Maussen, who calls for an urgent need to distinguish between 'academic discussions on the relations between Islam and modernity, public discussions on whether Islam recognizes the principle of separation of church and state, public outcries about Islam as a “backward religion” or as a “violent religion”', and hate speech.20 Certainly a sizeable number of those who pose questions regarding Islam are not necessarily motivated by an illogical attitude, biased mindset, pure fear, or blind hate.
This aspect is linked with a second point of concern regarding the prevalent mention of 'Islamophobia'. John Bowen argues that the term is more polemical than it is analytical: It is 'far from neutral'.21 In this recognition, parallels can be established with the widespread use of the label 'xenophobia' that has long been attached to those who questioned the impact of immigration or the problems arising from specific models of integration (or lack thereof) of immigrants. This issue is connected with what Chantal Mouffe has described as one of the greatest flaws of contemporary European democracies: the imposition of a 'moral framework' on a number of issues, legitimating the reign of good, 'acceptable discourse' (and sometimes cordon sanitaires) over discourse deemed evil and out-of-bounds. There is, of course, no denial of the existence of 'extreme' positions or xenophobic attitudes, for example. Yet, in the wake of fairly recent developments in Europe, one is hard-pressed not to support her denunciation of 'the danger of using this category [extreme-right] to demonize all the parties who defend positions that are seen as a challenge to the well-meaning establishment'.22 The indiscriminate use of such labels as 'Islamophobia', that have an unmistakably moralistic dimension, has the potential to stigmatize generally and relegate to the 'Islamophobic' periphery of public debate, those who criticize or even attempt to understand, in a non-monolithic fashion, some aspects of Islam. The conflation (sometimes open, often implicit) of legitimate criticism or valid points of view with demonization, has the consequence of ending any sort of truly democratic and open debate on any sort of issue, silencing voices afraid of stigmatization, and in practice facilitating the emergence and actions of those who indeed demonize. This rings especially true in the light of increasing recognition, in academia for example, that there has been in recent decades a lack of public debate and interaction between those who govern and the governed, about crucial issues (like immigration), which has in turn increased the appeal of those parties that profess to represent the people and call for 'true' democracies.23 In this light, 'anti-Islamic' seems a more suitable analytical category to apply to some discourses on Islam, particularly those coming from the extreme-right, because it at least starts a necessary (and long overdue) process of distinguishing between discourses about Islam: those who show irrational fears and treat Islam as a monolithic bloc from those who may be critical of some aspects yet are not ipso facto 'anti' Islam because of their criticism.24
A greater focus on Christianity?
The authors of a 1998 research paper to the European Commission argued that it was no longer possible to discuss political futures 'without also discussing questions of meaning, spirituality, and cultural identity'.25 A decade later these words ring truer than ever, particularly in regard to the European 'political future'. One of the developments of notice in the last years has been the growing relevance of Christian motifs and themes in the narratives set forth by a substantial number of European extreme-right parties.26 The increased perception of Muslims, and Islam in general, as an ominous threat to the native communities is in no small part responsible for this evolution. In a few cases, such as that of the National Front, the attention paid to Christianity is an intensified continuation of a previous ideological stance. Thus, when Le Pen defends outlawing large mosques on the grounds that they constitute 'buildings of political-religious conquest' and 'threaten the Christian identity of our country', he is by and large reiterating a familiar theme.27
In some cases this 'turn to Christianity' has been novel and dramatic, and has implied a rejection of previous positions. This has been the case, for instance, with the Northern League. During an initial phase—which lasted until the late 1990s—the Catholic Church was defined as a natural enemy of the freedom of the North, because of the Church's 'collusion' with the oppressive centralist forces since the unification of the Italian state. The Vatican, and its ecclesiastical hierarchy in particular, were denounced as a reactionary force and enemy of Northern liberation. The outbreak of the Kosovo war (which the party saw as part of an American-led project to 'Islamicize' Europe), coupled with an increasing emphasis by the party on 'traditional' values and principles (as a response to the disruptive forces of liberalization and globalization), triggered a shift in its discourse toward a pro-Christian, pro-Vatican direction. Pope John Paul II went from being a 'Polish enemy' of the besieged community to, in the words of Umberto Bossi, 'a great [man] … the first [pope] for one hundred years who does not retreat in front of the Masonic and anti-Christian doctrines … the Church is starting to wake up'.28 Thus, the League led the opposition against the construction of Islamic places of worship,29 and increasingly stressed the 'millenarian struggle' between Christianity and Islam.
This anti-Islamic reorientation of the party received a major boost after the terrorist attacks of September 11. If the anti-Islamic focus had previously been fixed on the consequences for the indigenous community identity of Muslim settlement in Italy, 'Islam' soon became in the narrative of the party the synonym for terrorism, violence, and death. The party increased its activism on the ground against policies and practices that seemed to facilitate what the party called the 'Islamization' of the country.30 A European MP for the Northern League declared at a street protest against the burqa that 'Islam is a dangerous virus, and we must stop it from spreading, because Padania must remain Christian'.31 Historical battles are reinterpreted in the light of the steady influx of Muslim immigration to Europe. When the Italian parliament decided to remove a painting of the 1571 naval battle of Lepanto (in which the Ottoman fleet was defeated by Christian forces) from parliament Mario Borghezio, a top Northern League official, reacted angrily, saying that the decision 'was an attack against the Christian identity of the country [because Lepanto] signalled the victory of a Christian Europe against Muslim invasion'.32 In this new context it come as no surprise that the party daily was one of the strongest supporters of Pope Benedict XVI when he made comments about the constitutive role of violence in Islam that triggered worldwide Muslim protests.33 Northern League officials also praise Benedict for his focus on the need to 're-Christianize' Europe. 'We need to thank Ratzinger', declared one League member. 'Because of him the Church has remembered its origins [and] what the deep meaning of belonging to a Christian community is'.34
A similar emphasis on 'Christian roots' has become a feature of the discourse of the British National Party (BNP), particularly since 2001 and in reaction to the Islam-as-a-threat framing of the debate. Nick Griffin, leader of the BNP, has proclaimed the party to be the 'vanguard of the resistance to Islamification', which he deems to be 'the most pressing problem of the first half of our young century'.35 As in the case of the Italian Northern League, the BNP has actively opposed the construction of mosques, each of which it describes as a step toward the 'Islamic colonization' of the country (as, for example, the large mosque planned for the 2012 London Olympics).36 Even a symbol of traditional English nationalism such as Saint George has been described as a 'fiery and powerful symbol of opposition to Islam'.37 Further the BNP has defended Pope Benedict XVI, and praised his 'courage to speak against the perils of Islam',38 while heavily criticizing the Anglican Church of England for lacking the resolve to address 'the very real threat of Britain becoming an Islamic state in the next few decades'.39 In this context, in which the Church of England is accused of having resigned itself to irrelevance and extinction, with 'hand wringing ministers kneel[ing] before the advancing waves carrying aloft the mighty sword of Islam',40 it is no wonder that the party has been linked to the creation of a new Christian organization, the Christian Council, whose mission statement reads: 'At this time of moral crisis and faced with the very real prospect of the spiritual void being filled with dangerous creeds and cults, now more than ever, is a strong voice needed to reconnect the church with the lost congregations'.41 When the head of the Church of England noted that the incorporation of some aspects of Sharia law into the British legal system was 'unavoidable', the BNP reacted by stating that these declarations were part of a larger disposition of the Establishment toward 'betraying Britain's Christian heritage in order to appease Islam'.42 In the party's magazine Identity, a writer suggested that the BNP should commit itself to the defence of 'civilisational Christianity', because 'the alternative to a Christian Britain is chaos' and could lead inter alia to 'the surrender to the aggressiveness of a certain foreigner religion'.43
This renewed emphasis on the 'Christian identity' of the 'original communities', who are now endangered by the advance of Islam in Europe, can be seen across the spectrum of parties on the extreme right. The short-lived political group of the European Parliament, 'Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty' (ITS), a coalition of extreme right parties from six member states that lasted from January to November 2007, had as a founding principle the 'commitment to Christian values, heritage, culture'. Chairman Bruno Gollnisch stated that one of the goals of the group was to go beyond a narrow euroscepticism (limited to attacking a European superstate) that does not 'properly defend Christian values'.44 During the Austrian parliamentary elections of October 2006, the Freedom Party campaigned with a specifically anti-Islamic platform and released a political advertisement in which the cross atop Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna, the oldest church in the country, was replaced with an Islamic crescent. The caption read: 'This is the true hidden desire of Muslims'.45 Amidst warnings against the impending 'Islamization' of the country, the Flemish party Vlaams Belang proclaims to be the real guardian of Christianity. As stated by Filip Dewinter, 'In political disputes about abortion, euthanasia, same-sex-marriage, adoption for homosexual couples, family values, subsidies for Christian or Jewish schools, we have always defended the Christian viewpoint. On those topics, we were better Christians than the so-called Christian-Democrats'. He added, 'Many of us are not “believers” in the religious meaning of the word, but we share the moral values of Christianity. They are the foundation of European civilization'.46
This idea of an embattled 'Christian Europe' weakened by secularism and threatened with disappearance under the continuous migratory flow and settlement of Muslim populations, has found support in the warnings of Pope Benedict XVI against the spiritual void into which Europe fell due to the triumph of a Godless rationality that denies its peoples the role of faith and spiritual guidance.47 As the Pope declared in an address regarding the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Europe has 'an identity comprised of a set of universal values that Christianity helped forge, thus giving Christianity not only a historical but [also] a foundational role vis--vis Europe. These values, which make up the soul of the Continent, must remain in the Europe of the third millennium as a “ferment” of civilization'. If Europe stays the course of radical secularism, in a context of the steady decline of birth rates, it is 'following a path that could lead to its departure from history'.48 This theme of an impending collapse of a Christian Europe is not exclusive to the Catholic hierarchy but also comes from Protestant environs. Although some of these voices specifically denounce the ongoing 'Islamization of Europe',49 the emerging consensus seems to focus on the need for a more assertive and aggressive defence of 'Christian' values that would bring about the 're-Christianization' of Europe. In this scenario it is not surprising that many nationalist parties find in the appeals of the Church, notably the Vatican, a confirmation of their own message and an ally in the need for urgent action against the decadence and the collapse of a Christian Europe that looms on the horizon. Eric Kaufmann has written that the growth of a European Islam may lead to an indigenous nationalist response (in the form of stronger nationalist parties) or 'may lead to a renewed emphasis on Christian identity'.50 Those variables, however, are not necessarily opposed and need not to exclude each other. The latest developments in European nationalist groups indicate that, particularly in opposition to visions of a Muslim takeover, a more Christian direction within these parties is already under way.
Toward philo-Semitism?
While anti-Semitism has been absent from the narrative of some parties (the Northern League, for example), distrust of Jews—perceived as alien, rootless, and engaged in international conspiracies against the unity of the nation—has long been a trait of European extreme-right parties (for instance, the National Front in France). In more recent times, however, there has been a discursive shift in many of these parties to a decidedly pro-Jewish direction. This trend has been uneven, and some parties, like Germany's National Democratic Party (NPD), remain decidedly loyal to their anti-Semitic origins.51 A case in point is the Flemish Vlaams Belang that went from hardly taking any notice of Jews52 to—in an increasingly anti-Islamic context—the staunch support of Judaism and Zionism.53 Filip Dewinter has often professed his support of and admiration for Jews, both in Jewish and in mainstream media. He repeatedly mentions the 'Judeo-Christian',54 foundations of Europe and the West. 'Jewish values are European values', he stated in an interview, 'and Jewish civilization is one of the roots of Western civilization'.55 The party has vowed to defend the Jewish communities against attacks from Muslims, which Dewinter described as 'the first pogroms in Belgium since World War II'.56 Israel is also praised as a 'natural ally' of Europe because it is 'the only nation with freedom of speech, freedom of religion, rule of law [in the Middle East]. It's a paradox, but even the Arabs in Israel have more political rights and more freedom than their brothers in the Arab countries. Israel struggles for survival and security in a region that's ruled by bloody dictators'.57 An interesting case is the British National Party that has recently been trying to distance itself from anti-Semitism, one of the driving forces of the party since its origins. The party leader has criticized the rabid 'blame-the-Jew' mentality,58 and stated that for the BNP the idea 'that “the Jew is the enemy” is simply over for us now' because the party wants to 'get on with the real struggles'.59 The party has given space to voices that openly profess admiration for Israel. A BNP member announced that the party 'has moved on in recent years, casting off the leg-irons of conspiracy theories and the thinly veiled anti-Semitism which has held this party back for two decades'. Instead the party identified as 'the real enemies of the British people' two groups: 'home grown Anglo-Saxon Celtic liberal leftists' and 'the Crescent Horde, the endless wave of Islamists who are flocking to our shores to bring our island nations into the embrace of their barbaric desert religion'. Thus, the anti-Semitic 'lunatic fringe of the Nationalist movement' should be rejected and Israel's 'nationalist' stance praised. After all, 'the 21st century is the Islamic century. Unless we start to resist the threat of Islamic extremism then within 100 years the West will have become Eurabia'.60 In France Marine Le Pen, who vowed to 'de-demonize' the image of the party, has made overtures to the French Jewish community and, as a member of the European parliament, has registered with the Delegation for Relations with Israel. She was behind the decision to send National Front members to a demonstration in memory of a French Jew killed in a hate-crime, and told the media that she wanted to put an end to a 'number of misunderstandings' between the party and the Jewish community who, Marine Le Pen said, 'have nothing to fear from the National Front'.61 'The French community, who are increasingly victims of attacks by Islamic radicals', she said on one occasion, 'should be able to turn to us for support'.62 For this show of solidarity with Jews, more traditional voices close to the party have accused her of trying to create, together with the Flemish Vlaams Belang, an 'axis' of rapprochement with the Jewish community in order to confront Muslims.63 Guillaume Faye, one of France's New Right main theorists, advocates that those who defend European identity should get rid of an obsessive and 'chronic anti-Judaism' because the real danger is colonization from 'the third world and Islam'.64
Recently a few voices in academia have argued that 'Muslims' have replaced 'Jews' as the new transnational Other in exclusionary discourses in the European Union. 'Welcome to the new Europe, in which the Jews are no longer persecuted but revered as cosmopolitan ancestors', observed Dominic Boyer.65 For Matti Bunzl, the modern form of anti-Semitism has run its historical course and 'there simply is no debate on the legitimacy of the Jewish presence in Europe'. Whereas anti-Semitism is a thing of the past, 'designed to protect the purity of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is marshalled to safeguard the future of European civilization'.66 To other scholars anti-Semitism provides an accurate model regarding how Muslims are increasingly perceived as perpetual aliens to the indigenous culture.67 Some remarkable differences between the treatment and status of Jews in the past and the situation of Muslims in today's Europe should not be underestimated, however, and the fact remains that traditional anti-Semitism can resurge in other forms—in a ferocious form of anti-Zionism, for example—and can even manifest itself in anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by Muslim youths (visible during the second Palestinian Intifada 2000-2006).68 Yet, an increasing number of acknowledgments by some extreme-right parties of the Jewish contribution to European culture, and support of Israel, may serve as evidence that the traditional demonization of Jews is taking a backseat to a new, fierce stigmatization of Muslims in narratives of belonging and exclusion in Europe.
Beyond nationalism?
Nationalism has long been identified as a core, and perhaps as the most-important, feature of extreme right-wing parties.69 Further, these parties proudly declare themselves to be the only 'authentic' national forces of the country, and a majority of them feature variations of 'nation' in their own names. It has been observed that in some intellectual circles, such as those around the European New Right, nationalism was running out of fashion, replaced by an allegiance to a wider source of cultural identity, such as Europe. I believe that this development is not restricted to these rather small circles. I argue here that although conceding that nationalism may have more than one centre of control,70 the height to which the notions of 'Europe' and 'West' have reached in the narratives of the European extreme-right warrants a closer look at the hypothesis that the 'defence' of the original communities by these groups has been increasingly extended to a European level and does not limit itself to the borders or territories of the country. This trajectory can be seen across the spectrum of extreme-right parties and has become more intense in recent years. In some respect this post-national discourse, the greater focus on European and Western borders and traditions, complements the nationalist stance, but has also the potential to compete with it. The emphasis on a broader entity—Europe or the West—emanates both from the need collectively to defend indigenous Europeans from the 'New World Order' and its globalist ethos (which erases traditions and roots),71 and from fears of, and struggle against, Islamization.
A recurring theme of transformation of Europe into a new geo-political entity dominated by Muslims called Eurabia emerges in many of the discourses. The work of Jewish historian Bat Ye'or,72 is becoming a reference, and such concepts as Eurabia and Dhimmitude (referring to the subjected status of Christians and Jews under Islamic governance) have entered the vocabulary of the extreme-right (and, one might add, some sectors of the mainstream right as well). Asked to define his party, Flemish Party leader Filip Dewinter replied, 'We are the defenders of Western civilization, with its two pillars: Judeo-Christianity and the heritage of the ancient Greece'. Bat Ye'or is hailed as someone who was able both to unveil the 'shameful political shift' that led European elites and Arab leaders to concoct together the formation of Eurabia, and to point out 'how European politicians are kowtowing to Islam'. Bat Ye'or sheds light on dynamics that were previously in the dark. Dewinter explains it thus: 'I never understood how European politicians could be so short sighted. It seems so absurd. Again, Bat Ye'or explains how this fits into a larger pattern of creating a new political entity called Eurabia. It's not just weakness or ill judgement. It's part of a plan'. Dewinter adds, 'These Eurabian-minded politicians think they can consolidate their political power by making an alliance with the Muslim world. By selling out Europe to its worst enemies. They hope a strong Eurabia will be able to counterbalance the power of the United States'. This Eurabia path is thus leading Europe to a catastrophe: 'It puts at stake the physical survival of our European nations. We could go down the road of Lebanon'.73 The focus here is on the survival of Europe, and potentially the entire West, with the threat to the Flemish community as part of a broader Europe-wide struggle. The Eurabian narrative is also gaining strength in the discourse of the British National Party. When Italian journalist and polemicist Oriana Fallaci passed away, the party praised her as someone who 'defied the civilizational transformation of Europe into Eurabia'.74 According to Nick Griffin, the BNP leader, 'We are deeply concerned about the mainly—though not exclusively—French elite project to morph the EU, Turkey and the Mahgreb into “Eurabia”. Bat Ye'or is 100% right about this'.75 In an article about the November 2005 riots in France Griffin described his party as 'the vanguard' in the 'struggle between the West and Islam', for if the party fails in its mission, 'Europe will be no more, and our grandchildren will curse us in their dhimmi status as they pay endless tribute and suffer ceaseless oppression, injustice, humiliation and rape in the lands that once belonged to their free forebears'.76 As written by a BNP columnist, 'This is in fact the start of World War 4, with its roots in the victory of Charles Martel over Islam in the Battle of Tours in 732 AD. Islam is once again awakening, and the West must awaken as well'.77
The Northern League in Italy shares an analogous view regarding the need to defend Europe and the West in the face of the 'imperialist' designs of Islam. Northern League senior member Roberto Calderoli, decrying the West's abjuration of 'our Christian roots, identity and culture', argued in the party's newspaper for the launch of 'crusades of Western peoples, who still remember the battle of Lepanto', against Islam.78 When the Islamic threat—both in terms of 'colonization' and terrorism—is discussed in the party literature, it is typically framed as a danger not merely to the community but to the peoples of Europe and the West. The party claims to itself the role of supreme protector of the West against Islam; after all, 'We were the first to ring the alarm about the danger that Islam represents, about their inherent hostility toward the West'.79 'As preached by Oriana Fallaci', commented a party official, 'we need to show the pride of being Westerners, Christians and Padani'.80 Mogens Camre, member of the European Parliament with the Danish People's Party, also mentions the need to combat the 'real danger of an Islamization of Europe' as a top priority of its party. He explicitly frames the discourse in terms of a collective European identity, saying, 'We think the Muslim countries belong in the Middle Ages and we will not see our democratic countries being destroyed by people who think they should rule the world according to a book written in the Middle East in the 7th and 8th centuries'.81 Regarding the threat of 'Islamization', an Austrian Freedom Party official observes that there is a real 'threat regarding the cultural integrity of the European nations and peoples with its cultures and traditions … when Islamization threatens our laws, rules, habits and traditions it needs to be rolled back'. He added, 'Islamic countries must grant equal rights to Christians in their countries as Europe grants to Muslims who integrate into our society'.82 At the same time the new 'pan-European party' envisioned by four right-wing nationalist leaders (from Austria, France, Belgium, and Bulgaria) aims at rescuing Europe from the twin evils of 'globalization and Islamization'. 'Patriots of all the countries of Europe, unite!' exhorted the leader of Austria's Freedom Party at the conference where such plans were announced.83 At the heart of political parties commonly described as 'extreme-right', nationalism is still the dominant force. Yet it is difficult to deny the emergence—and the examples presented here reinforce this perception—of a growing turn toward post-nationalist dynamics and arguments in the discourse of many of such parties. It is as if there is a direct relationship between their concerns vis--vis an Islamic community or umma united by faith and mores, and the need of these parties to present themselves as representatives and first line of defence of a wider European (and Western) transnational community also bound by a common (Christian) faith and values. This dynamic emerges clearly in the way, for example, that a potential (and increasingly unlikely) EU membership of Turkey is depicted by the European extreme-right. Many anti-Turkey membership propaganda materials, from a different number of parties, portray a threatening Crescent over the map of Europe with the headline, 'Turkey No!' One of the ways that, in the last general elections, the Austrian Freedom Party promoted its anti-system image was to state repeatedly that, unlike mainstream parties, it rejected Turkey's membership in the EU.84 The alternative 'European project' promoted by leader of the French National Front Jean-Marie Le Pen, is based on a 'coherent group of peoples belonging to a Christian civilization [and] sharing a common culture',85 which effectively excludes any Muslim countries (like Turkey). Raising the spectre of a 'true Islamic invasion of Europe' in the eventuality of Turkey's membership in the European Union, the Northern League has been continually campaigning for a popular referendum that 'will allow all citizens to have their say on a historical issue that will seal the destiny of our peoples'.86 It has been argued that the debate on Turkish membership transformed Turkey into the '“other” for self-definition of what it was to be defined as a European'.87 More to the point, Casanova wrote that after 30 years of immigration from territories outside of Europe, the Turkish question is part of a broader issue in which 'Islam' is identified as the 'utterly other'. Yet, the rejection of Islam by European extreme-right parties is dismissed by the same author as merely 'nativist' and 'nationalist'.88 As I have attempted to show in this section, a third 'Europeanist' dimension could be added, regardless of how different this 'Europe' is from the one currently promoted by Brussels. An increased 'European identity'—going beyond a mere attachment to the original homelands—in these parties is certainly associated with the prominent role that Islam plays as the 'other' in contemporary discourses about 'what it means' to be an European in the 21st century.89
From the periphery to the centre?
The question of the adoption by the mainstream right of themes and issues previously 'owned' by extreme-right parties (such as those dealing with law and order or immigration, for instance) has been addressed with some regularity by the literature on the extreme right.90 Hainsworth has edited a volume on these parties, containing the telling subtitle 'From the Margins to the Mainstream', in which he concludes by stating that 'in a variety of situations, they have influenced the agendas, policies and discourses of major political parties and governments'.91 In this section I will address the ways in which the increasing importance of the issue of 'Islam' has led to a de facto mainstreaming of opinions and policies previously deemed too 'extreme' and relegated to the periphery of the political spectrum by centrist parties.
But before illustrating and discussing this point, I will focus on another crucial consequence that this emphasis on Islam has had for the extreme right. In fact, recent years have witnessed a growing assimilation by these parties of a number of issues that are 'respectable', that are morally compelling for a substantial majority of public opinion and rooted in relatively consensual attitudes and inclinations. In short, the extreme right has co-opted issues that a large number of mainstream politicians, both on the mainstream Right and Left, find hard to disagree with, if not fully support. This development has rendered the distinction between what is 'mainstream' and what should be categorized as 'extreme' difficult and, at times, hopelessly muddied. For example, the situation of women in Muslim communities—and the issue of women's rights in general—illustrate this point well. When the situation of women in Islam is discussed, the European extreme right puts forward arguments that, in a not-so-distant past, were considered to be positions exclusive to progressive and feminist groups in the West. The extreme right has been visibly active in its rejection of several cultural practices associated with Islam—ranging from the use of the headscarf and forced marriages, to honour-killings and female genital mutilation—by using arguments similar to those employed by mainstream groups that denounce inequalities and discrimination against women. This development can be seen across the continent. Danish People's Party MEP Mogens Camre stated that 'headscarves and burkhas are a discrimination of women. The real effect is to keep women apart from society and prevent them from obtaining freedom and equality. No society can develop without equality and freedom for women'.92 One of the most popular books in Denmark, Islamists and Naivists, was co-written by two figures of the country's political mainstream (both Social Democrats, one a feminist) and denounces the 'totalitarian' impulses of Islam and its claim to control every single aspect of the lives of its adherents, and especially of women. As one of the writers observed, 'If a woman doesn't wear a headscarf, the Islamists will exert maximum pressure and use the threat of violence to make sure that she does. It is that zealous attempt to apply Islamist principles that is as authoritarian as Nazism or communism'.93
In recent years the theme of 'oppression of women' under Islam has become a major theme of the literature of the Italian Northern League. According to League writers, the condition of Muslim women is a tell-tale sign of Islam's 'backwardness', and is incompatible with the mores of a superior Western civilization that strives for gender equality. A party MP commented that the Western way of life 'is based on civilized [notions of] democracy and respect for others … rooted in the DNA of each citizen', while Islam's way of life 'is based on uncivilized traditions such as sharia, the death penalty, lex talionis … infibulation, polygamy, the idea that inside families men are superior to women. These are all uncivilized traditions'.94 When the Italian parliament refused to decide on a motion submitted by the Northern League coalition regarding 'violations against women's freedom in the name of religion', a party MP showed her outrage by declaring that 'in order to not offend Islamic susceptibilities', the parliament decided to ignore the fact that 'that in our country there are women and girls who are “slaves” or subjected to personal restrictions or forced [to accept] polygamy in the name of a religious faith that does not recognize the principle of equality between men and women'.95 The British National Party has also intervened in favour of women's rights, specifically in the context of media reports about the establishment of Sharia courts and a two-tier legal system in Britain.96 The BNP accused the media, and particularly the BBC, of ignorance about 'the abuse women and minorities suffer under Sharia laws the world over'. It continued: 'Women are beaten, raped, murdered, mutilated and oppressed by Muslim “culture” and English law should never turn its back on these vulnerable members of their society'. Like the Northern League, the BNP stresses gender equality in their denunciations of Islam. The party warns that the government's failure to stop Islamic law from taking hold, 'would be a travesty and a direct refutation of western morals that posit that all people are created equal and stand the same in the eyes of the law'.97
The debate about the use of the headscarf in French public schools provides an example of an issue that conflates the questions of separation of Church and State and of gender equality, and has mobilized on the same front different forces of the political spectrum from the extreme right to feminists and progressives. For example, one of the strongest supporters of banning the hijab was a prominent feminist, Elisabeth Badinter, who denounced the scarf as the 'oppression of a sex' and at odds with the Western tradition of women's emancipation.98 A Socialist and former president of SOS Racisme defended a left-wing policy of immigration quotas, and of setting as a precondition for potential immigrants the respect for both 'lacit [secularism] and gender equality'.99 One should not be surprised, then, that Le Pen repeatedly raised in his speeches the need to enforce the principle of separation of Church and State while decrying the measures taken by the French government,100 to 'institutionalize' Islam in the country. These efforts, Le Pen said, marked the end of the principle of lacit and the first stage of the official financing of Islam in France under the pressure of its burgeoning 'migrant and demographic force'.101 The necessity of maintaining religious and cultural neutrality in public schools has also been invoked by the Freedom Party in Austria as a reason to ban the use of the headscarves by both teachers and students.102 Denmark's People's Party was behind a proposal to ban 'culturally specific' headgear, except for those cultural manifestations that reflected a Christian-Jewish background.103 On this issue the Italian Northern League leads the fight against any attempt to remove Christian symbols from schools, and has even argued that in order to prevent a Muslim 'takeover' of public institutions, the Italian Constitution should explicitly strengthen the 'Christian identity' of the country.104
The increased political focus on Islam has also made a fierce opposition to the ritual slaughter of animals—particularly the production of halal meat, the only one permissible according to Sharia law—a major theme of extreme-right narratives. In this opposition these movements have often joined animal rights groups in protesting against halal food on the basis that it promotes an inhumane and barbaric method of slaughter. The British National Party has been active on this front, and even broke the news story that halal meat was served in many schools across the country because of an increasing number of Muslim students. The party quoted from a report by an animal rights group arguing that the practice caused considerable animal suffering. A BNP official added that 'we really don't like the way these animals are killed'.105 The party affirmed not only that 'this is an issue of animal welfare', but that 'parents have a right to know if their sons and daughters are unknowingly being fed on ritually slaughtered meat'.106 The Danish People's Party has launched a campaign to ban halal slaughter because 'consideration of religious minorities should not be prioritized over consideration of animals'.107 Similar accusations of cruelty to animals and calls by both the extreme right and animal welfare organizations to ban ritual slaughter have been reported in Austria,108 France,109 and Italy.110
At the same time, in no small part because of the pressure the 'Islamic question' places on contemporary European societies, 'governing parties' and politicians have shifted public policies and discourses toward positions that previous observers in academia have dismissed as extreme and exclusionary. A case in point is the growing relevance that cultural norms and values play in discussions of immigration, national identities, and national belongings across Europe. For the last 20 years, scholars have argued that contemporary extreme-right parties no longer held 'classic' racist positions in their discriminatory and exclusionist positions vis--vis other individuals and communities. Pierre-Andr Taguieff describes this transformation from 'biological racism' (based on inequality and hierarchy of races) to a new, 'differentialist' form of racism in which exclusion was based on cultural differences. This new cultural racism advocates the 'right to difference' in which different cultures, viewed as incommensurable 'totalities', needed to be preserved and separated in order not to corrupt the 'authenticity' and 'integrity' of each culture. Such a perspective views culturally distinct groups as aliens whose absorption into the prevalent culture provides mainstream society with a fruitless and potentially disastrous task.111 This distinction introduced by Taguieff, since its first formulation, has been widely used in the study of the extreme right in Europe and beyond Europe.112 Stolcke, in a similar manner, added the notion of 'cultural fundamentalism' to the debate over anti-immigrant and racist groups. This form of exclusion was thus based on the assumption that cultures are incommensurable, with the caveat that, contrasting with racist theories, cultural fundamentalism 'has a certain openness which leaves room for requiring immigrants, if they wish to live in our midst, to assimilate culturally'.113
Yet, as we progress toward the end of the first decade of the new century, even a detached observer cannot fail to notice that a great cultural revival has been taking hold of mainstream European politics. Though an emphasis on cultural aspects has of course existed before (see for example Germany's long-term reluctance to give citizenship to gastarbeiter, many of whom are Muslim Turks), particularly since the late nineties, the emphasis on culture in regard to immigration, both in mainstream discourse and policies, has become conspicuous. In a 1997 article, political scientist Giovanni Sartori warned about the challenges posed to pluralistic European communities by massive immigration, particularly that from Islamic countries. Referring to the danger that 'cultural strangers' represented, Sartori wrote that 'strangers who are unwilling to give in exchange for what they get, who wish to remain “alien” to the point of challenging the very laws of the land that hosts them, are bound to elicit fear, rejection, and hostility'.114 These arguments have been reinforced after the terrorist attacks of Muslim extremists both in America and Europe. Models of immigrant integration—from the multicultural (as in Britain or the Netherlands) to those focused on assimilation (as with the case of France)—have been questioned and revamped due to the unavoidable reality of the increased growth of separated communities that do not engage with and many times refuse, if are not downright hostile to, the norms and values of the broader society. The growing awareness of the danger that Islamic extremism represents for Europe's civil societies created a political need for intervention, for the sake of national security. Thus, underlying this cultural revival are not only worries about Europe's cultural demise but, importantly, an urgent need to address the real issue of radical Islamist activity on European soil. This is the starting point from which a wave of new policies toward immigrants and newcomers have sprung to life across Europe, and not only has urged the need for but has often imposed as a condition for entering or remaining within the country 'integration' and acceptance of 'indigenous' norms and values. These policies are intimately linked with a more pronounced emphasis on 'national' identity and values to which immigrants must demonstrate allegiance. This urged reassertion of national identity and liberal values not only emerges from conservatives,115 but cuts across the ideological spectrum. David Goodhart, a progressive, argues that the left must discard 'the fallacy that nationalism and national feeling is only and necessarily a belligerent and xenophobic force'.116
In this sense, it is true that civic integration policies have acquired an obligatory (and coercive) character.117 The Netherlands set the pace in revising an existent integration law and warning newcomers to 'be aware of Dutch values and keep the country's norms'. Immigrants are now required to pass an immigration test that includes a DVD showing gay and topless women.118 Such citizenship tests, for a long time unknown in Europe, are becoming the norm. In Denmark, the ministry of integration website instructs potential citizens 'to work, pay tax, don't hit your children, and show respect for equal rights between sexes'.119 Britain introduced an American-style citizenship ceremony, and has launched citizenship tests. These measures were preceded by a vigorous debate in which mainstream politicians, both from the left and the right, argued for a more active assertion of 'core' national values. Former Home Secretary David Blunkett vowed to 'protect the rights and duties of all citizens and confront practices and beliefs that hold them back, particularly women. The left has to be consistent about defending core values, rather than retreating into moral relativism when its commitments are tested'.120 In an op-ed piece David Davis, the shadow home secretary (from 2003 to June 2008), asked, 'Are we going to find the compromises to preserve the freedoms, the tolerance, the give-and-take, that characterize the most open, vital and creative society in history? Or are we going to allow the splintering of loyalties, the division of communities, that will corrode the foundations of that society?'121 There has been a growing public discussion about practices that are not part of British culture, for example forced marriages (particularly Muslim first-cousin marriages), and a cabinet minister warned about the 'genetic' dangers associated with inbreeding.122
France, under the initiative of then Interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, adopted an obligatory 'social integration contract' (targeted at combating ethnic endogamy) for all new entrants. Further, before applying for permanent residence, immigrants to France must prove that they are 'well-integrated' into French society, meaning, among other things, that the applicant complies with the principles of the French Republic.123 As a sign that the times—and the boundaries of what is acceptable to propose—have indeed changed regarding integration policies for immigrants in Europe, Sarkozy vowed during the presidential campaign to create a Ministry for Immigration and National Identity, which led Jean-Marie Le Pen to accuse him of 'soliciting' in the National Front's territory.124 The first bill presented by the new Ministry targeted foreigners who wanted to join their families, and introduced tests to ascertain would-be immigrants' knowledge of French language, history, and 'Republican values'.125
Taken as a whole these examples, which are far from exhaustive, illustrate how in recent years there has been a clear shift in the discourse and policies regarding immigration. This shift has been driven by the relevance that the frame Islam-as-a-threat- to-European-security-and-values has gained in public opinion. Further, the discussion and the launch of new models of integration of immigrants has been linked with cultural narratives (a fact that is not often acknowledged and is sometimes denied by public officials), and the need for communities with cultural practices at odds with the indigenous majority to adjust and conform. There is an underlying cultural justification running through the new citizenship reforms and 'integration contracts' imposed on newcomers. In truth, the emphasis is on 'integration', and these new official measures reveal per se the belief in the possibility of integration of immigrants from different cultures, as with the case of Muslims. This optimism is close to non-existent in extreme-right narratives that promote instead the impossibility of such integration and the need for separation. Nevertheless, the trend toward cultural justifications in order to decide or determine a sense of belonging to the community—long considered a feature of the extreme-right—seems clear. This realization arguably raises the question of whether the concept 'extreme' is indeed malleable, varying according to circumstances and the politicians behind the discourses and-or policies. It depends on the messenger, not the message.126 With respect to this a note of caution is necessary. While mainstream discourse on Muslim immigration tends to be nuanced both in terms of the diagnosis and proposed solutions, the extreme-right view is framed both on an either-or scenario (assimilation or expulsion) and in an apocalyptic tone (the coming of Eurabia, the extinction of European peoples, etc.). Also, it could be argued that in championing Western and democratic values as a way of countering Islam, the extreme right is essentially striving for legitimacy by inoculating itself from accusations of racism and xenophobia, while pursuing in its ultimate quest for ethnic homogeneity.127 In any case, the extent or degree to which, particularly after September 11, 2001, the extreme right has influenced the establishment (mainstreaming of its positions) and/or was influenced by a favourable anti-Muslim environment (co-option of issues) certainly deserves further qualitative and quantitative investigation.
The 'spirit of decadence' goes mainstream?
Another point, however, merits reflection. Scholars, or even non-specialists, who have followed the extreme-right are aware that one of the driving forces of its ideology is the idea of decline, either of the nation or, increasingly, of Europe.128 In a context in which signs of irreversible 'decadence' are perceived to be everywhere, extreme-right leaders portray their groups as the 'last defenders' of their beleaguered communities, whose cultural identity, authenticity, and independence are threatened by national and global forces. The 'disappearance' or 'death' of the community is, in these narratives, a real possibility looming on the near horizon. The patriarch of the European extreme-right, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has repeatedly warned that France and Europe, due to massive immigration and demographic decline, were living on borrowed time. His daughter (and in line to become his successor at the head of the party) Marine Le Pen argues that 'if we go on like this, Europe will no longer be Europe, [but] will turn into an Islamic Republic'. Thus, she says, 'We are at a turning point, and if we don't protect our civilization it will disappear'.129 For the British National Party's leader, what is at stake is Europe's survival because of 'continued mass immigration and the high Muslim birthrate, coupled with our own suicidally low one'.130
Yet, in this regard, particularly since the last decade, the idea of an encroaching decadence, once viewed as fringe and 'marginal' has moved to the centre and is increasingly being adopted by conservative mainstream voices. Established scholars and many commentators, on both sides of the Atlantic, have in recent years written the script for the last days of Europe in which because of a demographic collapse, self-defeating multicultural policies and unfettered immigration, mostly from Muslim countries, Europe will undergo drastic changes that will transform it forever. Historian Bernard Lewis argued that because of Europe's unwillingness to battle for cultural and religious control, the only question remaining regarding its future would be, 'Will it be an Islamized Europe or Europeanized Islam?'131 Walter Laqueur delivered the 'epitaph for an old continent': Because of uncontrolled immigration, misguided multicultural policies that created parallel societies, aggravated by self-imposed ghettoization of Muslim immigrants and a severe demographic problem, Europe has reached the 'belated realization that the continent faced enormous problems with which it had not yet come to terms: that the issue at stake was not its emergence as the leading superpower but survival'.132 This theme of European decadence is also present in the work of Niall Ferguson who argues that due to demographic reasons Islam has a long-term advantage vis--vis Europe (and the West), 'a youthful society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is quietly colonizing, in the original sense of the word, a senescent and secularized continent to the north and west of it'.133 Significantly, the work of Edward Gibbon on The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) is often cited as an ominous warning to the ongoing 'decline and fall' of Europe and the West.134
Other conservative voices that are part of the public debate are more dramatic and envision a future of warfare for Europe, with widespread violence triggered by an 'indigenous backlash' against Muslims. 'It is difficult to imagine any other future scenario for Western Europe than its becoming Islamicized or having a civil war', wrote a commentator.135 Steyn thinks likely in Europe's future a scenario of 'War—the decline into bloody civil unrest that these economic and demographic factors will bring; and Conquest—the recolonization of Europe by Islam'.136 Ralph Peters has warned that 'far from enjoying the prospect of taking over Europe by having babies, Europe's Muslims are living on borrowed time … I have no difficulty imagining a scenario in which U.S. navy ships are at anchor and U.S. marines have gone ashore at Brest, Bremerhaven or Bari to guarantee the safe evacuation of Europe's Muslims'.137 This grim scenario for Muslims in Europe is shared by voices on the left, such as the New Statesman, which had a cover story on 'The Next Holocaust' (of Europe's Muslims), with the rhetorical question, 'Do new pogroms beckon?'138 In all fairness, these prophecies of doom are also countered in the public sphere by those who see the new Europe as more of a paradise than an inferno.139
The noteworthy adoption by the extreme right of issues that have a relatively large consensus in the West (women's emancipation, for example), and the cultural shift of mainstream policies toward immigrants and newcomers lend tentative support to the hypothesis that the boundaries between extreme and reasonable or sound discourse have become increasingly indistinct. Matters are further complicated both because the extreme right uses Christianity as a sort of ideological shield, and mainstream conservative voices are also disseminating the catastrophic theme of 'decline and fall' of European nations under dual immigrant and demographic pressures.
Conclusion
In an attempt to anticipate what the future holds, Peter Jay and Michael Stewart wrote in 1987 of a post-millennium scenario in which the cross-national Europe First Movement, longing for a inward-looking Europe free of 'alien influences and undesirable immigrants', and proposing European-wide solutions, inter alia, to the erosion of European civilization and values, was able to supersede parochial nationalist parties and, in a period of economic breakdown, get hold by democratic means of the European Parliament and change in a isolationist, repressive, and exclusionist direction the European destiny.140 In this 'forecast' the issue of Islam was absent but, nevertheless, there are ongoing and systemic trends on the European ground that, if they do not confirm the 'apocalypse' pictured by the authors, give a fair amount of credibility to scenarios in which extremist European-wide groups claiming to be the last hope of a doomed culture and declining civilization could emerge and become a significant force. Across Europe, though recognizing the unevenness of the process, we are witnessing in different movements on the extreme-right the increase in post-national dynamics, the beckoning of an assertive Christian identity, the shedding of anti-Semitic origins, and the growing respectability of some of its positions in the public debate about the role of Islam in Europe. The aim of this article, obviously, is not to make sweeping claims but rather to reflect on the changes (and their significance) that have been occurring in the worldview of the extreme right, emanating in large part from the omnipresence of the theme of Islam, that point to new directions and, at the same time, pose new challenges to established consensus, both in academia and society in general.
Notes
1. UN (United Nations), 'Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding', Seminar held in New York, December 2004. http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/webArticles/112204_Conference.asp
2. IW (Islamophobia Watch), 2005. http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/about-us/
3. EUMC (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia) 'Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia', December 2006. http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN.pdf
4. EC, 'Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 Establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia', 1997. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/arcg/1035_97_en.pdf
5. See R. Eatwell, 'Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge', in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (Eds), Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (London: Routledge, 2004) pp. 1-16.
6. J.-Y. Camus, 'Le nouvel ennemi: le monde arabo-musulman ou l'Islam', Le Monde, January 23, 2005.
7. J.-Y. Camus, Jean-Yves, 'Interview', Council of Europe, March 17, 2005.
8. 'Le reveil de L'ISLAM', Identit: revue d'tudes nationales, No. 6, March-April 1990.
9. See C. Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 103 and 173.
10. See P. Davies and D. Lynch, The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 162; also, P. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 106.
11. M. Cox and P. Shearman. 'After the Fall: Nationalist Extremism in Post-communist Russia', in P. Hainsworth (Ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter, 2000), p. 232.
12. On this discussion see Ignazi, op. cit., Ref. 10, pp. 8-10.
13. C. Coon, 'Islamophobia', The Humanist, 66(3) (May-June 2006), pp. 4-5.
14. EUMC, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 61.
15. J. Csari, 'Introduction: Use of the Term “Islamophobia” in European Societies', in J. Csari (Ed.), Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11, Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security: 6th PCRD of European Commission (2006), p. 8.
16. See 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All', Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (London: The Runnymede Trust, 1997).
17. See for example, C. Allen, The 'First' Decade of Islamophobia: 10 Years of the Runnymede Trust Report 'Islamophobia': A Challenge for Us All (2007), p. 26. http://www.chris-allen.co.uk
18. Csari, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 8.
19. V. Geisser, La Nouvelle Islamophobie (Paris: ditions La Dcouverte, 2003), pp. 21-22.
20. M. Maussen, 'Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Mobilization in The Netherlands. Discourse, Policies and Violence', Csari, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 101.
21. J. Bowen, 'Commentary on Bunzl', American Ethnologist, 32(4) (2005), p. 524.
22. C. Mouffe, 'The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism', in F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), p. 59.
23. On this point see, for example, Mouffe, 'The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism', in F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), p. 59; W. Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 171-172.
24. See Maussen, op. cit., Ref. 20, pp. 102-103; Y. Karakasoglu, 'Anti-Islamic Discourses in Europe: Agents and Contents', paper presented at the conference Muslims in Europe and in the United States: A Transatlantic Comparison, CES Harvard, December 15-16, 2006.
25. H. Cleveland and M. Luyckx, 'Civilizations and Governance', Working Paper for the Seminar on Governance and Civilizations, Brussels, May 14-16, 1998, p. 22.
26. On this issue see also C. S. Liang, 'Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right', in C. S. Liang (Ed.), Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007) pp. 20-23.
27. J.-M. Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 'Discours de clture du XIIIe Congrs du Front National', November 18, 2007. http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter = 92
28. La Stampa, February 7, 2000.
29. See for example R. Guolo, 'I Nuovi Crociati: La Lega e L'Islam', Il Mulino, No. 391 (September/October 2000), pp. 890-901.
30. See C. Saint-Blancat and O. Schmidt di Friedberg, 'Why are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(6) (2005), pp. 1083-1104.
31. AGI (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia), October 2, 2006.
32. 'Rimossa la raffigurazione della bataglia di Lepanto a Montecitorio', La Padania, March 25, 2007.
33. 'Chiudamo le porte di casa nostra a chi arriva dai paesi musulmani', La Padania, September 19, 2006.
34. 'Chiudamo le porte di casa nostra a chi arriva dai paesi musulmani', La Padania, September 19, 2006
35. N. Griffin, 'The European Intifada—Rising to Meet the Great Challenge of Our Age', November 21, 2005. http://www.bnp.org.uk
36. 'Together We Can Stop the Mega-Mosque', March 27, 2007 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
37. 'St. George is for Life', July 4, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
38. 'Muslims Fail Sensitivity Test Once Again', September 15, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
39. 'Islamic takeover of Europe getting very nasty', November 2, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
40. 'Christian adviser Appointed to Mosque—Muslims Welcome Move', March 30, 2007 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
41. 'Mission Statement', Christian Council of Britain. 2007. The party has been accused by theologians and religious groups of using Christian themes in order to advance its political agenda. See, for example, 'BNP exploit racist fears and “Christian country” claims', Ekklesia, April 19, 2006.
42. The Voice of Freedom: The Newspaper of the British National Party, No. 93, March 2008.
43. T. Heydon, 'The Defense of Christian Civilisation', Identity: Magazine of the British National Party, February 2008.
44. 'New Far-Right Group Launches Its Mission to Defend European Identity', The Daily Telegraph, January 16, 2007.
45. 'Islamophobia Colors Austria Electioneering', IOL (IslamOnline.net). September 14, 2006.
46. Filip Dewinter, E-mail Interview. November 14, 2006.
47. R. Shorto, 'Keeping the Faith', The New York Times Magazine, April 8, 2007.
48. Benedict XVI, 'Address Of His Holiness Benedict XVI To The Participants In The Convention Organized By The Commission Of The Bishops', Conferences if The European Community (Comece)', March 24, 2007. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2007/march/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20070324_comece_en.html
49. Already in 1999, a Catholic bishop warned against the creation of mosques and cultural centres in Christian countries, proof of a 'clear program of expansion and reconquest'. See G. G. Bernardini, 'Bishop: Islam Expanding Conquests', Associated Press, October 13, 1999. The authors of an article written in the Catholic journal Studium, one of them a Jesuit, write for example that 'The Islamization of the West is neither a phantasm nor merely something feared: it is an intention and a fact that emerges from an objective examination of the evidence'. See R. A. M. Bertacchini and P. Vanzan, 'La Questione Islamica', Studium (January-February 2006), Year 102, p. 37. Georg Gaenswein, Pope Benedict XVI's private secretary, argued in an interview that 'attempts to Islamize the West cannot be denied', and warned against the danger that Islam represents to the identity of Europe. See 'Pope's private secretary warns of Islamization of Europe', Jerusalem Post, July 26, 2007.
50. E. Kaufmann, 'Breeding for God', Prospect: Politics, Essays, Argument, Issue 128 (November 2006), p. 29.
51. See G. Hentges, '“Popular Potential”: The Extreme Right and Germany's Peace movement', in The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University (Ed.), Antisemitism Worldwide (Tel-Aviv, 2002/2003), pp. 55-74.
52. Mudde, op. cit., Ref. 9, p. 100.
53. The nationalist Sweden Democrats (SD) have also shown a similar strong pro-Israel stance. Party Secretary Bjrn Sder has declared that the Swedish government and the West should back Israel, 'the only democratic state' in the Middle East. See B. Sder, 'Sweden should take a stance for Israel', 2006. http://www.bjornsoder.net/artiklar.php?action = fullnews&showcomments = 1&id = 1097836687
54. Dewinter, op. cit., Ref. 46.
55. F. Dewinter, 'Guess Who's Coming to Seder. Dewinter's Tale', The New Republic: A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Issue 4, 801, Vol. 236 (January 22, 2007), p. 13.
56. F. Dewinter, 'Right-Wing Party Threatens to Abolish Belgium, by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard', The Daily Telegraph, May 17, 2003.
57. Dewinter, op. cit., Ref. 46.
58. Griffin, op. cit., Ref. 35.
59. N. Griffin, 'The British National Party Goes Straight: Interview by Robert Locke', Think-Israel, September-October 25, 2005.
60. L. Barnes, 'Nationalism and Israel', July 28, 2006. http://www.bnp.org.uk
61. M. Le Pen, 'Le Front national et le Mouvement pour la France de Philippe de Villiers courtisent la communaut juive, Auteur: Christiane Chombeau', Le Monde, March 3, 2006.
62. M. Le Pen, 'Sympathy for the Devil? By Nicholas Simon', The Jerusalem Report, January 10, 2005. On this issue see also C. Chombeau, Le Pen fille & pre (Paris: ditions du Panama, 2007), pp. 295-297.
63. Le Pen, op. cit., Ref. 61.
64. G. Faye, La Nouvelle Question Juive (Paris: Les Editions du Lore, 2007), pp. 240-244.
65. D. Boyer, 'Welcome to the New Europe', American Eth
...
In particular since the turn of the millennium, social scientists have identified anti-Muslim sentiment as a key feature of the European extreme-right. This article will discuss the history and validity of the term 'Islamophobia', and will probe into the development of the theme of 'Eurabia' in extreme-right wing ideology. The author will analyze the manner in which visions of a Muslim settlement and 'takeover' of Europe have the potential to create a cross-national reconfiguration of extreme-right ideology, a thematic shift, and a movement toward convergence between different sides of the ideological spectrum. The author argues that this ideology is not static, and that its potential new direction challenges significant assumptions of the current literature on the extreme-right.
Introduction
Islamophobia is a word that is practically ubiquitous in today's discourse on Islam. The situation of Muslim minorities in the West is frequently framed both by academics and by pundits in terms of the 'need' to combat the 'evils' of Islamophobia. The United Nations has organized seminars on 'Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding',1 and such websites as Islamophobia Watch were created to denounce 'opinion columns and news items that we believe advocate Islamophobia and those writers and organizations taking a stand against Islamophobia'.2 The Vienna-based European Union agency European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC—since March 2007 it became the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights—FRA), with a specific focus on Europe, released a much-publicized, cross-national report on 'discrimination and manifestations of Islamophobia' since 2001.3
Yet the widespread mention of Islamophobia is a recent development. The 1997 document that officially established the EUMC includes no reference to Islamophobia, but rather specifies the 'phenomena of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism'.4 Literature on the European extreme right has mirrored the increasing ubiquitousness of the term Islamophobia in the public sphere. Though there is an ongoing debate on the definition of 'extreme right' and its shortcomings,5 the consensus has been to ascribe the label to highly nationalist, anti-system, and exclusionary (often racist) parties. In this light, Jean-Yves Camus, for example, has pointed out the emergence in the extreme right imagination of Islam as the 'new enemy',6 and has noted that 'racist rhetoric today [has] an undeniable Islamophobic dimension'.7 In academia, however, Islamophobia was not until recently seen as a basic feature of the extreme right's ideological and value system. The term itself was absent in early literature. It is true that Islam has been a target of some extreme-right parties for a considerable time. For instance, Identit, a Front National (National Front) magazine, dedicated a 1990 issue to the 'awakening' of Islam, and stressed both its 'incompatibility' with European culture and that it constituted once again in history 'a danger for Europe'.8 The scholarly tendency, however, has been to consider 'Islamophobia' as primarily a dimension of xenophobia,9 and 'anti-Muslim' narratives as part of a broader anti-immigration outlook of extreme-right parties,10 or as a consequence of aggressive foreign policy visions in post-communist Russia.11
However, in the early 21st century, and particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the threat that the Crescent will rise over the continent and the spectre of a Muslim Europe have become basic ideological features and themes of the European extreme right. Thus, the concept of 'Islam' galvanizes group action: as the group rallies a 'defence' against Islamization, new issues emerge, existent issues heighten or decline in prominence, party objectives become reconsidered, and new alliances form against the 'threat' of this 'common enemy'.
I thus accept the premise that extreme right ideology is not static but, within some limits, evolves and is shaped by the surrounding environment.12 This study focuses on a variety of parties across Europe, from Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, and Italy. The reason behind the choice of parties with different electoral fortunes and each emerging from diverse national traditions is to show how, despite their differences, they display commonalities in their approach to Islam. Because this paper's goal is to capture the overall narrative towards Islam, a primary focus on the parties' literature (such as manifestos, press releases, official party publications, speeches) as well as interviews of leaders and members both to the media and to the author, seems appropriate. Additionally, secondary sources (from mainstream newspapers, websites and outside groups) that yield insight into the parties' worldview are also incorporated.
In the pages that follow, and in the light of the increased weight that the issue of Islam has gained, I will pose a number of key questions, seek to analyze ideological developments of the extreme right, and probe into the challenges that these potential shifts and re-alignments offer to the literature on the subject. Bearing in mind that each development by itself could form the basis for a new article and invite further scrutiny, this paper aims to provide an overview of trends that, in my view, open new avenues of research into the ideology of the extreme-right party family.
Islamophobia or anti-Islamic?
As a preliminary note, it is necessary to point out not only that the term 'Islamophobia' is present both in and outside academia, as I mentioned in the introduction, but also that there is a growing alarmism regarding the issue. This perception of imminent danger is epitomized by the following words of the vice president of the American Humanist Association: 'It's like the beginning of a thunderstorm; you can sense the electricity in the air. Islamophobia is raising its ugly head in the United States as in Europe … We are teetering on the brink of a kind of mass hysteria—Islamophobia—that can set us back a generation or more in our quest for a world at peace'.13 Yet this perceived 'hysteria' seems to be over a term about which there is a lack of agreement regarding its meaning or to what exactly it refers. The last European Union report on 'Discrimination and Islamophobia' specifically states that the definition, application, and use of the term 'remains a contested issue'.14 The introduction to a cross-national report on 'Secularization and Religious Divides in Europe' notes that 'we therefore intend to use the term “Islamophobia” as a starting point' of analysis, but 'will not take the term for granted'.15 Regardless of these caveats, the fact of the matter is that the term shows staying power and has increasingly become the norm in the discussion of the situation of Muslims in Europe. Thus, Islamophobia designates the stigmatization of all Muslims, and is defined as a widespread mindset and fear-laden discourse in which people make blanket judgments of Islam as the enemy, as the 'other', as a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that it is the natural subject of well-deserved hostility from Westerners.16
Owing to a 'failure' in explaining what Islamophobia is, there have been calls for a new definition of Islamophobia, either broader or more constrained than the current one.17 There are, however, important reasons to rethink such widespread use of the term. Several criticisms have been levelled against it, some more compelling than others. For instance, Csari has mentioned the fact that 'the term can be misleading' because it may subsume other forms of discrimination (such as racial or class) under religious discrimination.18 In my view there are two compelling reasons that the employment by social scientists of the term 'Islamophobia' should be restrained. The first stems from the term's indistinctiveness: It places under the broad umbrella of 'fear or hatred of Islam', discourses and criticisms that have different sources, motivations, and goals. Vincent Geisser, for example, accuses pundits and social scientists who criticize Islam in the name of liberal values, of being driven essentially by a 'fear' that manifests in symptoms of a somewhat undefined 'latent islamophobia'.19 Against this 'catch-all' dynamic, I adopt an approach similar to that of Marcel Maussen, who calls for an urgent need to distinguish between 'academic discussions on the relations between Islam and modernity, public discussions on whether Islam recognizes the principle of separation of church and state, public outcries about Islam as a “backward religion” or as a “violent religion”', and hate speech.20 Certainly a sizeable number of those who pose questions regarding Islam are not necessarily motivated by an illogical attitude, biased mindset, pure fear, or blind hate.
This aspect is linked with a second point of concern regarding the prevalent mention of 'Islamophobia'. John Bowen argues that the term is more polemical than it is analytical: It is 'far from neutral'.21 In this recognition, parallels can be established with the widespread use of the label 'xenophobia' that has long been attached to those who questioned the impact of immigration or the problems arising from specific models of integration (or lack thereof) of immigrants. This issue is connected with what Chantal Mouffe has described as one of the greatest flaws of contemporary European democracies: the imposition of a 'moral framework' on a number of issues, legitimating the reign of good, 'acceptable discourse' (and sometimes cordon sanitaires) over discourse deemed evil and out-of-bounds. There is, of course, no denial of the existence of 'extreme' positions or xenophobic attitudes, for example. Yet, in the wake of fairly recent developments in Europe, one is hard-pressed not to support her denunciation of 'the danger of using this category [extreme-right] to demonize all the parties who defend positions that are seen as a challenge to the well-meaning establishment'.22 The indiscriminate use of such labels as 'Islamophobia', that have an unmistakably moralistic dimension, has the potential to stigmatize generally and relegate to the 'Islamophobic' periphery of public debate, those who criticize or even attempt to understand, in a non-monolithic fashion, some aspects of Islam. The conflation (sometimes open, often implicit) of legitimate criticism or valid points of view with demonization, has the consequence of ending any sort of truly democratic and open debate on any sort of issue, silencing voices afraid of stigmatization, and in practice facilitating the emergence and actions of those who indeed demonize. This rings especially true in the light of increasing recognition, in academia for example, that there has been in recent decades a lack of public debate and interaction between those who govern and the governed, about crucial issues (like immigration), which has in turn increased the appeal of those parties that profess to represent the people and call for 'true' democracies.23 In this light, 'anti-Islamic' seems a more suitable analytical category to apply to some discourses on Islam, particularly those coming from the extreme-right, because it at least starts a necessary (and long overdue) process of distinguishing between discourses about Islam: those who show irrational fears and treat Islam as a monolithic bloc from those who may be critical of some aspects yet are not ipso facto 'anti' Islam because of their criticism.24
A greater focus on Christianity?
The authors of a 1998 research paper to the European Commission argued that it was no longer possible to discuss political futures 'without also discussing questions of meaning, spirituality, and cultural identity'.25 A decade later these words ring truer than ever, particularly in regard to the European 'political future'. One of the developments of notice in the last years has been the growing relevance of Christian motifs and themes in the narratives set forth by a substantial number of European extreme-right parties.26 The increased perception of Muslims, and Islam in general, as an ominous threat to the native communities is in no small part responsible for this evolution. In a few cases, such as that of the National Front, the attention paid to Christianity is an intensified continuation of a previous ideological stance. Thus, when Le Pen defends outlawing large mosques on the grounds that they constitute 'buildings of political-religious conquest' and 'threaten the Christian identity of our country', he is by and large reiterating a familiar theme.27
In some cases this 'turn to Christianity' has been novel and dramatic, and has implied a rejection of previous positions. This has been the case, for instance, with the Northern League. During an initial phase—which lasted until the late 1990s—the Catholic Church was defined as a natural enemy of the freedom of the North, because of the Church's 'collusion' with the oppressive centralist forces since the unification of the Italian state. The Vatican, and its ecclesiastical hierarchy in particular, were denounced as a reactionary force and enemy of Northern liberation. The outbreak of the Kosovo war (which the party saw as part of an American-led project to 'Islamicize' Europe), coupled with an increasing emphasis by the party on 'traditional' values and principles (as a response to the disruptive forces of liberalization and globalization), triggered a shift in its discourse toward a pro-Christian, pro-Vatican direction. Pope John Paul II went from being a 'Polish enemy' of the besieged community to, in the words of Umberto Bossi, 'a great [man] … the first [pope] for one hundred years who does not retreat in front of the Masonic and anti-Christian doctrines … the Church is starting to wake up'.28 Thus, the League led the opposition against the construction of Islamic places of worship,29 and increasingly stressed the 'millenarian struggle' between Christianity and Islam.
This anti-Islamic reorientation of the party received a major boost after the terrorist attacks of September 11. If the anti-Islamic focus had previously been fixed on the consequences for the indigenous community identity of Muslim settlement in Italy, 'Islam' soon became in the narrative of the party the synonym for terrorism, violence, and death. The party increased its activism on the ground against policies and practices that seemed to facilitate what the party called the 'Islamization' of the country.30 A European MP for the Northern League declared at a street protest against the burqa that 'Islam is a dangerous virus, and we must stop it from spreading, because Padania must remain Christian'.31 Historical battles are reinterpreted in the light of the steady influx of Muslim immigration to Europe. When the Italian parliament decided to remove a painting of the 1571 naval battle of Lepanto (in which the Ottoman fleet was defeated by Christian forces) from parliament Mario Borghezio, a top Northern League official, reacted angrily, saying that the decision 'was an attack against the Christian identity of the country [because Lepanto] signalled the victory of a Christian Europe against Muslim invasion'.32 In this new context it come as no surprise that the party daily was one of the strongest supporters of Pope Benedict XVI when he made comments about the constitutive role of violence in Islam that triggered worldwide Muslim protests.33 Northern League officials also praise Benedict for his focus on the need to 're-Christianize' Europe. 'We need to thank Ratzinger', declared one League member. 'Because of him the Church has remembered its origins [and] what the deep meaning of belonging to a Christian community is'.34
A similar emphasis on 'Christian roots' has become a feature of the discourse of the British National Party (BNP), particularly since 2001 and in reaction to the Islam-as-a-threat framing of the debate. Nick Griffin, leader of the BNP, has proclaimed the party to be the 'vanguard of the resistance to Islamification', which he deems to be 'the most pressing problem of the first half of our young century'.35 As in the case of the Italian Northern League, the BNP has actively opposed the construction of mosques, each of which it describes as a step toward the 'Islamic colonization' of the country (as, for example, the large mosque planned for the 2012 London Olympics).36 Even a symbol of traditional English nationalism such as Saint George has been described as a 'fiery and powerful symbol of opposition to Islam'.37 Further the BNP has defended Pope Benedict XVI, and praised his 'courage to speak against the perils of Islam',38 while heavily criticizing the Anglican Church of England for lacking the resolve to address 'the very real threat of Britain becoming an Islamic state in the next few decades'.39 In this context, in which the Church of England is accused of having resigned itself to irrelevance and extinction, with 'hand wringing ministers kneel[ing] before the advancing waves carrying aloft the mighty sword of Islam',40 it is no wonder that the party has been linked to the creation of a new Christian organization, the Christian Council, whose mission statement reads: 'At this time of moral crisis and faced with the very real prospect of the spiritual void being filled with dangerous creeds and cults, now more than ever, is a strong voice needed to reconnect the church with the lost congregations'.41 When the head of the Church of England noted that the incorporation of some aspects of Sharia law into the British legal system was 'unavoidable', the BNP reacted by stating that these declarations were part of a larger disposition of the Establishment toward 'betraying Britain's Christian heritage in order to appease Islam'.42 In the party's magazine Identity, a writer suggested that the BNP should commit itself to the defence of 'civilisational Christianity', because 'the alternative to a Christian Britain is chaos' and could lead inter alia to 'the surrender to the aggressiveness of a certain foreigner religion'.43
This renewed emphasis on the 'Christian identity' of the 'original communities', who are now endangered by the advance of Islam in Europe, can be seen across the spectrum of parties on the extreme right. The short-lived political group of the European Parliament, 'Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty' (ITS), a coalition of extreme right parties from six member states that lasted from January to November 2007, had as a founding principle the 'commitment to Christian values, heritage, culture'. Chairman Bruno Gollnisch stated that one of the goals of the group was to go beyond a narrow euroscepticism (limited to attacking a European superstate) that does not 'properly defend Christian values'.44 During the Austrian parliamentary elections of October 2006, the Freedom Party campaigned with a specifically anti-Islamic platform and released a political advertisement in which the cross atop Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna, the oldest church in the country, was replaced with an Islamic crescent. The caption read: 'This is the true hidden desire of Muslims'.45 Amidst warnings against the impending 'Islamization' of the country, the Flemish party Vlaams Belang proclaims to be the real guardian of Christianity. As stated by Filip Dewinter, 'In political disputes about abortion, euthanasia, same-sex-marriage, adoption for homosexual couples, family values, subsidies for Christian or Jewish schools, we have always defended the Christian viewpoint. On those topics, we were better Christians than the so-called Christian-Democrats'. He added, 'Many of us are not “believers” in the religious meaning of the word, but we share the moral values of Christianity. They are the foundation of European civilization'.46
This idea of an embattled 'Christian Europe' weakened by secularism and threatened with disappearance under the continuous migratory flow and settlement of Muslim populations, has found support in the warnings of Pope Benedict XVI against the spiritual void into which Europe fell due to the triumph of a Godless rationality that denies its peoples the role of faith and spiritual guidance.47 As the Pope declared in an address regarding the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Europe has 'an identity comprised of a set of universal values that Christianity helped forge, thus giving Christianity not only a historical but [also] a foundational role vis--vis Europe. These values, which make up the soul of the Continent, must remain in the Europe of the third millennium as a “ferment” of civilization'. If Europe stays the course of radical secularism, in a context of the steady decline of birth rates, it is 'following a path that could lead to its departure from history'.48 This theme of an impending collapse of a Christian Europe is not exclusive to the Catholic hierarchy but also comes from Protestant environs. Although some of these voices specifically denounce the ongoing 'Islamization of Europe',49 the emerging consensus seems to focus on the need for a more assertive and aggressive defence of 'Christian' values that would bring about the 're-Christianization' of Europe. In this scenario it is not surprising that many nationalist parties find in the appeals of the Church, notably the Vatican, a confirmation of their own message and an ally in the need for urgent action against the decadence and the collapse of a Christian Europe that looms on the horizon. Eric Kaufmann has written that the growth of a European Islam may lead to an indigenous nationalist response (in the form of stronger nationalist parties) or 'may lead to a renewed emphasis on Christian identity'.50 Those variables, however, are not necessarily opposed and need not to exclude each other. The latest developments in European nationalist groups indicate that, particularly in opposition to visions of a Muslim takeover, a more Christian direction within these parties is already under way.
Toward philo-Semitism?
While anti-Semitism has been absent from the narrative of some parties (the Northern League, for example), distrust of Jews—perceived as alien, rootless, and engaged in international conspiracies against the unity of the nation—has long been a trait of European extreme-right parties (for instance, the National Front in France). In more recent times, however, there has been a discursive shift in many of these parties to a decidedly pro-Jewish direction. This trend has been uneven, and some parties, like Germany's National Democratic Party (NPD), remain decidedly loyal to their anti-Semitic origins.51 A case in point is the Flemish Vlaams Belang that went from hardly taking any notice of Jews52 to—in an increasingly anti-Islamic context—the staunch support of Judaism and Zionism.53 Filip Dewinter has often professed his support of and admiration for Jews, both in Jewish and in mainstream media. He repeatedly mentions the 'Judeo-Christian',54 foundations of Europe and the West. 'Jewish values are European values', he stated in an interview, 'and Jewish civilization is one of the roots of Western civilization'.55 The party has vowed to defend the Jewish communities against attacks from Muslims, which Dewinter described as 'the first pogroms in Belgium since World War II'.56 Israel is also praised as a 'natural ally' of Europe because it is 'the only nation with freedom of speech, freedom of religion, rule of law [in the Middle East]. It's a paradox, but even the Arabs in Israel have more political rights and more freedom than their brothers in the Arab countries. Israel struggles for survival and security in a region that's ruled by bloody dictators'.57 An interesting case is the British National Party that has recently been trying to distance itself from anti-Semitism, one of the driving forces of the party since its origins. The party leader has criticized the rabid 'blame-the-Jew' mentality,58 and stated that for the BNP the idea 'that “the Jew is the enemy” is simply over for us now' because the party wants to 'get on with the real struggles'.59 The party has given space to voices that openly profess admiration for Israel. A BNP member announced that the party 'has moved on in recent years, casting off the leg-irons of conspiracy theories and the thinly veiled anti-Semitism which has held this party back for two decades'. Instead the party identified as 'the real enemies of the British people' two groups: 'home grown Anglo-Saxon Celtic liberal leftists' and 'the Crescent Horde, the endless wave of Islamists who are flocking to our shores to bring our island nations into the embrace of their barbaric desert religion'. Thus, the anti-Semitic 'lunatic fringe of the Nationalist movement' should be rejected and Israel's 'nationalist' stance praised. After all, 'the 21st century is the Islamic century. Unless we start to resist the threat of Islamic extremism then within 100 years the West will have become Eurabia'.60 In France Marine Le Pen, who vowed to 'de-demonize' the image of the party, has made overtures to the French Jewish community and, as a member of the European parliament, has registered with the Delegation for Relations with Israel. She was behind the decision to send National Front members to a demonstration in memory of a French Jew killed in a hate-crime, and told the media that she wanted to put an end to a 'number of misunderstandings' between the party and the Jewish community who, Marine Le Pen said, 'have nothing to fear from the National Front'.61 'The French community, who are increasingly victims of attacks by Islamic radicals', she said on one occasion, 'should be able to turn to us for support'.62 For this show of solidarity with Jews, more traditional voices close to the party have accused her of trying to create, together with the Flemish Vlaams Belang, an 'axis' of rapprochement with the Jewish community in order to confront Muslims.63 Guillaume Faye, one of France's New Right main theorists, advocates that those who defend European identity should get rid of an obsessive and 'chronic anti-Judaism' because the real danger is colonization from 'the third world and Islam'.64
Recently a few voices in academia have argued that 'Muslims' have replaced 'Jews' as the new transnational Other in exclusionary discourses in the European Union. 'Welcome to the new Europe, in which the Jews are no longer persecuted but revered as cosmopolitan ancestors', observed Dominic Boyer.65 For Matti Bunzl, the modern form of anti-Semitism has run its historical course and 'there simply is no debate on the legitimacy of the Jewish presence in Europe'. Whereas anti-Semitism is a thing of the past, 'designed to protect the purity of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is marshalled to safeguard the future of European civilization'.66 To other scholars anti-Semitism provides an accurate model regarding how Muslims are increasingly perceived as perpetual aliens to the indigenous culture.67 Some remarkable differences between the treatment and status of Jews in the past and the situation of Muslims in today's Europe should not be underestimated, however, and the fact remains that traditional anti-Semitism can resurge in other forms—in a ferocious form of anti-Zionism, for example—and can even manifest itself in anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by Muslim youths (visible during the second Palestinian Intifada 2000-2006).68 Yet, an increasing number of acknowledgments by some extreme-right parties of the Jewish contribution to European culture, and support of Israel, may serve as evidence that the traditional demonization of Jews is taking a backseat to a new, fierce stigmatization of Muslims in narratives of belonging and exclusion in Europe.
Beyond nationalism?
Nationalism has long been identified as a core, and perhaps as the most-important, feature of extreme right-wing parties.69 Further, these parties proudly declare themselves to be the only 'authentic' national forces of the country, and a majority of them feature variations of 'nation' in their own names. It has been observed that in some intellectual circles, such as those around the European New Right, nationalism was running out of fashion, replaced by an allegiance to a wider source of cultural identity, such as Europe. I believe that this development is not restricted to these rather small circles. I argue here that although conceding that nationalism may have more than one centre of control,70 the height to which the notions of 'Europe' and 'West' have reached in the narratives of the European extreme-right warrants a closer look at the hypothesis that the 'defence' of the original communities by these groups has been increasingly extended to a European level and does not limit itself to the borders or territories of the country. This trajectory can be seen across the spectrum of extreme-right parties and has become more intense in recent years. In some respect this post-national discourse, the greater focus on European and Western borders and traditions, complements the nationalist stance, but has also the potential to compete with it. The emphasis on a broader entity—Europe or the West—emanates both from the need collectively to defend indigenous Europeans from the 'New World Order' and its globalist ethos (which erases traditions and roots),71 and from fears of, and struggle against, Islamization.
A recurring theme of transformation of Europe into a new geo-political entity dominated by Muslims called Eurabia emerges in many of the discourses. The work of Jewish historian Bat Ye'or,72 is becoming a reference, and such concepts as Eurabia and Dhimmitude (referring to the subjected status of Christians and Jews under Islamic governance) have entered the vocabulary of the extreme-right (and, one might add, some sectors of the mainstream right as well). Asked to define his party, Flemish Party leader Filip Dewinter replied, 'We are the defenders of Western civilization, with its two pillars: Judeo-Christianity and the heritage of the ancient Greece'. Bat Ye'or is hailed as someone who was able both to unveil the 'shameful political shift' that led European elites and Arab leaders to concoct together the formation of Eurabia, and to point out 'how European politicians are kowtowing to Islam'. Bat Ye'or sheds light on dynamics that were previously in the dark. Dewinter explains it thus: 'I never understood how European politicians could be so short sighted. It seems so absurd. Again, Bat Ye'or explains how this fits into a larger pattern of creating a new political entity called Eurabia. It's not just weakness or ill judgement. It's part of a plan'. Dewinter adds, 'These Eurabian-minded politicians think they can consolidate their political power by making an alliance with the Muslim world. By selling out Europe to its worst enemies. They hope a strong Eurabia will be able to counterbalance the power of the United States'. This Eurabia path is thus leading Europe to a catastrophe: 'It puts at stake the physical survival of our European nations. We could go down the road of Lebanon'.73 The focus here is on the survival of Europe, and potentially the entire West, with the threat to the Flemish community as part of a broader Europe-wide struggle. The Eurabian narrative is also gaining strength in the discourse of the British National Party. When Italian journalist and polemicist Oriana Fallaci passed away, the party praised her as someone who 'defied the civilizational transformation of Europe into Eurabia'.74 According to Nick Griffin, the BNP leader, 'We are deeply concerned about the mainly—though not exclusively—French elite project to morph the EU, Turkey and the Mahgreb into “Eurabia”. Bat Ye'or is 100% right about this'.75 In an article about the November 2005 riots in France Griffin described his party as 'the vanguard' in the 'struggle between the West and Islam', for if the party fails in its mission, 'Europe will be no more, and our grandchildren will curse us in their dhimmi status as they pay endless tribute and suffer ceaseless oppression, injustice, humiliation and rape in the lands that once belonged to their free forebears'.76 As written by a BNP columnist, 'This is in fact the start of World War 4, with its roots in the victory of Charles Martel over Islam in the Battle of Tours in 732 AD. Islam is once again awakening, and the West must awaken as well'.77
The Northern League in Italy shares an analogous view regarding the need to defend Europe and the West in the face of the 'imperialist' designs of Islam. Northern League senior member Roberto Calderoli, decrying the West's abjuration of 'our Christian roots, identity and culture', argued in the party's newspaper for the launch of 'crusades of Western peoples, who still remember the battle of Lepanto', against Islam.78 When the Islamic threat—both in terms of 'colonization' and terrorism—is discussed in the party literature, it is typically framed as a danger not merely to the community but to the peoples of Europe and the West. The party claims to itself the role of supreme protector of the West against Islam; after all, 'We were the first to ring the alarm about the danger that Islam represents, about their inherent hostility toward the West'.79 'As preached by Oriana Fallaci', commented a party official, 'we need to show the pride of being Westerners, Christians and Padani'.80 Mogens Camre, member of the European Parliament with the Danish People's Party, also mentions the need to combat the 'real danger of an Islamization of Europe' as a top priority of its party. He explicitly frames the discourse in terms of a collective European identity, saying, 'We think the Muslim countries belong in the Middle Ages and we will not see our democratic countries being destroyed by people who think they should rule the world according to a book written in the Middle East in the 7th and 8th centuries'.81 Regarding the threat of 'Islamization', an Austrian Freedom Party official observes that there is a real 'threat regarding the cultural integrity of the European nations and peoples with its cultures and traditions … when Islamization threatens our laws, rules, habits and traditions it needs to be rolled back'. He added, 'Islamic countries must grant equal rights to Christians in their countries as Europe grants to Muslims who integrate into our society'.82 At the same time the new 'pan-European party' envisioned by four right-wing nationalist leaders (from Austria, France, Belgium, and Bulgaria) aims at rescuing Europe from the twin evils of 'globalization and Islamization'. 'Patriots of all the countries of Europe, unite!' exhorted the leader of Austria's Freedom Party at the conference where such plans were announced.83 At the heart of political parties commonly described as 'extreme-right', nationalism is still the dominant force. Yet it is difficult to deny the emergence—and the examples presented here reinforce this perception—of a growing turn toward post-nationalist dynamics and arguments in the discourse of many of such parties. It is as if there is a direct relationship between their concerns vis--vis an Islamic community or umma united by faith and mores, and the need of these parties to present themselves as representatives and first line of defence of a wider European (and Western) transnational community also bound by a common (Christian) faith and values. This dynamic emerges clearly in the way, for example, that a potential (and increasingly unlikely) EU membership of Turkey is depicted by the European extreme-right. Many anti-Turkey membership propaganda materials, from a different number of parties, portray a threatening Crescent over the map of Europe with the headline, 'Turkey No!' One of the ways that, in the last general elections, the Austrian Freedom Party promoted its anti-system image was to state repeatedly that, unlike mainstream parties, it rejected Turkey's membership in the EU.84 The alternative 'European project' promoted by leader of the French National Front Jean-Marie Le Pen, is based on a 'coherent group of peoples belonging to a Christian civilization [and] sharing a common culture',85 which effectively excludes any Muslim countries (like Turkey). Raising the spectre of a 'true Islamic invasion of Europe' in the eventuality of Turkey's membership in the European Union, the Northern League has been continually campaigning for a popular referendum that 'will allow all citizens to have their say on a historical issue that will seal the destiny of our peoples'.86 It has been argued that the debate on Turkish membership transformed Turkey into the '“other” for self-definition of what it was to be defined as a European'.87 More to the point, Casanova wrote that after 30 years of immigration from territories outside of Europe, the Turkish question is part of a broader issue in which 'Islam' is identified as the 'utterly other'. Yet, the rejection of Islam by European extreme-right parties is dismissed by the same author as merely 'nativist' and 'nationalist'.88 As I have attempted to show in this section, a third 'Europeanist' dimension could be added, regardless of how different this 'Europe' is from the one currently promoted by Brussels. An increased 'European identity'—going beyond a mere attachment to the original homelands—in these parties is certainly associated with the prominent role that Islam plays as the 'other' in contemporary discourses about 'what it means' to be an European in the 21st century.89
From the periphery to the centre?
The question of the adoption by the mainstream right of themes and issues previously 'owned' by extreme-right parties (such as those dealing with law and order or immigration, for instance) has been addressed with some regularity by the literature on the extreme right.90 Hainsworth has edited a volume on these parties, containing the telling subtitle 'From the Margins to the Mainstream', in which he concludes by stating that 'in a variety of situations, they have influenced the agendas, policies and discourses of major political parties and governments'.91 In this section I will address the ways in which the increasing importance of the issue of 'Islam' has led to a de facto mainstreaming of opinions and policies previously deemed too 'extreme' and relegated to the periphery of the political spectrum by centrist parties.
But before illustrating and discussing this point, I will focus on another crucial consequence that this emphasis on Islam has had for the extreme right. In fact, recent years have witnessed a growing assimilation by these parties of a number of issues that are 'respectable', that are morally compelling for a substantial majority of public opinion and rooted in relatively consensual attitudes and inclinations. In short, the extreme right has co-opted issues that a large number of mainstream politicians, both on the mainstream Right and Left, find hard to disagree with, if not fully support. This development has rendered the distinction between what is 'mainstream' and what should be categorized as 'extreme' difficult and, at times, hopelessly muddied. For example, the situation of women in Muslim communities—and the issue of women's rights in general—illustrate this point well. When the situation of women in Islam is discussed, the European extreme right puts forward arguments that, in a not-so-distant past, were considered to be positions exclusive to progressive and feminist groups in the West. The extreme right has been visibly active in its rejection of several cultural practices associated with Islam—ranging from the use of the headscarf and forced marriages, to honour-killings and female genital mutilation—by using arguments similar to those employed by mainstream groups that denounce inequalities and discrimination against women. This development can be seen across the continent. Danish People's Party MEP Mogens Camre stated that 'headscarves and burkhas are a discrimination of women. The real effect is to keep women apart from society and prevent them from obtaining freedom and equality. No society can develop without equality and freedom for women'.92 One of the most popular books in Denmark, Islamists and Naivists, was co-written by two figures of the country's political mainstream (both Social Democrats, one a feminist) and denounces the 'totalitarian' impulses of Islam and its claim to control every single aspect of the lives of its adherents, and especially of women. As one of the writers observed, 'If a woman doesn't wear a headscarf, the Islamists will exert maximum pressure and use the threat of violence to make sure that she does. It is that zealous attempt to apply Islamist principles that is as authoritarian as Nazism or communism'.93
In recent years the theme of 'oppression of women' under Islam has become a major theme of the literature of the Italian Northern League. According to League writers, the condition of Muslim women is a tell-tale sign of Islam's 'backwardness', and is incompatible with the mores of a superior Western civilization that strives for gender equality. A party MP commented that the Western way of life 'is based on civilized [notions of] democracy and respect for others … rooted in the DNA of each citizen', while Islam's way of life 'is based on uncivilized traditions such as sharia, the death penalty, lex talionis … infibulation, polygamy, the idea that inside families men are superior to women. These are all uncivilized traditions'.94 When the Italian parliament refused to decide on a motion submitted by the Northern League coalition regarding 'violations against women's freedom in the name of religion', a party MP showed her outrage by declaring that 'in order to not offend Islamic susceptibilities', the parliament decided to ignore the fact that 'that in our country there are women and girls who are “slaves” or subjected to personal restrictions or forced [to accept] polygamy in the name of a religious faith that does not recognize the principle of equality between men and women'.95 The British National Party has also intervened in favour of women's rights, specifically in the context of media reports about the establishment of Sharia courts and a two-tier legal system in Britain.96 The BNP accused the media, and particularly the BBC, of ignorance about 'the abuse women and minorities suffer under Sharia laws the world over'. It continued: 'Women are beaten, raped, murdered, mutilated and oppressed by Muslim “culture” and English law should never turn its back on these vulnerable members of their society'. Like the Northern League, the BNP stresses gender equality in their denunciations of Islam. The party warns that the government's failure to stop Islamic law from taking hold, 'would be a travesty and a direct refutation of western morals that posit that all people are created equal and stand the same in the eyes of the law'.97
The debate about the use of the headscarf in French public schools provides an example of an issue that conflates the questions of separation of Church and State and of gender equality, and has mobilized on the same front different forces of the political spectrum from the extreme right to feminists and progressives. For example, one of the strongest supporters of banning the hijab was a prominent feminist, Elisabeth Badinter, who denounced the scarf as the 'oppression of a sex' and at odds with the Western tradition of women's emancipation.98 A Socialist and former president of SOS Racisme defended a left-wing policy of immigration quotas, and of setting as a precondition for potential immigrants the respect for both 'lacit [secularism] and gender equality'.99 One should not be surprised, then, that Le Pen repeatedly raised in his speeches the need to enforce the principle of separation of Church and State while decrying the measures taken by the French government,100 to 'institutionalize' Islam in the country. These efforts, Le Pen said, marked the end of the principle of lacit and the first stage of the official financing of Islam in France under the pressure of its burgeoning 'migrant and demographic force'.101 The necessity of maintaining religious and cultural neutrality in public schools has also been invoked by the Freedom Party in Austria as a reason to ban the use of the headscarves by both teachers and students.102 Denmark's People's Party was behind a proposal to ban 'culturally specific' headgear, except for those cultural manifestations that reflected a Christian-Jewish background.103 On this issue the Italian Northern League leads the fight against any attempt to remove Christian symbols from schools, and has even argued that in order to prevent a Muslim 'takeover' of public institutions, the Italian Constitution should explicitly strengthen the 'Christian identity' of the country.104
The increased political focus on Islam has also made a fierce opposition to the ritual slaughter of animals—particularly the production of halal meat, the only one permissible according to Sharia law—a major theme of extreme-right narratives. In this opposition these movements have often joined animal rights groups in protesting against halal food on the basis that it promotes an inhumane and barbaric method of slaughter. The British National Party has been active on this front, and even broke the news story that halal meat was served in many schools across the country because of an increasing number of Muslim students. The party quoted from a report by an animal rights group arguing that the practice caused considerable animal suffering. A BNP official added that 'we really don't like the way these animals are killed'.105 The party affirmed not only that 'this is an issue of animal welfare', but that 'parents have a right to know if their sons and daughters are unknowingly being fed on ritually slaughtered meat'.106 The Danish People's Party has launched a campaign to ban halal slaughter because 'consideration of religious minorities should not be prioritized over consideration of animals'.107 Similar accusations of cruelty to animals and calls by both the extreme right and animal welfare organizations to ban ritual slaughter have been reported in Austria,108 France,109 and Italy.110
At the same time, in no small part because of the pressure the 'Islamic question' places on contemporary European societies, 'governing parties' and politicians have shifted public policies and discourses toward positions that previous observers in academia have dismissed as extreme and exclusionary. A case in point is the growing relevance that cultural norms and values play in discussions of immigration, national identities, and national belongings across Europe. For the last 20 years, scholars have argued that contemporary extreme-right parties no longer held 'classic' racist positions in their discriminatory and exclusionist positions vis--vis other individuals and communities. Pierre-Andr Taguieff describes this transformation from 'biological racism' (based on inequality and hierarchy of races) to a new, 'differentialist' form of racism in which exclusion was based on cultural differences. This new cultural racism advocates the 'right to difference' in which different cultures, viewed as incommensurable 'totalities', needed to be preserved and separated in order not to corrupt the 'authenticity' and 'integrity' of each culture. Such a perspective views culturally distinct groups as aliens whose absorption into the prevalent culture provides mainstream society with a fruitless and potentially disastrous task.111 This distinction introduced by Taguieff, since its first formulation, has been widely used in the study of the extreme right in Europe and beyond Europe.112 Stolcke, in a similar manner, added the notion of 'cultural fundamentalism' to the debate over anti-immigrant and racist groups. This form of exclusion was thus based on the assumption that cultures are incommensurable, with the caveat that, contrasting with racist theories, cultural fundamentalism 'has a certain openness which leaves room for requiring immigrants, if they wish to live in our midst, to assimilate culturally'.113
Yet, as we progress toward the end of the first decade of the new century, even a detached observer cannot fail to notice that a great cultural revival has been taking hold of mainstream European politics. Though an emphasis on cultural aspects has of course existed before (see for example Germany's long-term reluctance to give citizenship to gastarbeiter, many of whom are Muslim Turks), particularly since the late nineties, the emphasis on culture in regard to immigration, both in mainstream discourse and policies, has become conspicuous. In a 1997 article, political scientist Giovanni Sartori warned about the challenges posed to pluralistic European communities by massive immigration, particularly that from Islamic countries. Referring to the danger that 'cultural strangers' represented, Sartori wrote that 'strangers who are unwilling to give in exchange for what they get, who wish to remain “alien” to the point of challenging the very laws of the land that hosts them, are bound to elicit fear, rejection, and hostility'.114 These arguments have been reinforced after the terrorist attacks of Muslim extremists both in America and Europe. Models of immigrant integration—from the multicultural (as in Britain or the Netherlands) to those focused on assimilation (as with the case of France)—have been questioned and revamped due to the unavoidable reality of the increased growth of separated communities that do not engage with and many times refuse, if are not downright hostile to, the norms and values of the broader society. The growing awareness of the danger that Islamic extremism represents for Europe's civil societies created a political need for intervention, for the sake of national security. Thus, underlying this cultural revival are not only worries about Europe's cultural demise but, importantly, an urgent need to address the real issue of radical Islamist activity on European soil. This is the starting point from which a wave of new policies toward immigrants and newcomers have sprung to life across Europe, and not only has urged the need for but has often imposed as a condition for entering or remaining within the country 'integration' and acceptance of 'indigenous' norms and values. These policies are intimately linked with a more pronounced emphasis on 'national' identity and values to which immigrants must demonstrate allegiance. This urged reassertion of national identity and liberal values not only emerges from conservatives,115 but cuts across the ideological spectrum. David Goodhart, a progressive, argues that the left must discard 'the fallacy that nationalism and national feeling is only and necessarily a belligerent and xenophobic force'.116
In this sense, it is true that civic integration policies have acquired an obligatory (and coercive) character.117 The Netherlands set the pace in revising an existent integration law and warning newcomers to 'be aware of Dutch values and keep the country's norms'. Immigrants are now required to pass an immigration test that includes a DVD showing gay and topless women.118 Such citizenship tests, for a long time unknown in Europe, are becoming the norm. In Denmark, the ministry of integration website instructs potential citizens 'to work, pay tax, don't hit your children, and show respect for equal rights between sexes'.119 Britain introduced an American-style citizenship ceremony, and has launched citizenship tests. These measures were preceded by a vigorous debate in which mainstream politicians, both from the left and the right, argued for a more active assertion of 'core' national values. Former Home Secretary David Blunkett vowed to 'protect the rights and duties of all citizens and confront practices and beliefs that hold them back, particularly women. The left has to be consistent about defending core values, rather than retreating into moral relativism when its commitments are tested'.120 In an op-ed piece David Davis, the shadow home secretary (from 2003 to June 2008), asked, 'Are we going to find the compromises to preserve the freedoms, the tolerance, the give-and-take, that characterize the most open, vital and creative society in history? Or are we going to allow the splintering of loyalties, the division of communities, that will corrode the foundations of that society?'121 There has been a growing public discussion about practices that are not part of British culture, for example forced marriages (particularly Muslim first-cousin marriages), and a cabinet minister warned about the 'genetic' dangers associated with inbreeding.122
France, under the initiative of then Interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, adopted an obligatory 'social integration contract' (targeted at combating ethnic endogamy) for all new entrants. Further, before applying for permanent residence, immigrants to France must prove that they are 'well-integrated' into French society, meaning, among other things, that the applicant complies with the principles of the French Republic.123 As a sign that the times—and the boundaries of what is acceptable to propose—have indeed changed regarding integration policies for immigrants in Europe, Sarkozy vowed during the presidential campaign to create a Ministry for Immigration and National Identity, which led Jean-Marie Le Pen to accuse him of 'soliciting' in the National Front's territory.124 The first bill presented by the new Ministry targeted foreigners who wanted to join their families, and introduced tests to ascertain would-be immigrants' knowledge of French language, history, and 'Republican values'.125
Taken as a whole these examples, which are far from exhaustive, illustrate how in recent years there has been a clear shift in the discourse and policies regarding immigration. This shift has been driven by the relevance that the frame Islam-as-a-threat- to-European-security-and-values has gained in public opinion. Further, the discussion and the launch of new models of integration of immigrants has been linked with cultural narratives (a fact that is not often acknowledged and is sometimes denied by public officials), and the need for communities with cultural practices at odds with the indigenous majority to adjust and conform. There is an underlying cultural justification running through the new citizenship reforms and 'integration contracts' imposed on newcomers. In truth, the emphasis is on 'integration', and these new official measures reveal per se the belief in the possibility of integration of immigrants from different cultures, as with the case of Muslims. This optimism is close to non-existent in extreme-right narratives that promote instead the impossibility of such integration and the need for separation. Nevertheless, the trend toward cultural justifications in order to decide or determine a sense of belonging to the community—long considered a feature of the extreme-right—seems clear. This realization arguably raises the question of whether the concept 'extreme' is indeed malleable, varying according to circumstances and the politicians behind the discourses and-or policies. It depends on the messenger, not the message.126 With respect to this a note of caution is necessary. While mainstream discourse on Muslim immigration tends to be nuanced both in terms of the diagnosis and proposed solutions, the extreme-right view is framed both on an either-or scenario (assimilation or expulsion) and in an apocalyptic tone (the coming of Eurabia, the extinction of European peoples, etc.). Also, it could be argued that in championing Western and democratic values as a way of countering Islam, the extreme right is essentially striving for legitimacy by inoculating itself from accusations of racism and xenophobia, while pursuing in its ultimate quest for ethnic homogeneity.127 In any case, the extent or degree to which, particularly after September 11, 2001, the extreme right has influenced the establishment (mainstreaming of its positions) and/or was influenced by a favourable anti-Muslim environment (co-option of issues) certainly deserves further qualitative and quantitative investigation.
The 'spirit of decadence' goes mainstream?
Another point, however, merits reflection. Scholars, or even non-specialists, who have followed the extreme-right are aware that one of the driving forces of its ideology is the idea of decline, either of the nation or, increasingly, of Europe.128 In a context in which signs of irreversible 'decadence' are perceived to be everywhere, extreme-right leaders portray their groups as the 'last defenders' of their beleaguered communities, whose cultural identity, authenticity, and independence are threatened by national and global forces. The 'disappearance' or 'death' of the community is, in these narratives, a real possibility looming on the near horizon. The patriarch of the European extreme-right, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has repeatedly warned that France and Europe, due to massive immigration and demographic decline, were living on borrowed time. His daughter (and in line to become his successor at the head of the party) Marine Le Pen argues that 'if we go on like this, Europe will no longer be Europe, [but] will turn into an Islamic Republic'. Thus, she says, 'We are at a turning point, and if we don't protect our civilization it will disappear'.129 For the British National Party's leader, what is at stake is Europe's survival because of 'continued mass immigration and the high Muslim birthrate, coupled with our own suicidally low one'.130
Yet, in this regard, particularly since the last decade, the idea of an encroaching decadence, once viewed as fringe and 'marginal' has moved to the centre and is increasingly being adopted by conservative mainstream voices. Established scholars and many commentators, on both sides of the Atlantic, have in recent years written the script for the last days of Europe in which because of a demographic collapse, self-defeating multicultural policies and unfettered immigration, mostly from Muslim countries, Europe will undergo drastic changes that will transform it forever. Historian Bernard Lewis argued that because of Europe's unwillingness to battle for cultural and religious control, the only question remaining regarding its future would be, 'Will it be an Islamized Europe or Europeanized Islam?'131 Walter Laqueur delivered the 'epitaph for an old continent': Because of uncontrolled immigration, misguided multicultural policies that created parallel societies, aggravated by self-imposed ghettoization of Muslim immigrants and a severe demographic problem, Europe has reached the 'belated realization that the continent faced enormous problems with which it had not yet come to terms: that the issue at stake was not its emergence as the leading superpower but survival'.132 This theme of European decadence is also present in the work of Niall Ferguson who argues that due to demographic reasons Islam has a long-term advantage vis--vis Europe (and the West), 'a youthful society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is quietly colonizing, in the original sense of the word, a senescent and secularized continent to the north and west of it'.133 Significantly, the work of Edward Gibbon on The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) is often cited as an ominous warning to the ongoing 'decline and fall' of Europe and the West.134
Other conservative voices that are part of the public debate are more dramatic and envision a future of warfare for Europe, with widespread violence triggered by an 'indigenous backlash' against Muslims. 'It is difficult to imagine any other future scenario for Western Europe than its becoming Islamicized or having a civil war', wrote a commentator.135 Steyn thinks likely in Europe's future a scenario of 'War—the decline into bloody civil unrest that these economic and demographic factors will bring; and Conquest—the recolonization of Europe by Islam'.136 Ralph Peters has warned that 'far from enjoying the prospect of taking over Europe by having babies, Europe's Muslims are living on borrowed time … I have no difficulty imagining a scenario in which U.S. navy ships are at anchor and U.S. marines have gone ashore at Brest, Bremerhaven or Bari to guarantee the safe evacuation of Europe's Muslims'.137 This grim scenario for Muslims in Europe is shared by voices on the left, such as the New Statesman, which had a cover story on 'The Next Holocaust' (of Europe's Muslims), with the rhetorical question, 'Do new pogroms beckon?'138 In all fairness, these prophecies of doom are also countered in the public sphere by those who see the new Europe as more of a paradise than an inferno.139
The noteworthy adoption by the extreme right of issues that have a relatively large consensus in the West (women's emancipation, for example), and the cultural shift of mainstream policies toward immigrants and newcomers lend tentative support to the hypothesis that the boundaries between extreme and reasonable or sound discourse have become increasingly indistinct. Matters are further complicated both because the extreme right uses Christianity as a sort of ideological shield, and mainstream conservative voices are also disseminating the catastrophic theme of 'decline and fall' of European nations under dual immigrant and demographic pressures.
Conclusion
In an attempt to anticipate what the future holds, Peter Jay and Michael Stewart wrote in 1987 of a post-millennium scenario in which the cross-national Europe First Movement, longing for a inward-looking Europe free of 'alien influences and undesirable immigrants', and proposing European-wide solutions, inter alia, to the erosion of European civilization and values, was able to supersede parochial nationalist parties and, in a period of economic breakdown, get hold by democratic means of the European Parliament and change in a isolationist, repressive, and exclusionist direction the European destiny.140 In this 'forecast' the issue of Islam was absent but, nevertheless, there are ongoing and systemic trends on the European ground that, if they do not confirm the 'apocalypse' pictured by the authors, give a fair amount of credibility to scenarios in which extremist European-wide groups claiming to be the last hope of a doomed culture and declining civilization could emerge and become a significant force. Across Europe, though recognizing the unevenness of the process, we are witnessing in different movements on the extreme-right the increase in post-national dynamics, the beckoning of an assertive Christian identity, the shedding of anti-Semitic origins, and the growing respectability of some of its positions in the public debate about the role of Islam in Europe. The aim of this article, obviously, is not to make sweeping claims but rather to reflect on the changes (and their significance) that have been occurring in the worldview of the extreme right, emanating in large part from the omnipresence of the theme of Islam, that point to new directions and, at the same time, pose new challenges to established consensus, both in academia and society in general.
Notes
1. UN (United Nations), 'Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding', Seminar held in New York, December 2004. http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/webArticles/112204_Conference.asp
2. IW (Islamophobia Watch), 2005. http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/about-us/
3. EUMC (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia) 'Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia', December 2006. http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN.pdf
4. EC, 'Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 Establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia', 1997. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/arcg/1035_97_en.pdf
5. See R. Eatwell, 'Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge', in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (Eds), Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (London: Routledge, 2004) pp. 1-16.
6. J.-Y. Camus, 'Le nouvel ennemi: le monde arabo-musulman ou l'Islam', Le Monde, January 23, 2005.
7. J.-Y. Camus, Jean-Yves, 'Interview', Council of Europe, March 17, 2005.
8. 'Le reveil de L'ISLAM', Identit: revue d'tudes nationales, No. 6, March-April 1990.
9. See C. Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 103 and 173.
10. See P. Davies and D. Lynch, The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 162; also, P. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 106.
11. M. Cox and P. Shearman. 'After the Fall: Nationalist Extremism in Post-communist Russia', in P. Hainsworth (Ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter, 2000), p. 232.
12. On this discussion see Ignazi, op. cit., Ref. 10, pp. 8-10.
13. C. Coon, 'Islamophobia', The Humanist, 66(3) (May-June 2006), pp. 4-5.
14. EUMC, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 61.
15. J. Csari, 'Introduction: Use of the Term “Islamophobia” in European Societies', in J. Csari (Ed.), Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11, Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security: 6th PCRD of European Commission (2006), p. 8.
16. See 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All', Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (London: The Runnymede Trust, 1997).
17. See for example, C. Allen, The 'First' Decade of Islamophobia: 10 Years of the Runnymede Trust Report 'Islamophobia': A Challenge for Us All (2007), p. 26. http://www.chris-allen.co.uk
18. Csari, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 8.
19. V. Geisser, La Nouvelle Islamophobie (Paris: ditions La Dcouverte, 2003), pp. 21-22.
20. M. Maussen, 'Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Mobilization in The Netherlands. Discourse, Policies and Violence', Csari, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 101.
21. J. Bowen, 'Commentary on Bunzl', American Ethnologist, 32(4) (2005), p. 524.
22. C. Mouffe, 'The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism', in F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), p. 59.
23. On this point see, for example, Mouffe, 'The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism', in F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), p. 59; W. Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 171-172.
24. See Maussen, op. cit., Ref. 20, pp. 102-103; Y. Karakasoglu, 'Anti-Islamic Discourses in Europe: Agents and Contents', paper presented at the conference Muslims in Europe and in the United States: A Transatlantic Comparison, CES Harvard, December 15-16, 2006.
25. H. Cleveland and M. Luyckx, 'Civilizations and Governance', Working Paper for the Seminar on Governance and Civilizations, Brussels, May 14-16, 1998, p. 22.
26. On this issue see also C. S. Liang, 'Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right', in C. S. Liang (Ed.), Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007) pp. 20-23.
27. J.-M. Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 'Discours de clture du XIIIe Congrs du Front National', November 18, 2007. http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter = 92
28. La Stampa, February 7, 2000.
29. See for example R. Guolo, 'I Nuovi Crociati: La Lega e L'Islam', Il Mulino, No. 391 (September/October 2000), pp. 890-901.
30. See C. Saint-Blancat and O. Schmidt di Friedberg, 'Why are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(6) (2005), pp. 1083-1104.
31. AGI (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia), October 2, 2006.
32. 'Rimossa la raffigurazione della bataglia di Lepanto a Montecitorio', La Padania, March 25, 2007.
33. 'Chiudamo le porte di casa nostra a chi arriva dai paesi musulmani', La Padania, September 19, 2006.
34. 'Chiudamo le porte di casa nostra a chi arriva dai paesi musulmani', La Padania, September 19, 2006
35. N. Griffin, 'The European Intifada—Rising to Meet the Great Challenge of Our Age', November 21, 2005. http://www.bnp.org.uk
36. 'Together We Can Stop the Mega-Mosque', March 27, 2007 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
37. 'St. George is for Life', July 4, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
38. 'Muslims Fail Sensitivity Test Once Again', September 15, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
39. 'Islamic takeover of Europe getting very nasty', November 2, 2006 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
40. 'Christian adviser Appointed to Mosque—Muslims Welcome Move', March 30, 2007 (BNP, British National Party). http://www.bnp.org.uk
41. 'Mission Statement', Christian Council of Britain. 2007. The party has been accused by theologians and religious groups of using Christian themes in order to advance its political agenda. See, for example, 'BNP exploit racist fears and “Christian country” claims', Ekklesia, April 19, 2006.
42. The Voice of Freedom: The Newspaper of the British National Party, No. 93, March 2008.
43. T. Heydon, 'The Defense of Christian Civilisation', Identity: Magazine of the British National Party, February 2008.
44. 'New Far-Right Group Launches Its Mission to Defend European Identity', The Daily Telegraph, January 16, 2007.
45. 'Islamophobia Colors Austria Electioneering', IOL (IslamOnline.net). September 14, 2006.
46. Filip Dewinter, E-mail Interview. November 14, 2006.
47. R. Shorto, 'Keeping the Faith', The New York Times Magazine, April 8, 2007.
48. Benedict XVI, 'Address Of His Holiness Benedict XVI To The Participants In The Convention Organized By The Commission Of The Bishops', Conferences if The European Community (Comece)', March 24, 2007. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2007/march/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20070324_comece_en.html
49. Already in 1999, a Catholic bishop warned against the creation of mosques and cultural centres in Christian countries, proof of a 'clear program of expansion and reconquest'. See G. G. Bernardini, 'Bishop: Islam Expanding Conquests', Associated Press, October 13, 1999. The authors of an article written in the Catholic journal Studium, one of them a Jesuit, write for example that 'The Islamization of the West is neither a phantasm nor merely something feared: it is an intention and a fact that emerges from an objective examination of the evidence'. See R. A. M. Bertacchini and P. Vanzan, 'La Questione Islamica', Studium (January-February 2006), Year 102, p. 37. Georg Gaenswein, Pope Benedict XVI's private secretary, argued in an interview that 'attempts to Islamize the West cannot be denied', and warned against the danger that Islam represents to the identity of Europe. See 'Pope's private secretary warns of Islamization of Europe', Jerusalem Post, July 26, 2007.
50. E. Kaufmann, 'Breeding for God', Prospect: Politics, Essays, Argument, Issue 128 (November 2006), p. 29.
51. See G. Hentges, '“Popular Potential”: The Extreme Right and Germany's Peace movement', in The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University (Ed.), Antisemitism Worldwide (Tel-Aviv, 2002/2003), pp. 55-74.
52. Mudde, op. cit., Ref. 9, p. 100.
53. The nationalist Sweden Democrats (SD) have also shown a similar strong pro-Israel stance. Party Secretary Bjrn Sder has declared that the Swedish government and the West should back Israel, 'the only democratic state' in the Middle East. See B. Sder, 'Sweden should take a stance for Israel', 2006. http://www.bjornsoder.net/artiklar.php?action = fullnews&showcomments = 1&id = 1097836687
54. Dewinter, op. cit., Ref. 46.
55. F. Dewinter, 'Guess Who's Coming to Seder. Dewinter's Tale', The New Republic: A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Issue 4, 801, Vol. 236 (January 22, 2007), p. 13.
56. F. Dewinter, 'Right-Wing Party Threatens to Abolish Belgium, by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard', The Daily Telegraph, May 17, 2003.
57. Dewinter, op. cit., Ref. 46.
58. Griffin, op. cit., Ref. 35.
59. N. Griffin, 'The British National Party Goes Straight: Interview by Robert Locke', Think-Israel, September-October 25, 2005.
60. L. Barnes, 'Nationalism and Israel', July 28, 2006. http://www.bnp.org.uk
61. M. Le Pen, 'Le Front national et le Mouvement pour la France de Philippe de Villiers courtisent la communaut juive, Auteur: Christiane Chombeau', Le Monde, March 3, 2006.
62. M. Le Pen, 'Sympathy for the Devil? By Nicholas Simon', The Jerusalem Report, January 10, 2005. On this issue see also C. Chombeau, Le Pen fille & pre (Paris: ditions du Panama, 2007), pp. 295-297.
63. Le Pen, op. cit., Ref. 61.
64. G. Faye, La Nouvelle Question Juive (Paris: Les Editions du Lore, 2007), pp. 240-244.
65. D. Boyer, 'Welcome to the New Europe', American Eth
...
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)